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ABSTRACT
THE PARADOX OF NATURE: MERLEAU‐PONTY’S SEMI‐NATURALISTIC CRITIQUE
OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

Shazad Akhtar, B. A., M. A.
Marquette University, 2010
This dissertation deals with Merleau‐Ponty’s critical transformation of Husserl’s
phenomenology through a rethinking of the concept of “nature,” which Husserl,
Merleau‐Ponty argues, fails to integrate or explain successfully in his philosophical
system. The first chapter reconstructs Husserl’s “transcendental‐phenomenological”
project in Ideas I, while the second widens the investigation to cover the
ontologically‐centered Ideas II and III. In my third chapter, I chart what I call
Merleau‐Ponty’s “organic appropriation” of Husserl and the unique hermeneutical
challenges it poses. Here the ambiguity of Ideas II, which both grounds subjectivity
in the lived body and separates nature from “spirit” (Geist), plays a crucial role. The
fourth chapter concentrates on the Merleau‐Ponty’s later meditations on the
ontology of nature and subjectivity, particularly in his recently translated Nature
lectures of 1959‐61. Finally, the fifth chapter compares and contrasts Husserl and
Merleau‐Ponty, in terms of both substance and method, through a detailed
examination of their different notions of (and ways to address) “paradox.” I show
how Merleau‐Ponty’s “paradoxical” thinking stems not from chance or mere
temperament but a fundamental, systematic commitment to the self‐contradictory
(or “dialectical,” but in a modified sense) nature of being and truth themselves.
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Introduction

The central dynamic of this dissertation is the creative encounter between
Maurice Merleau‐Ponty (1908‐1961) and Edmund Husserl (1859‐1938), two of the
most important philosophers of the twentieth century. I explore this encounter—an
“encounter” between two philosophies as opposed to two philosophers, as the two
thinkers had never formally met and are separated by more than a generation—
with respect principally to the ontological issues surrounding the classical division
of “nature” and “spirit.” But in the case of phenomenology, ontological and
epistemological issues cannot be cleanly separated. Thus major questions of
epistemological significance, such as those of idealism and the nature of reflection,
are also addressed and related to the question of what it means to do
phenomenology—and even philosophy—itself. Phenomenology, ontology,
epistemology—all of these terms are negotiated and re‐negotiated in the course of
Merleau‐Ponty’s sustained hermeneutics of Husserl’s work, a hermeneutics that
opens up onto a hidden world of possibilities latent in the (ostensibly) simple
phenomena of sensing, seeing, speaking, and reflecting.
Merleau‐Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl has been commented on before.
However, one of the unique contributions of the present research, I believe, is its use
of the concept of “nature,” a fundamental concern of both thinkers but in very
different ways, to go to the heart of the questions of phenomenological method and
the relationship of human subjectivity to the world. This choice allows us to
appreciate the motivations of Merleau‐Ponty’s rethinking of phenomenology,
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putting aside its challenge to classical metaphysical binaries such as “human‐
animal” and “nature‐spirit,” in the context of a wider philosophical‐ontological
tradition (though still very much a “modern” one, for the most part). Merleau‐
Ponty’s critique of some elements of Husserlian philosophy clearly belongs to his
general critique of modernism and, in turn, blend harmoniously with his positive
appropriation of Husserlian phenomenology as a kind of unified‐field theory of
Being, once cleansed of its Cartesian presuppositions.1
In Husserl, “nature” appears primarily in three guises: as the “natural
attitude”; as the regional domain of the “natural sciences”; and as the ontic‐noematic
correlate of “spirit” in the realm of worldly (non‐transcendental) reality. For
Merleau‐Ponty, on the other hand, “nature” comes to emerge as a complex and
nuanced “otherness” at the heart of subjectivity, manifesting itself most directly in
the realm of “life,” especially animality, and yet also haunting consciousness, or
spirit, with its “presence by absence,” its impenetrable “origin”‐ality. It is, as
Schelling says, a “wild Being” untamed by thought, yet also untamable, for there
could be no thought without a horizon, and that horizonality is the depth that
cannot be known without my vanishing from the world altogether and somehow
“seeing it from above”—an impossibility even for a God, however, since, as both
Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty remind us, vision is a corporeal act.
In my interpretation, “Nature”—and then “Being,” and still again, the
“flesh”—come, in Merleau‐Ponty’s treatment, to quietly displace the “transcendental
ego” of Husserl, itself a hold‐over of the Cartesian‐epistemological prioritization of
1

It is in this light, too, that we can appreciate Merleau‐Ponty’s endorsement of the work of Leibniz,
Hegel, and Bergson, on the one hand, and his rejection of (much of) Kant and Sartre on the other.
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the “inner” over the “outer.” Nature is ambiguously both inner and outer—an
interiority qua exteriority, like the living organism, whose “outward behavior” can
only be understood as living‐out within the “internal” horizon of an Umwelt. The
organism, most evidently in the simpler (but not the very simplest) forms, like crabs
or worms, is radically self‐centered (“in its own world”) at the same time that it
lacks a center, an “ego” that can differentiate itself “absolutely” from a “world” apart
from its interiority. The animal is its world. The living being in its unity with its
world serves as a reminder of the pre‐reflective life of consciousness that
underlies—and challenges from within—the dualisms of reflective thought,
including that of the “natural” and “spiritual,” the central division of Husserl’s Ideas
II.2
While remaining a phenomenologist to the end, Merleau‐Ponty rejected both
Husserl’s “transcendental idealism”3 as well as the latter’s implicit (and ironical)
collusion with natural science over its definition of the “essence” of nature. It is not
only in response to Husserl or Ideas II, of course, that Merleau‐Ponty developed his
ideas of nature; after all, he had been at work on the ontological implications of
animality even before he became acquainted with Husserl’s works in a serious way,
starting with his first major work The Structure of Behavior (1942).4 Nonetheless, in
Ideas II he sees Husserl struggling with the consequences of dividing the world from
consciousness and nature and animality from spirit, and his articulation of an
2

Husserl, Edmund. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,
Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Trs. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989
3 It can be debated to what degree, of course; see Toadvine, Ted. “Leaving Husserl’s Cave? The
Philosopher’s Shadow Revisited.” In MerleauPonty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and
Lester Embree. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 (pp. 71‐94).
4 Merleau‐Ponty, The Structure of Behavior. Trans. A.L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963.
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alternative cannot be fully appreciated without this work as a hermeneutical
backdrop.
The remainder of this introduction offers an overview of the present status in
the relevant secondary literature of the theme(s) of this work, as well as a preview
of the contents of the dissertation chapter by chapter, culminating in a summary of
the conclusions I draw from all of the foregoing studies.

I. Present Status of the Problem

A. MerleauPonty’s Interpretation of Husserl and Husserl’s Conception of Nature
While there are a number of good articles on Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of
Husserl, several of which are collected in the 2002 essay collection entitled Merleau
Ponty’s Reading of Husserl,5 there is very little material written specifically on
Merleau‐Ponty’s critique of Husserl’s conception of nature,6 let alone a sustained
assessment of their respective philosophies through the lens of this idea. The dearth
of material on the question of nature is probably due to the fact that Merleau‐
5

MerleauPonty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree. Dodrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2002. Other good articles include those by Taylor Carman and Anthony
Steinbock for instance, which both compare Husserlian and Merleau‐Pontian phenomenologies of the
body, a major theme of Ideas II; Carman even explicitly discusses Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of Ideas II,
though only in passing. This material is, however, only partially relevant for our present purposes.
See: Carman, Taylor. “The Body in Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty.” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 27, No. 2,
Fall 1999 (pp. 205‐225); Steinbock, Anthony. “Saturated Intentionality.” In The Body. Ed. Donn
Welton, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999 (pp. 178‐199).
6
An exception is Stephen Crowell’s essay “The Mythical and the Meaningless: Husserl and the Two
Faces of Nature.” Printed in Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II. Eds. Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996. (pp. 81‐106) This essay also contains much
extraneous material, for our purposes, on the philosophy of mythology.
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Ponty’s most pointed criticisms on this issue are directly to be found in his lecture
courses on nature, which were however published only relatively recently.7 The
present dissertation closes some of this gap in the scholarship.
Much of the discussion of Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of and philosophical
relation to Husserl is polemical and in some ways parallel to the more standard
“Husserl versus Heidegger” debate. Taylor Carman expresses a characteristic “pro‐
Merleau‐Pontian” view:

“Unlike Husserl, but like Heidegger, Merleau‐Ponty looks beyond the subject‐object divide to try to
gain insight into the concrete structures of worldly experience… Indeed, taking the problem of
embodiment seriously, as Merleau‐Ponty does, entails a radical reassessment of the very conceptual
distinctions on which Husserl’s enterprise rests.”8

Carman further claims that going beyond Husserl “would mean relinquishing the
conceptual dualism on which [his] project rests.”9 Many Husserlians would dispute
this characterization of Husserl, though I personally believe it is largely accurate,10
though there are actually several “conceptual dualisms,” not just one, that must be
contended with and sorted through on their own terms, not all of which equate to a
“substance dualism” of a sort one finds in Descartes (and is at least outwardly
refuted in Husserl). I address this issue in Chapter 2.

7

Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France. Compiled and with notes
from Dominique Séglard. Trans. Robert Vallier. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois,
2003.
8
Carman, Taylor. “The Body in Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty.” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 27, No. 2, Fall
1999, p 206.
9
Ibid., p. 208
10
Françoise Dastur, a careful and relatively non‐polemical reader of both Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty,
agrees with the latter that Husserl is basically dualistic. See Dastur, Françoise. “Husserl and the
Problem of Dualism.” Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology: Man and Nature (Analecta
Husserliana, Vol. XVI), ed. Anna‐Teresa Tymieniecka. Dordrecht: Springer, 1983 (pp. 65‐77). Merleau‐
Ponty is routinely read as a zealous anti‐dualist, a claim I will partially challenge in chapters 4 and 5.
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Husserl has plenty of defenders, of course, some of whom, like Panos
Theodorou, take issue with the widespread reading of Ideas II that understands it as
validating, essentially, the natural‐scientific view of nature.11 J. Claude Evans agrees
that this reading is misleading, and goes even further, arguing for the superiority of
Husserl’s account of nature and science in Ideas II over his later reflections on the
life‐world, definitely a minority position for those concerned with this problem.12
Within Husserlian scholarship, at least as evidenced by MerleauPonty’s
Reading of Husserl, a chief question lies in just how far Merleau‐Ponty diverges from
Husserl. For diametrical positions on this question, see for example Seebohm’s and
Zahavi’s articles in said volume.13

B. MerleauPonty’s Later Ontology and Concept of Nature
In recent years there has been a spate of literature on Merleau‐Ponty’s later
philosophy and his general “ontology.” These include several book‐length
treatments, for example by Dillon (1998) and Barbaras (2004)14—two of the best
available—as well as many articles, interestingly largely in English. (Merleau‐Ponty
has proven to be popular in America especially, though one should not fail to

11

Theodorou, Panos. “Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl’s Analysis of “Nature‐Thing” in
Ideas II.” In The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy Volume 5, 2005.
Eds. Burt Hopkins and Steven Crowell, 165‐187. Seattle: Noesis Press, 2005.
12
Evans, J. Claude. “Where is the Life‐World?” Printed in Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II. Eds. Thomas
Nenon and Lester Embree. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
13
Seebohm, Thomas M. “The Phenomenological Movement: A Tradition without Method? Merleau‐
Ponty and Husserl.” In MerleauPonty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree.
Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 (pp. 51‐70); Zahavi, Dan. “Merleau‐Ponty on Husserl: A
Reappraisal.” In MerleauPonty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree. Dodrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 (pp. 3‐29).
14
Barbaras, Renaud. The Being of the Phenomenon. Trans. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004; Dillon, M.C. MerleauPonty’s Ontology. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1988
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mention that there is also a Japanese Merleau‐Ponty Circle). One of these articles, by
Geraets, deals with the theme of nature explicitly,15 while others deal more with “the
flesh” and other related topics from the later philosophy.16 A comprehensive
treatment of Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy of nature, one long overdue, has been
recently authored by Ted Toadvine.17

C. Ideas I and II
Regarding Husserl, there are innumerable works dealing with the central
concepts of transcendental idealism and with Ideas I18, as a text, in particular—
indeed, virtually every introductory text or statement on Husserl has to take this
seminal work into account. My reliance on secondary literature for the section on
Ideas I is minimal, however, for two reasons. First, I expound only the work’s most
basic themes—epoché and reduction, noesis and noema, the transcendental ego, etc.
Second, although these notions themselves are all controversial and contested
throughout the Husserl literature, my aim is not to give a definitive interpretation of
them, only to facilitate through my treatment of them a comprehensible discussion
of Merleau‐Ponty’s general appropriations and criticisms of Husserlian
phenomenology.
15

Geraets, Théodore F. “Merleau‐Ponty’s Conception of Nature.” In Soul and Body in Husserlian
Phenomenology: Man and Nature (Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XVI), ed. Anna‐Teresa Tymieniecka.
Dordrecht: Springer, 1983 (pp. 301‐312).
16
See for example Dastur, Françoise. “World, Flesh, Vision.” In Chiasms: MerleauPonty’s Notion of
Flesh. Eds. Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor. State University of New York Press. Albany: 2000 (pp. 23‐
50).
17
Toadvine, Ted. MerleauPonty’s Philosophy of Nature. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
2009
18
Husserl, Edmund. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,
First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. Trans. F. Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1983
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Work on Ideas II is far less extensive than that on Ideas I, but there has been
some noteworthy secondary scholarship in the last decade on Ideas II, some of it
included in the volume Issues in Ideas II19, which draws together a number of essays
on various aspects of the work. Other penetrating readings include those of
Rockstad20 and the already‐mentioned Evans and Theodorou. Ideas II has of course
been written about by major phenomenologists, including Ricoeur21, Landgrebe22,
and (obviously) Merleau‐Ponty himself. I have found that these, along obviously
with the primary text, are still the most valuable elements in Ideas II scholarship at
the present time.

II. Summary of the Dissertation

A. Chapters One and Two
In Chapters One and Two, I sketch a picture of Husserl of Ideas I and II, the
“idealist” Husserl who, in the latter of these two works, nevertheless lays the
foundations of most of what Merleau‐Ponty will forge into a new vision of
19

Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II, eds. Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1996.
20
Rokstad, Konrad. “The Historicity of Body and Soul.” In Phenomenology of Life  From the Animal
Soul to the Human Mind: Book I: In Search of Experience, ed. Anna‐Teresa Tymieniecka. (pp. 127‐159).
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007; also, Rokstad, Konrad. “Nature, Subjectivity and the Life‐
World.” In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol LXXVII, ed. Anna‐
Teresa Tymieniecka. (pp. 41‐59). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 2002.
21
Ricoeur, Paul. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology. Trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester
Embree. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967 (Third chapter: “Husserl’s Ideas II: Analyses
and Problems,” pp. 35‐81).
22
Landgrebe, Ludwig. The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Ed. Donn Welton. Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1981.

9
phenomenology and the nature‐spirit relation. As just alluded to, the first chapter is
a detailed overview of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology—the eidetic and
transcendental‐phenomenological reductions, the natural and transcendental
attitudes, noesis and noema, intentionality, the transcendental ego, constitution, and
the like.23 The purpose of this chapter is mostly expository (some interpretation is
involved, of course—as any genuine exposition in fact requires anyway); the
demands of explaining Husserl’s philosophical system, however, also happen to
make it the longest chapter in this work.
The second chapter is a detailed exposition and reading of Ideas II24, with a
focus on its onto‐phenomenological meditations on the realms of “material nature,”
“body and soul”, and “spirit,” along with the question of the enigmatic relation of
these “constituted realities” and the transcendental subjectivity (or simply
“consciousness”) of the transcendental reduction formally expounded in Ideas I.

23

A Note on the Choice of Text: Husserl was constantly in the process of reinventing himself; Ideas I is
only one of many possible “introductory” texts to use to present Husserl’s “transcendental” version of
phenomenology (Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis of the European Sciences come most quickly to
mind, but there has even been a book‐length introduction to Husserl, by Kockelmanns, based on his
Encyclopedia Britannica article on phenomenology—see: Kockelmanns, Joseph J. Edmund Husserl’s
Phenomenology. Indianapolis: Purdue University Press, 1994). Why choose Ideas I? Aside from the
reason that Ideas I and II belong together by their titles (Ideas II had been initially planned as a
sequel and further explication of the thesis maintained in Ideas I), it is also true that Ideas I is
sufficient to introduce most of the fundamental planks of Husserlian phenomenology. Whether or not
Husserl eventually, in the 1930s, shifted his basic position to a more “existential” and
“detranscendentalized” form of phenomenology, or whether the later “genetic” phenomenology is
not merely an extension of the phenomenology of the Ideas but rather a far‐reaching radical
rethinking of it, are questions I will not and need not deal with here. For it would suit my purposes if
the Husserl/s of Ideas I and II are regarded as just one (or two) of many actual or possible “Husserls,”
only because the points I will be trying to make are basically systematic ones, which the texts at hand
bring out sufficiently on their own.
24
Husserl, Edmund. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,
Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. The year of publication of the original German‐
language edition was 1952.
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In Ideas II, Husserl presents a picture of nature as a the lifeless, meaningless
(Sinnlos) substrate of reality, a bare “physical thinghood” that distinguishes itself
from life (soul, Seele), on the one hand, and mind (spirit, Geist), on the other. The
lived‐body, as presented by Husserl, is the “unity” of mind and matter, but,
importantly, it is distinguishable from the “pure” forms of either. What shields
Husserl from bald‐faced “Cartesian” dualism is his claim, announced already in Ideas
I, that pure or transcendental subjectivity—and here he follows (roughly) Kant,
whose “Copernican turn” he broadly endorses—cannot be reduced to “thinghood”
or “objectivity” of any kind. Pure subjectivity is more fundamental than any object,
since it is the very condition for the possibility of objectivity in the first place.
Husserl’s prioritization of transcendental subjectivity over empirical subjectivity
radicalizes this difference by placing empirical subjectivity so completely in the grip
of the “objective” and even “lifeless” world of “physical nature,” that we are forced to
see that subjectivity strictly (or purely) speaking cannot be of the world, literally.
This is not to say that it can exist without it, but it certainly can be conceived to do
so—as demonstrated in a famous, and, to some, infamous, passage in Ideas I that is
echoed in later writings as well. That Husserl was interested in making such an
underlying point is clear from Ideas II and its other, complementary arguments
against mind‐body reductionism in that text.25

25

For a good treatment of this, see Marcelle, Daniel. “The Ontological Priority of Spirit Over Nature:
Husserl’s Refutation of Psychophysical Parallelism in Ideas II.” In Philosophy Today, vol. 50 (suppl.),
2006 (pp. 75‐82). Whether consciously or not, Husserl presents a kind of “ontological gambit”
directed against the naturalistic or physicalistic philosopher. In this language, Merleau‐Ponty’s
concern might be that Husserl’s gambit fails, in the process conceding far too much to natural
science. According to this view, then, the transcendental ego, that is, is too thin a reed to put the
burden on, so that in the wake of the failure of transcendental phenomenology, there would be only
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Ideas II was unpublished in Husserl’s life‐time but read and studied closely
by Merleau‐Ponty, whose positive appropriation of that work lies mostly in the area
of the phenomenology of the body (the lived‐body, or Leib).26 Merleau‐Ponty’s
reservations regarding the work as a whole, however, and in particular on what he
regarded as its underlying conceptual confusions, were considerable. And the
question of nature—what it is, and how human beings are to be understood in
relation to it—occupied (as we have seen) great deal of Merleau‐Ponty’s mature
thought, whose general thrust goes against the grain of Husserl’s findings in Ideas II.
Husserl does not seem either to recognize the tensions in Ideas II as fundamental
ones or realize that nature poses a radical problem for the transcendental‐
phenomenological method itself. We might put it this way: whereas for Husserl
nature has to be explained in terms of its “constitution” in transcendental
consciousness, for Merleau‐Ponty, it is this very consciousness which would need
explaining, in light of its obvious origination in the primordial experiences of the
lived‐body, which is itself an emblem of nature.

B. Chapters Three and Four
Chapter Three addresses Merleau‐Ponty’s specific form of phenomenology in
relation to Husserl’s own. It essentially represents my take on the decades‐old
question of how best to understand Merleau‐Ponty’s often controversial reading of
Husserl. The issue is complex, but after thoroughly documenting Merleau‐Ponty’s
the naturalistic‐physicalistic option left, a disastrous option. Hence there is the need to rethink
phenomenology in a wholly new light (though still rooted in perception, as Husserl had it).
26
See for example Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. “The Philosopher and His Shadow.” In Signs. Trans.
Richard M. McCleary. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964
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re‐envisioning of classic phenomenological motifs such as the phenomenological
and eidetic reductions from the Phenomenology of Perception through The Visible
and the Invisible, I argue finally that the French philosopher’s manner of
appropriation of Husserl is persuasive but also, more interestingly, highly “organic.”
I use this term not only in the sense that it draws on Husserl in a natural manner, so
to speak, but more particularly in the sense that it embodies or instantiates
Merleau‐Ponty’s style of philosophy and even his own ontology. For example,
Merleau‐Ponty’s own notions of ambiguity, reflection, and paradox, among others,
actually prove to be the key to unlocking the secret of his Husserl‐reading. But this
also means that the extent to which one agrees with Merleau‐Ponty’s reading
correlates somewhat to the degree to which one accepts his overall philosophical
vision, something that may account for at least some of the dogged opposition to
him from certain members of the “strong Husserlian” camp, at least. (Merleau‐
Ponty’s reading of his own reading of Husserl—his view of the degree of his own
faithfulness or unfaithfulness to the source, for example—is also here largely
confirmed through the prism of his own dialectical views and hermeneutics.)
The fourth chapter plumbs Merleau‐Ponty’s writings, most particularly the
Nature lectures, to connect his reading of Husserl and “existentialization” of
phenomenology to his newly developing conceptions of nature and, accordingly, the
nature of humanity as well. The Nature lecture series is an excitingly detailed and
dense tract of original research and textual and scientific interpretation that
Merleau‐Ponty gave as the head of the Collège de France over a period of several
years, between 1958 and 1961, shortly before his untimely death. He delivered
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them at the same time he was composing his unfinished masterpiece The Visible and
the Invisible, also a text I will also heavily rely on in both Chapters 4 and 5 (it is
effectively Merleau‐Ponty’s most significant work since the Phenomenology of
Perception).
Merleau‐Ponty’s express aim in the lectures is to initiate a project of
“ontology” starting from the idea of “nature” as it appears in the history of Western
philosophy and science, particularly in the modern period down to his own present
day. This is a surprising choice for a self‐identified phenomenologist, but it is
consistent with Merleau‐Ponty’s own famous assertion that the phenomenological
method, including the phenomenological and eidetic reductions, are radically
“incomplete” and thus, one is safe to conclude, unable to seal consciousness off from
the empirical realm in the way Husserl, the progenitor of the method, had intended.
(This is not to say that “natural” means “empirical,” only that there is a “family
resemblance” between doing existential phenomenology and an archaeology of
nature, the root of our living “existence.”)
Whereas in The Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception the
focus had been on animality and the lived‐body—the significance of which remains
in the later philosophy (which I do not, as do some others, read in terms of a “break”
with the old, rather only a deepening that occasionally prompts a correction),
Merleau‐Ponty now broadens his inquiry to Being as a whole, thereby finding
himself inquiring into nature as a field of life prior to the division of “subject” and
“object.” Nature turns out to be nothing like either the “objective Nature” of
scientists or the “noematic pole” of Husserlian transcendental consciousness, since
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it is, in a profound sense, forever beyond any powers of “constitution.” Remarkably
and importantly, Merleau‐Ponty does not abandon the phenomenological attitude or
stand‐point of reflective thought in favor of a holistic immersion in pre‐reflective
life. His vision is one of the human being’s inevitable belongingness and alienation
from nature—that is, from himself/herself. Human existence is therefore self‐
interrupting, though not to the point of realizing a Sartrean disconnection from the
whole spectacle of Being, in whose internal “fold” human consciousness takes its
rightful place. It is, however, a conditioned consciousness, just as freedom for
Merleau‐Ponty is a conditioned freedom. In either case, one can put the emphasis on
either the first or the second term and find, in each case, an important nuance that
illumines a unique side of existence.
Much of the most interesting material in the Nature lectures presents these
ideas indirectly through Merleau‐Ponty’s original interpretations of such
philosophical figures as Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Schelling, and Bergson, as well the
findings of contemporaneous scientists. Merleau‐Ponty’s later conception of nature,
and a new ontological vocabulary to go with it, had been gestating for a long time,
since his first works in fact. Nature, as we have already seen, comes to take on the
meaning of what Schelling called the “barbarous principle” of the real, or again “wild
Being,” which cannot be brought in a transparent way within the orbit of reflection.
Merleau‐Ponty’s critique of transcendental phenomenology is apparent here (much
as Schelling criticized the “reflexivity” of Hegel and idealism generally). It seems as
though Merleau‐Ponty’s “nature” is one which somehow, from within itself, gives
rise to subjectivity and reflection—and thereby “transcends itself” while remaining
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opaque to itself at the same time. (This opacity is reflected in the motto “we are
given to ourselves.”) The parallel to Schelling’s own Naturphilosophie is
unmistakable, as are the romantic resonances of his understanding of nature
generally.27 But what is gone is “intellectual intuition” or the claim to an insight into
a “higher order” of being.

C. Chapter Five
The final chapter is a systematic exploration of one fundamental difference
between Husserl (and perhaps the vast majority of traditional philosophy) and
Merleau‐Ponty, and it pertains to their approach to philosophy—and thought—
itself. Is philosophy best appreciated as a problem‐solving enterprise, as Husserl
believes, or rather as a meditation on paradoxes, themselves beyond any simple
“solution”? Merleau‐Ponty finds the ultimate truth of the human condition to consist
in a certain “dialectical” contradiction which, however, unlike Hegel’s version, does
not find a resolution in something “higher,” such as an absolute stand‐point.
Merleau‐Ponty is ultimately a philosopher of paradox, which is what explains the
title of the present dissertation, “The Paradox of Nature...” It is regarding the
problem of nature—at once the home of human spirit, as well as its permanent
other—that Merleau‐Ponty finds one of his most fruitful applications of what he
calls in The Visible and the Invisible the method of “interrogation.”
27

Watson mentions Novalis in this connection. (Watson, Stephen H. “Merleau‐Ponty’s
Phenomenological Itinerary From Body Schema to Situated Knowledge: On How We Are and How We
Are Not to ‘Sing the World.’” Janus Head, Winter/Spring Issue, 9.2, 2007. Amherst, NY: Trivium
Publications, p. 534‐549.) Robert Vallier has written his dissertation, not published unfortunately, on
the topic of Schelling and Merleau‐Ponty. (“Institution: Of Nature, Life, and Meaning in Merleau‐Ponty
and Schelling.” DePaul University, 2001)
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Of course, Husserl himself makes “paradox” a central part of the discourse of
phenomenology—in the narrow sense that he never ceases first of all to emphasize
the utter counter‐intuitiveness of the “revolutionary” perspective of transcendental
phenomenology, of the enormous effort it takes to overturn (para‐) the common
view (doxa) that places subjectivity at the mercy of the spatio‐temporal‐causal
world, rather than vice‐versa. Yet he also speaks eloquently in the Crisis about what
he calls the “paradox of subjectivity”—“paradox” here more in the more Merleau‐
Pontian sense of “antinomy”—namely the paradox that subjectivity is at once a part
of the world (in its embodied form, in individual consciousnesses), even as it is the
transcendental condition for the very possibility of the world (what Husserl
controversially calls “absolute” existence as opposed to the “relative” existence of
the world). In an important way, this, too, is a paradox of nature: for the world—
nature—is both the condition of the possibility of consciousness, even as
consciousness is the condition for the possibility of the world. But Husserl offers a
“solution” to the paradox by making a distinction between two types of subjectivity,
and offering one priority over the other. As we have already seen, such a solution
will not do for Merleau‐Ponty. And in the end, Husserl is no less sympathetic to
antinomies than most of the canonical thinkers of the Western philosophical
tradition, from Aristotle (Metaphysics, Book III) onward.
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III. Conclusion

In Husserl, the thematic of nature initially asserts itself in that philosopher’s
famous (though clearly ambiguous) rejection of the “natural attitude” and his strong
distinction between “world” and “consciousness,” and it extends in Merleau‐Ponty’s
work to the latter’s fine‐grained attempts, through his life‐long studies of biology
and psychology, to negotiate between this sort of dualism and the equal danger, in
his eyes, of a purely scientific “naturalism.” Merleau‐Ponty eventually settles on an
interpretation of the “phenomenological reduction” as a deepening of the “natural”
attitude rather than a flight to pure consciousness—or, as Merleau‐Ponty
paradoxically states it (in Hegelian terms), it is only a departure by way of returning
to ourselves. In this way, Merleau‐Ponty’s lecture course on nature—a focal text of
this dissertation, along with Ideas I and II and The Visible and the Invisible—can be
seen to be the culmination of an on‐going critique of Husserlian “transcendental”
phenomenology in favor of a more “existential‐naturalistic”—at once
phenomenologically thick and scientifically informed—variety, which places human
subjectivity at the heart of nature, or Being, rather than outside or above it. The
consequence is that for Merleau‐Ponty, phenomenology is not a new science or a
magic key to unlock philosophical puzzles once and for all; rather, it is the
witnessing of the miraculous coherence of contradictory truths in the spectacle of
existence.
From the beginning, Merleau‐Ponty refuses to adopt a method that would
allow for the world’s thorough‐going constitution in the mind. At the same time, he
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explicitly prioritized what we might call the “first‐personality” of the
phenomenological method over the naïve‐realist method of most so‐called
“naturalists.” The “naturalistic” method Merleau‐Ponty and Husserl (not to mention
Heidegger) oppose is that of taking the world as something first self‐constituted, so
to speak, and then later experienced or not experienced, depending on causal
conditions that obtain between “subjects” and the world as “object.” In Merleau‐
Ponty’s way of thinking, human subjectivity, or “spirit” broadly speaking, bears an
intrinsic relation with the world it lives‐through, perceives, and understands, but at
the same time, it is alienated from this world at a level which suggests a twisting or
breaking‐apart (dehiscence) at the root level of being itself. Merleau‐Ponty’s analysis
of “nature” and phenomenology marks a turn towards what I call Merleau‐Ponty’s
“semi‐naturalistic” version of the phenomenological project; “naturalistic” because
it situates human subjectivity or spirit in terms that inscribe it in a larger matrix of
being, but only “semi‐” naturalistic because it is not the full‐blown or “reductive”
naturalism of a kind that, once again, both Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty vigorously
opposed.
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Chapter One: Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology
in Ideas I28: The Basic Position

I. Introduction: Ideas I and the Project of Transcendental Phenomenology

Ideas I demands our attention both for the boldness and originality of its
ideas and for being an undeniable milestone in Husserl’s career as well as a
watershed moment in the history of the phenomenological movement. It is the first
text in which Husserl, the effective founder of the movement as we know it today,29
formally introduces some of his most famous and distinctive theories, including the
phenomenological‐transcendental epoché and the phenomenological‐transcendental
reduction.30 It also contains preliminary attempts at a rigorous definition of
The full title of the work is Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy (First Book). I will refer to it throughout this text as Ideas I for short, as is common
practice.
29 Brentano, Husserl’s teacher, revived the medieval notion of intentionality and practiced a
rudimentary (and arguably “psychological”) form of what he termed “phenomenology,” but Husserl’s
Logical Investigations and Ideas I are generally credited for initiating the school known today as
“phenomenology,” though Heidegger’s 1927 work Being and Time also contributed strongly to the
way the idea of “phenomenology” eventually came to be received and interpreted.
30 Husserl sometimes makes a strong distinction between the “phenomenological” and the
“transcendental” reductions, which is something I will bring up again below (IID) with respect to
Husserl’s famous Encyclopaedia Britannica article on phenomenology. But in Ideas I, he treats them
as having the same extension, only referring to different aspects of a single process. Thus he
distinguishes them as follows: “...we shall, on most occasions, speak of phenomenological reductions
(but also, with reference to their collective unity, we shall speak of the phenomenological reduction)
and, accordingly, from an epistemological point of view [my italics here], we shall refer to
transcendental reductions.” (Ideas I, 66) In other words, the distinction as given here is merely one of
perspective, and accordingly I will often use the two terms—”phenomenological reduction” and
“transcendental reduction”— interchangeably, except when the exposition demands that they
temporarily be understood as distinct. (What goes for the reduction in this case goes for the epoché
as well, for they are companion concepts.)
28
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phenomenology as distinct from other sciences (“natural” and “human”) and the
introduction of the terminology (noesis and noema, natural and transcendental
attitudes, constitution) so characteristic of Husserl’s subsequent technical
phenomenological discussions. It is, then, easily on par in importance with Husserl’s
earlier and similarly path‐breaking Logical Investigations.31
Yet even in comparison to other published texts by Husserl, Ideas I is not a
particularly easy text to understand or unpack. It is highly abstract and rarely
pauses to explain the significance or philosophical context of its analyses, taking this
background more or less for granted. As Paul Ricoeur points out, the motivations of
the work, rooted in a confrontation with skepticism, are best discerned through
unpublished texts and lectures from the period between 1905 and 1913, as well as
with the help of the writings of Husserl’s remarkable assistant Eugen Fink.32 Indeed,
the actual text of Ideas I reads at times like a starter’s training manual, in this case
for the practice of a new phenomenological method of thinking and analysis. Yet the
“manual” is also a record of self‐discovery and has the feel of a work in progress, as
Husserl was himself working through many of its ideas and their implications, not
all of which, as is clear from his later introductory texts, are fully worked out in its
pages.

Husserl, Edmund. Logical Investigations. Trans. J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge, 1900/01 (2nd,
revised edition 1913) (Hereafter LI)
32 In Ricoeur’s words: “Finally, it must be said that Ideas I is a book whose meaning remains
concealed and that one is inevitably inclined to look for its meaning elsewhere.” See: Ricoeur, Paul. A
Key to Edmund Husserl’s Ideas I. Trans. Bond Harris and Jacqueline Bouchard Spurlock. (Trans.
revised by Pol Vandevelde, ed.) Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996 (pp. 36‐7) Hereafter
Key. Ricoeur relies heavily on the Husserl‐approved essay by Fink, “Die phänomenologische
Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik” (1933), to fill in some of the gaps left by
Husserl himself. Merleau‐Ponty was to do the same later on.
31
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It would be impossible to condense all of Ideas I in the space of one chapter,
let alone to show how it builds on Husserl’s considerable output before its
publication, or for that matter how his still later thinking relates to Ideas I. Indeed,
Ideas I is written with readership of the LI largely being presumed. Certain of the
latter’s ideas are revisited anew—intentionality, for example—while others are
enfolded implicitly into the substance of newer reflections.33 It is necessary for the
purposes of the present work for us to sketch out Ideas I’s main argument (if this is
the right word) and its basic orientation towards some of the fundamental questions
it poses to itself, concerning especially: the nature of consciousness and the
relationship of consciousness to the world; the definition of phenomenology as a
“transcendental” (as well as eidetic) science that eschews the “natural attitude”
while seeking to explain its contents; the ideas of “transcendence” and
“immanence”; and the question of the scope and meaning of the phenomenological
epoché and reduction, the latter question bearing of course on the central issue of
the phenomenological method. These are all interrelated questions; indeed, one
might even go so far as to say (in Heideggerian style perhaps) that they are “the
same” question. For roughly, they all concern the underlying relationship of
consciousness to world—or, put in another way, subjectivity and nature. We cannot

For example, in Ideas I Husserl takes for granted the notion that phenomenology deals with “acts”
of consciousness, whose “meaning‐intentions” are either “empty” or “fulfilled.” This principle is of
course foundational to Husserl’s ideas on perception. For example, while I can see or “intend” one
side of a die, I generally also “intend” its hidden sides as well. The former intention is fulfilled by
intuitive evidence—the givenness of the die in its color, shape, etc., as it shows itself to me visually.
The latter “signitive” intentions are not fulfilled and are thus “empty”—unless or until other sides of
the die are seen by me. The distinction is important for it allows Husserl to explain how it is that we
perceive the die and not merely “this side of” the die. We perceive objects, in other words, not merely
profiles. This is one of Husserl’s strategies, so to say, for overcoming the “appearance‐reality” divide
that has hampered previous theories of perception.
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hope to do full justice to the many angles one might use to approach and address
Husserl’s multifaceted answer to these questions. To take one example, we will have
to gloss over the significant controversies surrounding Husserl’s concept of the
“noema”34 or of its relation to “fulfilment.”35 Nonetheless, many of the sorts of
fundamental problems that arise in such debates will be touched on in other
sections of the overview provided below. This overview, along with some
independent commentary and brief references to some of the secondary literature
on Ideas I, will constitute the bulk of this chapter.
Yet given the relatively “intermediary” status of Ideas I in the course of
Husserl’s own lifelong task (from Ideas I onward) of explaining transcendental
phenomenology, it might still be wondered why we are concentrating in this chapter
on this particular text. Merleau‐Ponty, for example, regarded Ideas I as a belonging
to a “middle” or “transition” period between Husserl’s “logicism,” presumably
culminating in the Logical Investigations, and the later supposed “existentialism” of

This question has been written about endlessly, especially in context of the debate between those
who interpret the noema as “percept” (Gurwitsch, Cairns, et al.) and those, lead chiefly by Føllesdal,
who interpret it as a variant of Frege’s Sinn. For a nice recap of the debate, see: Solomon, Robert C.
“Husserl’s Concept of the Noema.” In Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, Frederick A. Elliston and
Peter McCormack, eds. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977 (pp. 54‐69). Solomon
begins his essay by noting: “It is generally agreed that the concept of the noema is one of the themes,
if not the central theme, of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy.” J. N. Mohanty is seemingly in
perfect agreement when he makes a passing reference to “the all‐important idea of noema and
noetic‐noematic structure, regarded by many as constituting the most important and original part of
[Ideas I].” (Mohanty, J. N. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2008, p. 372) Another topic we will have to leave out, though in this case
because it is almost wholly absent from the Ideas itself, is the topic of time‐constitution, which later
figures deeply in all of Husserl’s most advanced analyses.
35 For an excellent summary of the debate, see Pol Vandevelde’s introduction to Key (pp. 16‐20). Also
of note is Ricoeur’s remark, inspired also by the difficulties surrounding the noema, and quoted by
Vandevelde in the introduction, that ‘thus, reality always seems to escape transcendental
constitution.”
34
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the “life‐world” philosophy, best known through the Crisis.36 Given such views, why
not review Husserl’s later reformulations of much of this material? Moreover, as
mentioned above, Husserl himself later admits to the disadvantages—though not
necessarily inadequacies—of the “Cartesian” way to the reduction presented herein.
He also developed a new form of phenomenology, “genetic” or “dynamic”
phenomenology, which supplements (and some say supplants) the “static”
phenomenology of Ideas I.
The fact remains, however, that Husserl himself never totally abandoned
either the static or the “Cartesian” phenomenological method. Regarding the latter,
for example, no less than the author of the heterodox text The Other Husserl, Donn
Welton notes that “[t]he existence of the Cartesian Meditations, and the fact that
[Husserl] recommended its French translation to readers as late as 1933 even as he
began developing the text of the Crisis…convinces us that [the Cartesian way to the
reduction] was never overthrown.”37 Furthermore, Husserl never abandoned the
basic framework of “transcendental subjectivity” and its wholly non‐naturalistic
essence. Ideas I presents a broadly faithful picture of the basic thrust of
transcendental phenomenology, and this fact, combined with its historical
importance and the fact that it is the “prequel” to Ideas II, a text equally if not more
vital for our task, are, I believe, enough to recommend it for detailed investigation at
the present time.
See Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Tr. Colin Smith. New York:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962 (p. 320n). Crisis refers to Husserl’s text The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Trans.
David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
37 Welton, Donn. The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology. Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 2000 (p. 118). Hereafter “Welton.”
36
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II. Epoché and Phenomenological Reduction

A. Introduction
The heart of Ideas I, and probably the signature of phenomenology itself as it
is popularly known, is the phenomenological reduction. It is all but impossible to
give a brief definition of it, but any account must begin with the concept of “epoché”
or the “suspension” or “bracketing” of all one’s beliefs regarding external existence
of the objects of perception (and of course of any other mental act). Through this all‐
important suspension, one effects a radically new “attitude,” the phenomenological
attitude, according to which the world is seen to be as it is for the consciousness, or
subjectivity, that beholds it. In this way, all “objective reality” is “reduced” to its
significance for consciousness—or, alternately, to its meaningfulness as a
“noematic” correlate to the “noetic” acts of a consciousness in which the world is
“constituted.”38
The jargon‐laden definition given above must, however, be carefully
explained. Furthermore, many possible misinterpretations must be obviated—at
least regarding Husserl’s own intentions—such as the interpretation of the
reduction as being a means to expose the illusoriness of the external reality. This is
not at all Husserl’s intention or reflective of his actual view. At the same time, it

This language will be explained below (IVA). Note that the term “reduction” does not have the
modern meaning of “reductiveness” for Husserl; there is no question here of converting objective
reality into a subjective substratum. “Reduce” means, etymologically, “to bring or lead back,” and this
is Husserl’s intended meaning. The reduction leads back a consciousness that loses itself in its
world—back to its own achievements as a sense‐bestowing and world‐constituting being.
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cannot be denied that Husserl did in some sense prioritize subjectivity over objective
“reality.” Husserl did not deny the existence of such a reality, but as we will see,
under the reduction it acquires a wholly new sense—namely, that of being the sense
“mind‐independent reality” (along with innumerable other senses which give the
world its “intelligibility”). To put it another (un‐Husserlian) way, while we can say
that there is a world that transcends the mind, it only does so for the mind,39
acquiring its meaningfulness as such a transcendent being in this way alone. Thus, it
can in a certain way be called independent (in its existence, or “thatness”) from the
mind in one way and yet wholly dependent on it (for its meaning, or “whatness”) in
another. Consciousness itself—in its “purified” and “transcendental” form—is, by
contrast, dependent on nothing. And it is solely because of this asymmetry, and not
because of some supposed “non‐existence” of external reality, that Husserl calls
consciousness (as opposed to the transcendent world as such) “absolute.” All of
these notions will be further explored individually, however, in Part IV below.
In the sections that follow, I will proceed to describe the reduction as it is
outlined in Ideas I. Along the way, I will be flagging some of the most significant and
controversial issues of interpretation, as well as possible inconsistencies, mysteries,
or ambiguities in Husserl’s account, which can be (and usually already have been)
raised. In doing so, it is inevitable that some commentary be mixed with “pure”
description (contrary to the spirit of Husserl’s own methodology!) even before the

I will at times use the word “mind” for “consciousness,” despite the potential hazards that come
therewith. “Mind” can easily be reified, whereas by “consciousness” (Bewusststein) Husserl means
anything but an “object” or ‘substance” in the classical Cartesian sense. Nonetheless, it is
cumbersome to use the word “consciousness” solely to translate “Bewusststein,” and hence synonyms
will occasionally, though cautiously be used.
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final section, which is primarily commentary. But my underlying goal is to present
Husserl’s conception of the reduction as accurately as I can, and furthermore with
minimal recourse to jargon (though Husserl is, after all, coining many new terms
here), and in a way that is at least plausible as an interpretation of just what Husserl
was after. Nonetheless, extended quotations are occasionally called for, as much is
to be gained (and clarified) through a direct examination of Husserl’s precise
phraseology of his own main ideas.

B. The Natural and the Transcendental Attitudes
The story of the reduction, so to speak, begins with a description of the
“natural attitude.”40 So what, then, is the natural attitude? It would help to begin by
contrasting it with what Husserl alternatively calls the “philosophical,”
“phenomenological,” and “transcendental” attitudes (all of these being equivalent in
the current context).41 The natural attitude is the default, “normal” attitude in which
we tacitly or non‐tacitly frame our (mostly perceptual) experiences; the alternative
attitude is one in which we have disengaged from the presuppositions of the natural
attitude, particularly regarding objective existence and non‐existence, and have
taken up a new appreciation of the origins of meaningful experience in the depths of

40Of

course, what is possibly most controversial about the reduction is how it can be “begun” at all,
but we will come to that later (Part V).
41 This picture of “attitudes” will become importantly expanded and enriched in Ideas II, in which the
natural attitude is divided into “personalistic” and “naturalistic” forms. These will be discussed
closely in the next chapter.
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subjectivity—in ourselves: “I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by
a universal self‐examination.”42
But what does Husserl mean by attitude (Einstellung)? Amazingly, Husserl
nowhere defines his technical usage of the term in the text of the Ideas (or
anywhere, as far as I can tell), perhaps owing to its status as basic to understanding
the reduction itself. For now, we will see how Husserl uses the term; we will return
to the question of how it might best be defined at the end of this section.
To describe the natural attitude, Husserl presents a series of observations of
what experience in this attitude consists in:

“I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly
become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that
I experience it. By my seeing, touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the different modes of sensuous
perception, corporeal physical things…are simply there for me, “on hand” in the literal and figurative
sense…”43

In the natural attitude, he continues, “we… [are] human beings who are living
naturally, objectivating, judging, feeling, willing.”44 But animate beings and people
are there for me also: “I look up; I see them… I grasp their hands…”45
The natural attitude is “natural” first of all in the sense of its everyday
pervasiveness as well as its default character. It comes to us “naturally.” Roughly,
then, we can characterize this as a condition in which we as normal, adult human
beings find ourselves routinely and as it were automatically, just insofar as we are

Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Trans. Dorion Cairns.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999 (p. 157). Hereafter CM.
43 Ideas I, p. 51
44 Ibid., p. 51
45 Ibid., p. 51
42
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alive and awake (and maybe asleep and dreaming as well), in which we perceive
there to be objects, as well as people and value‐characteristics of things, to exist
outside us and “on hand.” Husserl stresses that the world as we know it in the
natural attitude is not simply the world of science or a “material world”; thus we
“naturally” perceive a “world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical
world…”46 In terms of “material” objects, we perceive not simply (or virtually ever,
unless we are scientists in a “scientific attitude”) “matter,” but things like “tables”
and “pianos”—objects with cultural meaning‐accretions. The natural attitude is also
one in which we think and cogitate, at least in the everyday (non‐
phenomenological!) way.47 But most pertinently with regard to the
phenomenological epoché, in the natural attitude we accept the world as a “factually
existent actuality and also accept it as it presents itself to [us] as factually existing.”48
Empirical science and its mode of cognition pertain to this world, precisely taken as
existent in the sense outlined. Hence science (as an activity and a form of thought)
itself belongs to the “natural attitude,” a fact Husserl never tires of exploiting to the
advantage of philosophy as he conceives it.
Husserl regards his description of the natural attitude as pre‐theoretical; that
is, it is not a construct, but simply what is directly intuited to be the case about
natural, non‐transcendental experience:

Ibid., p. 53 (Husserl’s italics)
Ibid., p. 53
48 Ibid, p. 57 (Husserl’s italics)
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“What we presented as a characterization of the givenness belonging to the natural attitude, and
therefore as a characterization of the attitude itself, was a piece of pure description prior to any
“theory”.”49

He then notes that by “theories” he means “preconceived opinions of every sort.”
Husserl claims to “keep these at a distance” strictly, a stance he maintains
throughout his career, in keeping with his commitment to go to “the things
themselves” and by‐pass the corrupting influence of “presuppositions” of any kind.
(Hence his famous—and famously imperiled—dream of developing a
“presuppositionless science.”) But while Husserl’s description of the natural attitude
may be pre‐theoretical, it is more than apparent from it that we, insofar as we dwell
in the natural attitude, are all a type of “naïve realist,” to use the modern parlance.
Thus, Husserl’s understanding of the natural attitude may best be understood
through a simple consideration of what somebody unbiased by, say, “fancy”
metaphysical theories understands himself to be experiencing everyday, in the most
thoroughly ordinary sense imaginable, as a living human being. It is this
thoroughgoing averageness, the basic mediocrity of existence, that Husserl
continually contrasts with the disconcerting and vertiginous heights of the
transcendental attitude. It is not as though Husserl dismisses natural experience; to
the contrary, the whole purpose of phenomenology is to understand it. It is just this
embrace of the ordinary that distinguishes phenomenology from more “speculative”
sorts of philosophical endeavors. And yet there is a transcendental, “noetic‐
noematic” dimension of meaning‐constitution, a realm in which ordinary experience
becomes clarified in terms of its source and true meaning. It is through
49

Ibid., p. 56
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transcendental investigation that natural consciousness comes to know the
foundations of the experientiality it takes naïvely for granted. (I will explore the
transcendental level in subsequent sections.) Sebastian Luft helpfully frames the
natural/transcendental distinction in terms of the classical division between doxa
and episteme:

“When Husserl conceives of the ‘natural’ in opposition to the ‘philosophical attitude’, this echoes the
distinction between pre‐transcendental and transcendental standpoints as a modern ‘version’ of the
doxa/episteme distinction. The transcendental turn anticipated by Descartes, and taken by Kant,
applies the realization of the subject‐relativity of the world. The turn to the subject, the ‘reduction’ to
the ego (cogito), becomes the foundation of science. The world is not an ‘absolute being,’ but is
relative to the experiencing subject.” (Luft 203‐4)

He further explains:

“The distinction of doxa and episteme ‘translated’ into this conception means: Philosophy that
believes it can operate on a ‘realistic’ level is bound to the natural attitude and it cannot be critical in
the transcendental sense. This is not only Husserl’s critique of pre‐transcendental philosophy but
especially of his pupils who neglected to pursue the transcendental path that he had taken up with
Ideas I (1913).50

Luft’s explanation is useful, but it must be kept in mind, a fact I will come back to
later on, that in addition to being “doxic” as opposed to “epistemic,” the natural
attitude for Husserl is a false doxa, a “wrong view.” This is important because the
natural attitude’s naïve realism is not only “naïve” but, precisely in showing a
“blind[ness] to the correlativity of world and experience,” (Luft, 208) it wrongly
pronounces against just this correlativity, falsely (though tacitly) affirming, as Luft
points out, the world’s absolute existence.

Luft, Sebastian. “Husserl’s Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction: Between Life‐World and
Cartesianism.” In Research in Phenomenology 34, 2004 (p. 204) Hereafter, “Luft.”
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Let us first return to the initial question of what an “attitude” is supposed to
be in the first place. If we take Husserl for his word, an “attitude” cannot be
explained merely as a psychological state, as the word (in English) is routinely taken
to denote. After all, only the natural attitude properly deserves to be called
“psychological,” as Husserl himself on occasion does call it.51 An attitude, then, I
propose, might best be defined as the orientation in which the parameters of
experience are delimited and defined. In the natural attitude, these parameters are
defined, so to speak, by the internal and external horizons of transcendent things
(and the “halos” that form the background in which we perceive them), by people
and living beings, by various acts of fantasy and memory, and to an extent by our
self‐perception (and hence our own egos). But in the transcendental attitude, these
parameters shift to something new, a field of constitution, as well as to the
transcendental ego or “pure consciousness” in which all worldly beings, including
the empirical ego, are themselves constituted (in which they come to being).52 A
shift in attitude is thus a shift of the entire matrix of intelligibility of things—a
prefiguring, perhaps, of Heidegger’s later concept of “world.”53

Ibid., p. 126: “In our case we have, accordingly, on the one hand, the psychological attitude in which
our naturally focused regard is directed to mental processes—e.g. to a mental process of rejoicing—
as a sequence of mental states of human or beast. On the other hand, we have the phenomenological
attitude…” (Husserl’s italics) See also p. 172 for further clarification of what the psychological
attitude involves.
52 It is true that Husserl does not restrict the term “attitude” to the contrast of natural and
transcendental attitudes: he also speaks of the “eidetic” attitude, the natural‐scientific attitude, etc..
One may still apply our definition, however: for example, in the eidetic attitude the parameters of
experience are essences, rather than facts. (It needs to be understood, of course—as I will discuss
below—that the transcendental attitude presupposes the eidetic, while the natural may or may not
overlap with eidetic attitude.)
53 I am indebted to Dr. Pol Vandevelde for this language of “parameters” and “intelligibility,” as well
as to his understanding of Heidegger’s conception of a “world,” though I would not presume to say he
would endorse my application of these concepts under these circumstances.
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C. Phenomenological Epoché
Husserl begins his shift into the new attitude by noticing that, contrary to its
spirit of total self‐confidence, the natural attitude has some answering to do. For
there are “presuppositions” to its “psychological experience”54 that remain so far
unexplored and unknown (to natural consciousness itself). Husserl wants to
investigate these. Here now a “radical alteration” is called for: “a new style of
attitude is needed which is entirely altered in contrast to the natural attitude in
experiencing and the natural attitude in thinking.”55 In order to demonstrate this
transformation, Husserl calls fatefully upon the example of Descartes and the latter’s
Meditations on First Philosophy. Subsequently, the way to the reduction outlined in
Ideas I is typically called the “Cartesian” way. Husserl certainly believed that
Descartes had opened the way to a wholly new field of being, which Husserl himself
calls “transcendental subjectivity,” but he also believed that Descartes did not
properly understand his own achievement and hence fell away from the new perch
almost as soon as he reached it, as we will see below.
Husserl exploits the Cartesian “method of doubt” in a new and original way.
Through his own confrontation with skepticism, Descartes enacted this famous
method in order to reach the foundation of knowledge, the self‐certain “I think, I
am” (cogito). Husserl now practices a variation of this method in order to reach a
similarly self‐evident sphere, something he is about to call a sphere of pure
consciousness or immanence. But Husserl does not want to actually doubt anything,
certainly not the indubitable existence of the world (which is always presupposed in
54
55

Ideas I, xix
Ibid., xix
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consciousness as its ultimate horizon). What he is interested in is the “attempt” at
doubt. For while we cannot doubt certain things, “we can attempt to doubt anything
whatever, no matter how firmly convinced of it, even assured of it in an adequate
evidence, we may be.”56 The nature of such an act, the attempt at doubt, is to
hypothetically place the existence of that which is doubted into metaphorical
“brackets” or “parentheses.” It “effects a certain annulment of positing and precisely
this interests us.” There is no question of negating that which exists, i.e. denying its
existence. But there is a sudden neutrality with regard to this entire question—
something “wholly peculiar.”57 The question of the existence of things is suddenly
“put out of action,” and in my words, into a kind of purgatorial “maybe” that
nevertheless allows one to focus on something else—in this case, on the manners of
givenness of things. This new focus58 automatically implicates them as experienced
by someone, i.e., shows them in their “self‐givenness.”
As we have said, the “parenthesizing” of “positings” of existence is what is
called the “epoché.” More specifically, there are several types of epoché. What is at
issue now, however, is not, for example, the kind of epoché one speaks of in regards
to the “bracketing” of features unrelated to the study at hand (for example, a
scientist brackets all value‐predicates of “physical” objects and focuses on their
spatiotemporal determinations solely, a phenomenological psychologist brackets all
material or biochemical aspects of an living organism, etc.), but rather the full and

Ibid., p. 58
Ibid., p. 58
58 It might be noted that this sort of language—”changing focus”—would not really be sufficient for
Husserl to capture the radicality of the new attitude, since it is itself borrowed from experience
within the natural attitude.
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total bracketing of the question of existence (or non‐existence) of the entire world
(including even oneself insofar as one is part of the world, though this comes
later)—the “thesis of the world” (Weltthesis). But can we effect a global epoché of
this sort? Can we put the whole of reality in brackets? This is a question we will
come back to at the end of this chapter.

D. PhenomenologicalTranscendental Reduction(s)
The bracketing of transcendent things is not for Husserl sufficient, however,
to reach the transcendental ego.59 It only goes as far as sealing the psyche off from
what might be called (from a natural‐attitudinal stand‐point, anyway) the “external
world.” It is here that Husserl makes another interesting departure from Descartes.
The ego, too “[is] a real Object like others in the natural world.”60 This is not true
only in the sense that I have a physical body, but also in the sense that “I effect
cogitationes, acts of consciousness in both the broader and the narrower sense and
these acts, as belonging to the human subject, are occurrences within the same
natural actuality.”61 (This principle of the naturality of “psychic”—as opposed to
transcendental—consciousness will once again become a central theme in Ideas II.)
In later writings, Husserl distinguishes between the “phenomenological reduction”
and the “transcendental reduction,” characterizing the latter as a further step
beyond the former, precisely in terms of the further bracketing of the ego. The
phenomenological reduction on this understanding effects a universal epoché on the

More is said about this concept in this section below.
Ideas I, p. 64
61 Ibid.
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60

35
natural world, but not upon the ego itself. Hence it is a reduction to what might be
called “phenomenological psychology” or the intentional life of consciousness, but
without an explicit recognition—only to be supplied through the final,
transcendental reduction—of the ultimate source of meaning, the transcendental
ego:

“If the transcendental relativity of every possible world demands an all‐embracing bracketing, it also
postulates the bracketing of pure psyches and the pure phenomenological psychology related to
them.”

And so,

“Accordingly, the consistent reflection on consciousness yields him time after time transcendentally
pure data, and more particularly it is intuitive in the mode of new kind of experience, transcendental
“inner” experience.”62

In Ideas I, Husserl later comes to understand these two distinct steps to have been
conflated.63 Once it is kept in mind, however, it is sufficient for our purposes to keep
them both as comprising what Husserl treats in Ideas I as a single
“phenomenological reduction”—a reduction to phenomenological consciousness
and, therewith, the transcendental ego.
Husserl’s bracketing of the (empirical) ego is a major development that, in
Husserl’s understanding, distinguishes his own method, at this point, from

These quotes are from Husserl’s Encyclopaedia Britannica article of 1928 (trans. Richard E.
Palmer), reproduced in full in: Kockelmanns, Joseph J. Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology.
Indianapolis: Purdue University Press, 1994 (p. 209) Kockelmann’s source for the translation is
Husserl: Shorter Works. McCormack and Elliston, eds. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981 (pp. 21‐35).
63 See fn. 3, above.
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Descartes.’64 For the reduction does not retreat into a private “cogito” or its theater
of consciousness; neither does it merely seize on the essence of consciousness, when
taken in the mundane sense (this is still the task of “psychology”).

“Even more inaccessible to him [Descartes], and naturally so, was the consideration that the ego as it
is disclosed within the epoché, existing for itself, is as yet not at all “an” ego which can have other or
many fellow egos outside itself. It remained hidden from Descartes that all such distinctions as “I”
and “you,” “inside” and “outside,” first “constitute” themselves in the absolute ego.”65

Husserl understands Descartes to have correctly discovered the “absolute
ego” as the “indubitable” ultimatum of transcendental inquiry, only to have then
misinterpreted his own discovery in an important way. In particular, he failed to
properly grasp the nature of the “I” of the self‐certain “I think, I am.”66 The “I” in
question is not me, Descartes or even some possible individual empirical ego, at least
not qua psychophysical being, but rather transcendental subjectivity—not a
thinking subject but the thinker as such, transcendentally considered, for whom and
in whom an entire world is constituted and, hence, available in full “self‐evidence”
for my knowing regard. Furthermore, while Husserl endorses Descartes’ thesis that
the “I” is in some way more certain than the very question of the existence of the
world, he laments the latter’s failure to see that the world is still preserved as a
phenomenon in the reduction. What Descartes fundamentally misunderstood is that
the indubitable self is not the mere “ego‐pole” of consciousness or even psychic
empirical consciousness itself. It is transcendental subjectivity.67

Ideas I, p. 68
Ibid., p. 82
66 My italics on the Cartesian quote
67 Crisis, p. 81. One can also see here the language of Descartes’ “self‐misinterpretation.”
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Yet what remains after the reduction is nonetheless a “stream” of mental life.
Is this the notorious “transcendental ego”? Just what Husserl means by the
“transcendental ego” is one of the very difficult problems to solve in Husserl
scholarship. According to David Bell, “…the transcendental ego is nothing but the
ordinary, common‐or‐garden mind, albeit viewed from within a philosophical or
transcendental perspective.” In support of this thesis he cites the following passage
from the Crisis: “As transcendental ego, after all, I am the same ego that in the
worldly sphere is a human ego. What was concealed from me in the human sphere I
reveal through transcendental enquiry.”68 In this spirit, we would perhaps not do
badly to understand the transcendental ego of Ideas I as the self qua transcendental
sphere of noeticnoematic consciousness, with all of its acts and intentional objects
included, and understood to constitute itself through the laws of temporality
(though Husserl elaborates on this last part later). Of course, this definition might
seem to conflict with Husserl’s enigmatic post‐Ideas I claim that the meaning of
transcendental subjectivity is transcendental intersubjectivity.69 But we will have to
presently leave that complex issue aside.

Bell, David. Husserl. New York: Routlege, 1990 (p. 207), hereafter “Bell”; the Husserl quote can be
found in Crisis, p. 264
69 The subtitle of the Fifth Meditation of the CM (p. 89) states the point directly: “Uncovering of the
Sphere of Transcendental Being as Monadological Intersubjectivity.” There can be no question but
that Husserl views “intersubjectivity” here (and for the rest of his career) as the authentic meaning of
transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental ego is not a you or me, but neither is it an empirical
community (as this could lead to relativism, one of Husserl’s avowed enemies), but somehow an “I”
that is a “we” in a transcendental register. We cannot here rehearse the steps of Husserl’s elaborate
description of the manner in which the being of other egos is “evinced and verified in the realm of the
transcendental ego.” (p. 90) For a detailed exposition and interpretation of Husserl’s view see:
Zahavi, Dan. Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the LinguisticPragmatic
Critique. Translated by Elizabeth A. Behnke. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001. (See especially pp.
159‐66).
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E. An Interlude: On the Motivation of the Reduction
Before further exploring the philosophical and ontological implications of the
reduction (see Part IV below), we might at this stage ask what actually motivates it
in the first place. So far, we have presented the reduction largely as Husserl (in Ideas
I) himself does, namely as a procedure for getting at the truth of experience and the
world. But what makes Husserl think this particular method is necessary, as opposed
to others? Here it is important to understand that Husserl fits into a very old
tradition in philosophy, namely the quest for what might be called real and secure
knowledge. Along these lines, the philosopher speaks of the elemental quest for
freedom—in this case the “epistemic freedom” that can also be described as the
freedom from error and bias, illusion and empty abstraction. For it is the pursuit of
certainty, clarity, and freedom from prejudice that conspire to produce the precisely
Husserlian version of phenomenology that bursts forth out of Ideas I. See, for
example, Husserl’s reference to “genuine freedom from prejudice”70 in the first part,
or Husserl’s own declaration that the goal of the phenomenological reductions is to
reach “the free vista of ‘transcendentally’ purified phenomena and, therewith, the
field of phenomenology in our peculiar sense.”71
What we can gather, then, is that (transcendental) phenomenology is
motivated by a thirst for a certain freedom, in particular a freedom from
presuppositions. But if freedom from presuppositions motivates the reduction, what
is this supposed to be a freedom to? In short, Husserl was in search of the
foundation of knowledge. We must be free from bias in order to gain access to a
70
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Ibid., xix

39
secure zone of knowing, a direct access to reality. Logic, science, and mathematics
make the most vigorous claims to knowledge in our and Husserl’s era, but Husserl
became convinced that even they needed securing on a more fundamental basis. But
Husserl was not simply a “meta‐scientist.” Instead of being merely fixated on giving
these sciences a foundation, he came also to be fascinated for its own sake with the
realm of meanings in which consciousness revealed all things in their essence. He
came to regard philosophy—understood in a new and non‐dogmatic way—as the
indispensable science and the foundation of all knowledge. It alone bears the
customary role—and the responsibility—of answering the skeptic who denies the
possibility of knowledge, and he does this by showing the way to an indubitable,
undeniable source of apodictic evidence. Husserl’s striving for knowledge is so deep
and thorough that he is willing to revise himself ruthlessly. Husserl did not think
philosophy was a science among sciences—i.e., as just another “formal” or
“material” ontology that makes claims and arguments about a certain region of
reality. So unlike previous philosophers, Husserl—in large agreement with Kant, his
“transcendentalist” ancestor—placed all his trust not in some realm of metaphysical
truths, intuited or learned through revelation (such as Platonic Forms, God,
Absolute Spirit), from which to derive and secure others, but simply in experience.
Philosophy’s role is to draw its evidence from the well of experience—acts of
consciousness and the things of which it is conscious (ego cogito cogitatum)—
through a method in which everything but this purified experientiality is suspended
indefinitely, and “put out of action” for the transcendental gaze.
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In this way Husserl’s philosophical orientation, broadly construed, is
radically “epistemological.” But this does not mean Husserl was concerned with
“epistemology” in the narrow sense in use today—Husserl was not overly concerned
with defining “knowledge” as “justified true belief” or something else, for example.
And he is not, once again, obsessed with the “subjective” side of “knowing” (“noetic
phenomenology”) in the way traditional epistemology is (excepting the “causal” and
“externalist” models, of course), as he gives ample attention to the various objects
that are known (“noematic phenomenology”). It does mean, however, that for
Husserl, to discover how knowledge takes place is both a necessary and a sufficient
task for philosophy as such, regarded in its purest essence.

III. Essences and the Eidetic Reduction

Besides the phenomenological reduction, there is another, no less important
type of reduction whose performance is also necessary for phenomenology as
Husserl conceives it: the eidetic reduction. Husserl begins the version of Ideas I
eventually published with a tacked‐on but (to his mind) crucial discussion of the
“eidetic” nature of phenomenology, trying to classify phenomenology among and as
against other “sciences.” This material is very interesting, but we can only touch on
it briefly here, insofar as it is relevant to our task.
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There is, for Husserl, a fundamental divide between “matters of fact” (in
much the “Humean” sense) on the one hand and “essences” (or eidē) on the other.72
Overlapping with this distinction is that between “reality” (the real, which is to say
factical) or “the empirical” on the one hand, and “essentiality,” on the other. What
exactly is a Husserlian essence, or eidos? Is it, for example, a “universal”? Such a
question may not be terribly helpful, given the contestedness of the question of
universals itself, but Husserlian essences are “universal‐like” in that they are
multiply instantiable and “non‐particular.” That is, they are not “singular” in the way
“existent” particulars are. However, it is not technically true to say that they are
outside of space and time; they do not subsist like Platonic Forms in a supra‐
spatiotemporal order, as Husserl forcefully underscores.73 Essences are also
ontological in a strong sense—that is, they are not purely “linguistic” or
“conventional.” We do not decide “as a community” what is or is not an essence, at
least as pertains to the natural and spiritual furniture of the world; we discover such
essences.
The clear grasp of essences is achieved through a method known as
“imaginative variation.” In the eidetic reduction—which is to be performed before
the phenomenological reduction—one is to bracket out all particular, factical, and
contingent features of things perceived (or remembered, imagined, etc.) and to seize
only those features that belong to the object necessarily—i.e., that make the object
what it is. In other words, the eidetic reduction distills those categorial forms that
we intuit in things. Yet how does one clearly distinguish between the essential and
72
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inessential aspects of things? This is where imaginative variation as a multiply‐
repeatable exercise becomes crucial: we are to imagine the things in many different
circumstances and undergoing many changes. In each change of circumstance, some
feature or property of the thing is altered. Does the object survive as just the object
that it is even after this alteration? Then the property altered must have been
inessential. After varying the object enough, it is to become apparent what the
essential features of the object are.
Hence, in keeping with a tradition inaugurated by the Greeks and sustained
by the scholastics, essences reveal the what of things (and people), the essential
“nature” of things, and, to this extent, their being. All the same, there are two distinct
senses of the word “being”—essence and existence.74 It would seem that the essence
of a thing cannot exist without there existing things that instantiate that essence.75
There are, then, at least these two options for the theoretical regard of an
object or “real” (a thing or state of affairs, for example): to view it as factual and
spatiotemporally located, or to view it in its essentiality, i.e. in terms of the essences
it instantiates. The distinction does not, however, correspond to that between the
natural and transcendental attitudes; for transcendental reflection is not the only
science done in the “eidetic attitude.” Essences are not the province only of
phenomenology. Phenomenology is an eidetic science, but not all eidetic sciences—
e.g., logic and mathematics—are per se phenomenological. Phenomenology, in
Husserl’s conception, is therefore one of many eidetic sciences. (To be more precise
Ibid., p. 12
At times, it does seem as though Husserl goes even further: “Positing of… essences implies not the
slightest positing of any individual factual existences; pure eidetic truths contain not the slightest
assertion about matters of fact.” (Ideas I, p. 11; Husserl’s italics)
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still, one might say that there is nothing phenomenological in the “eidos” of the
“eidetic,” but very much something “eidetic” in the “eidos” of the
“phenomenological.”)
Husserl makes much depend not only on the eidetic reduction, but also on
the strict and absolute difference between facts and essences, the empirical and the
eidetic. Essentialism also becomes extremely important for Husserl’s purposes in
terms of his distinguishing between the essences of “mental processes” on the one
hand and “physical things” on the other.76 Thus it will be central to Husserl’s
delineations of the essences of consciousness and reality, as we will see below.

IV. Consciousness and World

A. Intentionality, Noesis and Noema, and Transcendence
For Husserl, as for his teacher Brentano, the most fundamental fact about
consciousness is that it is intentional—it is intrinsically “about” or “of” something.77
From the perspective of the traditional issues in modern “philosophy of mind” and
epistemology, the phenomenological notion of intentionality, already anticipated by
Kant78, could by itself be seen to solve, as it were, the old question of how something
like “consciousness,” which is “inner,” can ‘transcend” itself and reach out to a world
Ibid., p. 98
Ibid., pp. 73‐5
78 See, for example: Russell, Matheson. Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed. Continuum Books. New
York: 2006 (p. 47). Hereafter “Russell.” The concept is also present in medieval writers.
76
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that is outside of it—“outer.” For intentionality reveals an intimate, indeed
unbreakable bond between an act of consciousness (“noesis”) on the one hand, and
an “intentional object” (“noema,” vaguely akin to Kant’s “phenomenological
object”—Gegenstand) on the other. One might at first be tempted to say that such a
relationship takes place within consciousness itself, but “consciousness” should now
be seen as an equivocal term. Consciousness as intentionality houses both a
“subjective” pole as well as an “objective” one; consciousness in this sense is not
“mere” subjectivity. While this is not so much a “proof” that there exists an “outside
world,” since this is built into the very definition of experience (at least for Husserl),
it is a fundamental problematization of the very “inner/outer” distinction
philosophy had been taking for granted pre‐phenomenologically (or pre‐”critically”
in the Kantian sense). There is simply no sense in the idea of a consciousness
essentially unrelated to an intended world, horizon, or object.
Most commentators have generally found the referent of the term “noesis” to
be unproblematic to grasp, but not so “noema.” As mentioned, the term “noesis”
refers to intentional acts of consciousness and “noema” to the objects so intended
(and qua intended). In Husserl’s words:
“Corresponding in every case to the multiplicity of Data pertaining to the really inherent noetic
content, there is a multiplicity of Data, demonstrable in actual pure intuition, in a correlative
“noematic content” or, in short, in the “noema”—terms which we shall continue to use from now
on.”79

Husserl gives an example, pertaining to the experience of seeing a tree:
“the tree simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to Nature, is nothing less than this perceived tree as
perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree can burn up, be
79
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resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense—the sense of this perception, something
belonging necessarily to its essence—cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real
properties.”80

However, the noema is not for Husserl a “really inherent” part of consciousness. The
noema “tree,” says Husserl, is “no more contained inherently than is the tree which
belongs to actuality.”81
Hence the “noema” of a perception is simply the perceived as perceived. This
would apply across the board to all the various types of act: the noema of a
recollection is the recollected as recollected, the noema of a fantasy is the fantasied
thing as fantasied, etc. Husserl also calls the noema or “noematic correlate” the
“sense” of an act. How this definition of it matches up with the first is a deep source
of debate, but it cannot be furthered addressed here.82
As hinted at already, the noetic‐noematic bifurcation allows Husserl to claim
that phenomenology is not merely about consciousness in the narrow sense of
“subjective” consciousness—since this is only the “noetic” pole of experience—but
also about the objects experienced (as experienced)—the “noematic” pole. Every
conscious experience, without fail, has both a noetic and a noematic side. It makes
no sense to isolate the “consciousness‐of” from that of which there is
consciousness—a point Mohanty makes eloquently in speaking of the irreducibility
of the phrase “consciousness of something”:

Ibid., p. 216
Ibid., p. 237
82 Once again, Bell’s way of characterizing the issue is helpful for our present narrow purposes:
“…something is noematic in so far as it is an immanent, but non‐real contributory factor in the
possession by an act of significance or meaning.” (Bell, p. 180)
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“Consciousness is… a correlation between noetic acts and noematic meanings. The world is a
structure and interconnectedness of such meanings, and is the correlate of consciousness. The two,
consciousness and world, together, in their correlation, constitute transcendental subjectivity… The
true transcendental foundation is: consciousnessoftheworld. Realism deletes the hyphens… but it
cannot in fact do so. I want to keep them tied together.”83

If consciousness itself has an “inner” and “outer”, a “here” and “there,” a
subject and object, then it is already, in a sense, self‐transcending; and so
immediately one can see how “transcendence” becomes a fundamental theme in the
structure of consciousness. Husserl generally speaks of “transcendence” in the
context of the transcendent intentional object, including, most importantly, the
“necessary transcendence” that belongs to the essence “physical thing.” But it is
important to see that because transcendence is first predicated on intentionality,
and intentionality is a structural feature of (noetic‐noematic) consciousness as such,
the transcendence of the world, whatever form it will take, will be such as not to
leave consciousness trapped in a skeptical impasse or locked into the “private
theater” of the mind. Once again, Husserl’s theory could be seen as an advance over
less sophisticated “modern” theories of mind and world.
But what exactly is Husserl’s conception of “transcendence”? It is important
here to trace the exact sense in which Husserl employs the term, for this will have
enormous consequences for the general philosophical implications of Husserl’s final
“transcendental‐phenomenological” position. To begin with, Husserl denies the

Mohanty, J. N. “My Philosophical Position/Response.” In The Transcendental and the Empirical. Ed.
Bina Gupta. Oxford, England: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000 pp. 261‐2 (my italics). In
this way, the noetic‐noematic structure of consciousness (in the wide sense) can be seen to follow
from the original thesis of intentionality itself. Yet it also confirms Husserl’s interest in the
“appearing as appearing” of things (in the wide sense). It is not things in their “real” existence, but
things “as they appear,” that concern us within the phenomenological reduction. We do not worry
about whether or not there “really is” an apple tree before us; we are concerned with the noema of
“the apple tree.” Reality qua real existence is not denied, just put out of play.
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Kantian distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon.84 The thing‐in‐
itself is not unknowable—precisely the opposite. But how can it be knowable, if it is
also transcendent? It is knowable in degrees or “adumbrations”—the profiles of
things as seen from different angles; hence it is known, in Husserl’s terminology,
“inadequately”—and not just for finite observers but for any observer whatsoever,
including God. (This reflects the intrinsic nature of perception, understood as a
general relationship of consciousness to extra‐conscious reality). Hence the thing is
“transcendent” only after a peculiar way—not wholly other than or alien to
consciousness, but in a way that belongs to it noetically‐noematically, through
adumbrations, yet not with respect to the whole of the object all at once. Things are
encountered as transcendent—they have this “meaning”—but such “transcendence”
amounts only, ultimately, to a kind of regulative Idea (roughly in the Kantian sense)
of “adequate” objectivity—the infinite limit of full, adequate givenness of the object
in all of its profiles at once. Transcendence is thus not a property of things but the
idea of a complete unity of adumbrations, the sum of profiles of a thing. Warns and
clarifies Husserl:

“…one must not let oneself be deceived by speaking of the physical thing as transcending
consciousness or as ‘existing in itself.’ The genuine concept of the transcendence of something
physical which is the measure of the rationality of any statements about transcendence, can itself be
derived only from the proper essential contents of perception or from those concatenations of
definite kinds which we call demonstrative experience. The idea of such transcendence is therefore the
eidetic correlate of the pure idea of this demonstrative experience.”85

See, for example: Husserl, Edmund. “Kant and the idea of transcendental phenomenology,” trans.
Ted E. Klein, Jr. and William E. Pohl. The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 5.3 (1974), p. 11
(citation found in Russell, p. 91)
85 Ibid., p. 106 (my italics)
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Fundamental to this picture is the notion of givenness. In the words of one
commentator, “the given...includes not only that which is immanent in a real sense
but also the transcendent, provided that it is given.”86 This also allows Husserl to
convert all transcendence into what he calls “immanent transcendency.” With
respect to physical things this term denotes that “...the transcendency belonging to
the physical thing as determined by physics is the transcendency belonging to a
being which becomes constituted in, and tied to, consciousness...”87
Yet in this case, one might suspect that Husserl has secured access to the
“things” at a bit of an unfair price. Such a criticism might run as follows: Either
things are not truly transcendent, or they are not necessarily known—unlike their
phenomenal appearance, which may, after all, with Kant, be conditioned by our own
cognitive apparatus. But Husserl despises both subjectivism and constructivism as
equally unbearable concessions to the skeptic (or the strict Kantian), so these
options are closed by him. Husserl wants a pure transparency of being—a pure
knowing—as well as the otherness, so to speak, of this being, or the object. But can
he have this?
Husserl would probably argue that the counter‐argument sketched above
rests on a false dilemma that transcendental phenomenology moves beyond. The
critic does not see a third possibility between transcendental realism and
skepticism, namely the possibility of a transcendental level at which the world is
revealed to be integrally unified with consciousness. This is but a brief pre‐sketch of

DeBoer, Theodore. The Development of Husserl’s Thought. Trans. Theodore Plantinga. The Hague,
the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, p. 314
87 Ideas I, p. 123
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one way Husserl could respond to the objection. I will say much more about this
way to approach the “consciousness/world” relation and its potential for success,
however, in the concluding thoughts of this chapter.

B. The Eidetic Distinction between Mental and Physical
Husserl’s quasi‐”Cartesianism” does not end with the “Cartesian way” to the
reduction. It is also evident in his effort to distinguish the essences of the “mental”
and the “physical” on several grounds. For instance, it belongs to the essence of
mental phenomena that they are indubitable, of physical phenomena that they are
not. “Every perception of something immanent [i.e., in the sphere of consciousness]
necessarily guarantees the existence of its object.”88 However, “[a]ccording to
eidetic law it is the case that physical existence is never required as necessary by the
givenness of something physical, but is always in a certain manner contingent.”89
What Husserl is indicating, of course, is that I cannot be wrong about the
existence of something’s appearing to me as such‐and‐such thing. For example,
while I can be wrong that a monster is standing in front of me, I cannot be wrong
that it appears as though one does. Even the Pyrrhonian skeptics were indeed
comfortable with this much. But does this reveal something about the “mental” and
the “physical,” or merely our cognitive relation to ourselves on the one hand and
transcendent realities on the other? This question reaches back to the question of
whether Descartes’ own “real distinction” is invalid on the grounds that he confused
the epistemological properties of the mind with real properties of minds and
88
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extended things. But in Husserl, as opposed to Descartes, this question cannot arise,
because after the phenomenological reduction and overcoming of the natural
attitude, it makes no sense to speak of anything but meanings. To speak of things as
being totally disconnected from consciousness is, as we have seen, meaningless; so
we have to take the manner of givenness of objects in perception as revealing
something essential about these objects themselves, and not only as telling us about
“ourselves” as perceivers.90
Physical things, by contrast to mental processes and appearances, are, as we
have already seen, transcendent. That is, the meaning “physical thing” contains this
transcendence. As transcendent, physical things somehow do not possess the seal of
self‐evidentness of immanent mental phenomena. For this is something that belongs
essentially to the nature of “the physical.” In sum (notice the continuous emphasis):

“Over against the positing of the world, which is a “contingent” positing, there stands then the positing
of my pure Ego and Egolife which is a “necessary,” absolutely indubitable positing. Anything physical
which is given “in person” can be nonexistent; no mental process which is given “in person” can be non
existent. This is the eidetic law defining this necessity and that contingency.”91

The “real” (Descartes’ term) or “eidetic” (Husserl’s) distinction between
physical and mental is established in other ways as well. Let us return to the issue of
perception. As we have said, transcendent things—“the world,” collectively
regarded—present themselves to consciousness in profiles or “adumbrations.” We
see only the sides of things, and can never—not even in principle—view all sides of
a thing at once, for perception is irreducibly perspectival. Therefore, we can say this
Ibid., p. 92
Ibid., Husserl’s italics. Husserl’s quotation marks here are not meant to be ironic, they are simply
designating essential types.

90
91

51
much about transcendent objects: they are always given inadequately. We never
have a totalistic perception of an object, but just as truly, objects do not give
themselves in full adequacy.92 By contrast with physical objects, pure cogitata and
mental appearances are given adequately. For example, I do not conceive of a
triangle in its adumbrations, but adequately and all at once. Husserl generalizes the
point to include all “mental processes,”93 concerning which he remarks, “Where
there is no spatial being it is senseless to speak of a seeing from different stand‐
points with a changing orientation in accordance with different perappearances,
adumbrations.”94
Herewith Husserl once again establishes that there is an essential
difference—with echoes here again of Descartes’ “real distinction”—between
consciousness and reality. Consciousness is a sphere of immanence, in which the
objects of thought are given adequately, whereas (physical) reality is a sphere of
transcendence—unqualified transcendence, to be precise—whose objects are given
to consciousness inadequately. Husserl actually makes two important relevant
essential distinctions: between that of perception and non‐perceptual mental
processes on the one hand, and between perception and “depictivesymbolic
objectivation,” or, more simply, “sign‐consciousness,” on the other.95 In this way,
Husserl tries to set phenomenology apart from the following alternatives, long
familiar from traditional or modern “epistemology”: pure idealism (which would
This does not, by the way, mean that we only perceive “parts” of objects when we see them—we
generally perceive the whole object, through its profiles or adumbrations. Hence the
“adequacy/inadequacy” relation cannot be correlated with the part‐whole relation.
93 Ideas I, p. 91
94 Ibid., p. 91
95 Ibid., p. 93
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deny the first distinction), representationalism of a Lockean variety (which would
deny the second), and naïve realism (which does not consider consciousness to have
its own essence in the first place). To this we must add the distinction between
phenomenology and Kantianism. For as we have pointed out, Husserl denies the
phenomenon‐noumenon distinction. Thus he stresses that:

“…in immediately intuitive acts we intuit an ‘in itself’, and that in perception the ‘it itself’ is further
characterized in its peculiarity as ‘in person’ in contrast to its modified characteristic as ‘floating
before us,’ as ‘presentiated’ in memory or in free phantasy.”96

Owing to his maintenance of an essential distinction of consciousness and reality,
not to mention his own invocation of Descartes, Husserl could easily be suspected of
espousing at this point a Cartesian dualism as well. We will look at this charge
below. To see fully how he would distinguish phenomenology from that dead end,
we will eventually have to turn to his arguments about the primacy of consciousness
over reality, in the subsequent sections. Such an asymmetry, if successful, would
definitively render the impossibility of Cartesian dualism. In the meanwhile, I will
try to dispel the specter of straightforward Cartesian dualism below.

C. The Charge of Dualism
The charge of “dualism” could superficially be leveled at Husserl, but if what
is meant by this is Cartesian “substance” dualism, it is clearly unfair. Husserl
decisively rejects this sort of dualism, and it is already clear from his own analysis
that he never regards “external reality” as truly and absolutely “external.” How
96
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could we know it in the first place, or perceive the world—“it itself”—in acts of
perception, if this were the case? This sort of comparison to Descartes would be
especially irresponsible given Husserl’s trenchant critique of that philosopher’s
view, already partially laid out above (IIB).
Whatever Husserl’s position with respect to his argument for transcendental
phenomenology, it should be clear by now that he has rejected naïve realism,
Kantian dualism, representationalism, and Cartesian dualism alike. Indeed, it is
better to start on his own terms—that is, in terms of “transcendental idealism.”
Consciousness is transcendental in that it makes both experience—“natural”
experience—and the world so experienced, possible. Transcendentality is not,
however, a sufficient condition for the existence of transcendent objects. Husserl
does not deny the reality of nature—of a realm of purely transcendent being (albeit
defined under conditions in which such transcendence obtains in necessarily co‐
subjective terms).
None of this is to deny, however, that Husserl can sound like a dualist much
of the time. With the transcendental reduction, Husserl frees transcendental
consciousness from the “real world.” Thus he speaks of the “essential
detachableness of the whole natural world from the domain of consciousness”97 and
proclaims that a “veritable abyss yawns between consciousness and reality.”98 His
words here admittedly concern not “natural” consciousness—or the human or
animal psyche—but “pure” consciousness. Yet even so, they raise concerns about
the possibility that Husserl has descended into a Cartesian‐style dualism. Husserl
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himself seems to relish emphasizing the absolute distinctness of transcendental
subjectivity and “Nature”:

“Everything which is purely immanent and reduced in the way peculiar to the mental process,
everything which cannot be conceived apart from it just as it is in itself, and which eo ipso passes
over into the Eidos in the eidetic attitude, is separated by an abyss from all of Nature and physics and
no less from all psychology—and even this image, as naturalistic, is not enough to indicate the
difference.”99

But how, we might wonder, would a non‐dualistic view like this really work?
And how, as Husserl claims, can there be any form of consciousness essentially
disconnected from the human ego, the latter of which now relegated to the “real” or
“natural” world? If this possibility is denied, Cartesianism might be seen to be the
inevitable result. But Husserl is not one to hedge his bets; everything rests on the
possibility of transcendental subjectivity in the strict, “irreal”100 sense in which he
understands it. Husserl’s enterprise in its radicality of purpose would be completely
misunderstood, in my view, by one who softens or blurs this emphasis on this
radical separability of consciousness and world. For it is precisely the inversion of
the naturalistic prioritization of the “real” over subjectivity that needs to be effected,
in Husserl’s view, before phenomenology is ever to come into its own and appear as
itself, and he says this repeatedly throughout his work.101 A philosophy that does
not cross the threshold of transcendental consciousness, making a clean break once
and for all from naturalism, is simply a form of “psychology.” It does not recognize

Ibid., 217 (my emphasis)
Ibid., p. 4
101 To take one example, see Crisis, p. 200: “the complete inversion of the natural attitude, thus into
an ‘unnatural’ one, places the greatest conceivable demands upon philosophical resolve and
consistency.” This sounds exactly like a “conversion” experience.
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the autonomy of the subject, and hence it is destined to remain enthralled by
“science” and “scientism.”102

D. Absolute and Relative Existence and the “WorldAnnihilation” Experiment
Husserl’s ultimate contention with respect to the relationship of
consciousness and reality is that the being of consciousness is “absolute” whereas
the being of the world is merely “relative” (namely, to consciousness). Thus Husserl
is not content with merely making an eidetic distinction between the “mental” and
the “physical.” He also explicitly assigns priority (in a sense yet to be determined) to
the former over the latter, at least when it comes to transcendental consciousness in
its relation to the material world (and those “strata”—psychical, for example, that
are founded upon it). We have already seen that from the point of view of
experience—and, importantly, there is no other point of view!—the world’s
existence is not, strictly speaking, necessary, but the existence of consciousness is.
Yes, perceptual consciousness, in which we are continually enmeshed directly or
indirectly, is consciousness of the world; but perceptions may be merely fantasies.

However accurate or misguided this position may be, it is powerful enough to exert considerable
pressure over a later, “post‐transcendental” phenomenologist like Merleau‐Ponty. For his part,
Merleau‐Ponty was equally opposed to scientific naturalism, but not on the grounds that it was
correct in its own domain, yet overly presumptuous in taking the “natural” world as the domain of all
being. Husserl widens the net, preserving science wholesale in its most basic objectivist assumptions,
while Merleau‐Ponty attacks transcendentalism (in both its Kantian and Husserlian forms) and
scientific naturalism alike, in search for a holistic alternative, one might say. Yet all the same,
Merleau‐Ponty would have to struggle with the problem of distinguishing philosophy’s task
compellingly from those of the sciences; he was to settle finally on a notion of reciprocity, contrary to
Husserl’s uncompromising, but to some, more appealing absolutism.
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For with any given case of (possible) perception, “the possibility of the non‐being of
the world is never excluded.”103 Or again:

“What hovers before one may be a mere figment; the hovering itself, the inventive consciousness, is
not itself invented and there belongs to its essence, as to any other mental process, the possibility of a
perceiving reflection which seizes upon absolute factual being.”104

Besides, the existence of external objects is established only on the basis of coherent
patterns of experience over extended periods of time—but what if these were to
dissolve into full‐blown incoherence, i.e. “chaos”? “The world” would not now
“exist”, but consciousness (of a real or imagined world) nonetheless would.
This latter notion—featured in Husserl’s “world‐annihilation” experiment—
is perhaps the most radical thought in all of the Ideas I, as well as perhaps its most
contested, even by many Husserlians. The thought experiment is designed to show
the ultimate asymmetry of consciousness and world—and subsequently to lend
further proof of the independence of transcendental phenomenology from the
empirical sciences of the “natural attitude.” Husserl observes that the meaning
“world” is established as a certain harmony of appearances. That is, physical things
can by definition never become completely immanent, and hence we cannot know
them absolutely and directly. So the only way we come to understand them to exist
transcendently is through the regular ways in which they appear to us. It is on the
basis of appearances or presentations of things to consciousness that we posit (as it
were) the existence of a transcendent world—only then does its “meaning” as
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“transcendent” (Kant’s “transcendental object=X”105) become constituted. The
appearances must have a certain regularity, and they must “appear” in a way that
satisfied a minimal level of expectation on our part. For example, we would not at
first take a flashing “object,” which popped into and out of existence randomly and
rapidly, as an external object, even if it were one; we would likely take it to be an
hallucination.106 But suppose this regularity were to break down at a fundamental
level, such that, effectively, there ceases to be a world.107 Does this automatically
entail the abolishment of consciousness? Husserl thinks not:

“…while the being of consciousness, of any stream of mental processes whatever, would indeed be
necessarily modified by an annihilation of the world of physical things its own existence would not be
touched.”108

Mental processes could still occur—why not? After all, according to the method of
epoché and reduction themselves, we have no right to assume that consciousness is
causally dependent on, or interdependent with, the world. All such presuppositions,
as well as notions of causality, have by now been exposed for exactly what they are,
and they have been bracketed accordingly. What remains is what Husserl calls the
“phenomenological residuum,”109 or a certain “stream” of conscious life.
All the same, it is very important to note that we are not in the Berkeleyan
camp with this argument. For nowhere does Husserl suggest that physical things
themselves, in their transcendent being, depend on the existence of consciousness
Ibid., pp. 342‐3
If others reported seeing it as well, this would begin to change our view. But then again, they
would not report it, either, unless there were some reason—a harmony of appearance and satisfied
expectations over time—to do so.
107 Ideas I, p. 109
108 Ibid., p. 109
109 Ibid., p. 65
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or perception (“esse est percipi”). His point is that we would have no reason to posit
the existence of transcendent things in the first place, were it not for the
deliverances of consciousness in the form of adumbrated appearance‐perceptions.
Yet in its reflexive moment of self‐perception, the same cannot be said of
consciousness itself: it can be sure of its existence, an existence that is therefore, in
this sense, “absolute.” And it can see self‐evidently that it exists, even if there is no
maturely formed “ego” there to be able to articulate this. This much of the Cartesian
legacy survives in Ideas I.110 For Husserl, consciousness’ knowledge of itself, at some
deep level, is absolute. This is enough to ground transcendental phenomenology—
namely on a “pure” level of experience in which all objects, on the noematic side, as
well as all perceivings and thinkings, on the noetic, are constituted.
To deny that this sort of asymmetry exists might be tempting, but on what
grounds could we do so after the epoché? Certainly there are no grounds to speak of
a causally necessary relationship of world to consciousness, for it is precisely any
possible causal relation between the two that Husserl purposefully brackets and
It is true that there follows from Husserl’s view the distinct possibility of solipsism, at least of a
“transcendental sort”: “Only for an Ego, or a stream of mental processes, in relation to itself, does this
distinctive state of affairs exist; here alone there is, and here there must be, such a thing as
perception of something immanent.” (italics added) The problem of solipsism is one Husserl tackles
memorably in later works, particularly the Cartesian Meditations, though to questionable success.
The problem is roughly this: Does the reduction reveal the necessity solely of myself as
transcendental ego, in the sense that the world is the “transcendental phenomenon” (Husserl’s term)
for my transcendental ego? This would indeed be a disastrous consequence for the transcendental
reduction, if it were true. It is in the Fifth Meditation of the Cartesian Meditations that Husserl finally
reveals that transcendental subjectivity resolves into transcendental intersubjectivity, which already
presupposes a multiplicity of ego’s and, subsequently, the world of “Objective Nature” as decisively
shared by these egos in a common space and time. (CM, p. 130) It is only with the introduction of
transcendental intersubjectivity that one can answer in a full and positive way the charge that
transcendental phenomenology is a form of “transcendental solipsism” that collapses the being of the
world and of other people to a kind of absolute transcendental “intra‐subjectivity.” Nonetheless,
Husserl’s solution is strictly “transcendental” and never presupposes the actual existence of anyone
at all. Compare with his remarks on the tree that need not exist in being perceived (IVA above) and
the world that need not exist for me to have conscious experience (present section).
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ignores. But how are we to avoid the consequence of a complete collapse into
idealism—to an embrace of the possibility of a self‐sufficient Ego, in which the
“world as such” finds its true home? Here it might seem, in other words, that there is
no way to prove—or to discover in the first place—just what “the world” is like, as a
transcendent world, apart from its manners of givenness to consciousness, so that, if
we are to reject subjective idealism, we seemingly must grant the existence of a
transcendent world only as a matter of prejudice. But this is not acceptable,
certainly not for Husserl. This sort of prejudice or “blind assumption” is exactly
what Husserl wants to avoid, and it is why worldly existence must prove itself
through experience, and not vice‐versa.
Husserl’s experiment has not been convincing to many people, but it should
probably be viewed as a perfectly reasonable illustration of the more basic
Husserlian principle—namely the possibility of a global epoché and transcendental
reduction. That is, if we wish to question the world‐annihilation experiment,
perhaps we need first to question this possibility of a global epoché. It is precisely
over this point that the phenomenologist Jan Patǒcka, to take one prominent
example, takes Husserl to task, arguing that a bracketing of the very existence of the
world itself is impossible, for we can only do this for a subset of the world. Moreover,
Patǒcka argues that the existence of the world is something we could never even
attempt to doubt. In his book on Husserl, he begins by pointing out that “…the world
as a whole is ever‐present, present as a horizon; this horizonal givenness is
something original. For the horizon is neither a particular perspective nor an
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anticipation. Perspectives and anticipations are possible only on the basis of it.”111
He then goes on to dispute Husserl’s equation of a “chaos” with the absence of a
“world”: “A chaos, though, is something different than no world at all; it is precisely
an unordered world. An un‐ordered world does not mean the non‐existence of the
whole, only the nonexistence of a whole of a certain type.”112 In this way Patǒcka
correctly connects the world‐annihilation experiment directly with the notion of a
global transcendental epoché, regarding the rejection of the one as entailing the
rejection of the other.113

E. Husserl’s Final Position: “Transcendental Idealism”
If Husserl is not a simple Cartesian dualist, then what is he? First of all, he
takes himself to be starting a sui generis enterprise that is wholly incomparable to
any prior philosophical system. He also takes himself to have gone beyond the one‐
sided debates of realism and idealism and taken a higher route, like Kant. However,
in fact, he calls his own view “transcendental idealism” (my emphasis). In this way
he invites the view that he is somehow “anti‐realist,” to use the modern turn of
phrase.
Many of Husserl’s critics, both on and off the Continent, contemporaneously
as well as more recently, have regarded him suspiciously because of this self‐
declared “idealism.” In this label they have seen the vestiges of an old mistake,
Patocka, Jan. An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology. Trans. Erazim Kohák. Chicago: Open
Court Publishing Company, 1996. (p. 105) Hereafter “Patocka.”
112 Ibid., p. 105
113 Patocka’s conclusion is that the “thesis” of the world “as a whole” “does not in principle reduce to
any givenness of a particular, so that its thesis can never be excluded by suspending the theses of
such particulars.” (Patocka, p. 105) And under this view, the reduction has to presuppose the world,
for transcendental reflection itself requires it.
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namely to conflate experience with that which is experienced. Indeed the
philosopher J. N. Findlay, English translator of the Logical Investigations, rejected
Husserl’s later philosophy in part because of just this turn towards “idealism.”114
And this is coming from an self‐avowed “rational mystic”! But the same was true of a
very different group of thinkers, Husserl’s own sometime followers—including
Alexander Pfänder, Adolf Reinach, and Johannes Daubert—of the so‐called “Münich”
school of “realist” phenomenology. Daubert had written a detailed commentary on
Ideas I in shorthand, only recently translated, again taking issue with its idealism.115
(Daubert argues for the “primacy of the real” and for consciousness as a mere
“function” of reality.) Husserl himself rarely uses the term “idealism” in Ideas I, but
there is no doubt that the text embraces a kind of idealism, which we will investigate
below, in his effort to secure for phenomenology the position of “first
philosophy.”116
In Husserl’s account, consciousness is not closed, but open‐to‐the‐world. The
meaning “the world” very much belongs to conscious experience as an integral and
necessary part of it—and certainly in acts of sense‐perception, in which the
intentional objects are things like “chairs” and “cats,” encountered physically‐
transcendently—but also, less directly, in all other acts. Husserl was thus not a
See, for example: Findlay, J. N. The Discipline of the Cave. New York: George Allen and Unwin, 1966,
p. 162: “This is why a deeply reflective thinker like Husserl, whose whole training in the thought of
Brentano made him wary of all the more facile snares of idealism, nonetheless veered towards
idealism in his later phenomenology.” (my italics) See also the interesting article by David Carr
entitled “Findlay, Husserl, and the Epoché” (Ch. 5 of Studies in the Philosophy of J. N. Findlay, eds.
Cohen, Martin, and Westphal, Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), esp. pp. 154‐5
115 The “code‐breaker” was Karl Schuhmann. See the essay by Schuhmann and Barry Smith entitled
“Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I.” Review of Metaphysics 38 (1985), pp. 763‐
793.
116 Of course, there are scholars who would dispute even this claim. Dallas Willard insists that
Husserl is in fact a “realist,” for example. But since Husserl called himself a transcendental idealist, it
seems to behoove us at least to understand in what sense he might have taken himself to be one.
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subjective idealist, certainly not by design.117 For him, the world exists very much
independently of particular acts of consciousness. The a priori correlativity (as he
was to later term it) of world and consciousness is a matter of the world’s giving
itself to consciousness in certain fixed and uniform manners, which are themselves
anchored in certain essential types of subjectivity and “subjective
accomplishment.”118 In other words, it is to say that we cannot make sense of a
world that has no intrinsic connection to a potential or actual subjective
experiencing of that world, just as there is no way to understand such an
experiencing without a concomitant principle of an objective or noematic pole
through which the world becomes manifest and given in its actuality in perceptual
experience.
But one of the consequences of Husserl’s idealism is the denial that there is
any meaningful sort of reality, such as physical reality, that can become de‐coupled
from the mind at all levels. Husserl’s way of putting the point is as follows:

“…the whole spatiotemporal world...has the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness.... It
is a being...determined and intuited only as something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities
of experience: beyond that it is nothing.”119

From the point of view of the phenomenological attitude (as opposed to the natural
one), what things are is simply what they are for consciousness. But since the
phenomenological attitude is philosophically truer and superior120 to the natural

He explicitly rejects the label in Ideas I, 129
Crisis 159‐60
119 Ideas I, p. 112
120 Cf.: “From the transcendental standpoint one understands the natural attitude as a ‘lower’ stance,
or which says the same, the natural attitude is already transcendental, yet without knowing it. The
117
118
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(because it is freer of “presuppositions”), it follows that we should obey its authority
when it reveals that the essence of worldly being is to be dependent on another, in a
way that does not apply symmetrically to consciousness itself. We are still not
talking about existential‐causal dependence, however. We are not claiming that the
world is a fiction generated by the imagination, or that it is merely a variant of
consciousness itself. After all, because consciousness is inherently intentional, it is
always already a consciousness “of” things, of its “surrounding world”—which
Husserl also makes clear is a constant ground in a way that imagined and
remembered worlds are not. So the world cannot be dismissed or subjectivized; but
it can be revealed as a being dependent for its meaning on another, and this is
consciousness.
Yet can we not turn this argument back, and argue that consciousness is
similarly dependent for its meaning—as consciousness—on the world? Not for
Husserl, crucially. The reason is remarkably simple: a certain sort of primordial
subjectivity remains, as a residue, after all other things—all existential claims—have
been bracketed. Acts of consciousness remain, and they remain intuitively
accessible as just what they are, without the interference of any “presuppositions.”
The existence of consciousness is not something we claim; it—the “transcendental
ego”—is the basis for the making of any valid claims whatsoever. It is the ultimate,
timeless, and primordial source of meaning. Husserl does not claim for it the status

natural attitude is ‘implicate’ in the transcendental perspective.” (Luft, 225) Only, we might wish to
make a distinction between raw natural experience and such experience as laden with realistic
“assumptions,” the latter being the full “natural attitude” as Husserl describes it.
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of a godhead, however. Strictly, it is neither “human” nor “divine.” (!) Yet it certainly
is self‐contained:

“[C]onsciousness considered in its purity must be held to be a self‐contained complex of being, a
complex of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip, to
which nothing is spatiotemporally external and which cannot be affected by any physical thing...”121

Now ironically, this sort of remark has precisely the effect of circumventing the
possibility of dualism. For what Husserl is telling us is that (pure) consciousness is
not something on the same level as either “physical” things or “mental” ones (non‐
”purified” subjective things like particular human egos and their “real”
components), and that it is not indeed a thing at all, but the basis on which all things
become known and defined. Whether we agree with him or not, we must take
seriously his own claim to be revealing an undiscovered country, as it were, whose
terrain has never before been seen. It is as if to say that Husserl claims to have found
(or rediscovered, after Descartes and others) the access point, itself neither part of
the world nor other than it, to the comprehensibility of that world (and itself). This
structure is the ultimate concern of “philosophy,” now understood as
“transcendental phenomenology”—the study of the underlying structures, or again
the origins of,122 experience and experienceable reality.
We might end this section with an extended quote from Husserl, in which he
himself neatly summarizes the bulk of his position in Ideas I. Hopefully, by now the
reader will be familiar with the concepts discussed herein:
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“The realm of transcendental consciousness as the realm of what is, in a determined sense, ‘absolute
being,’ has been provided us by the phenomenological reduction. It is primal category of all being (or,
in our terminology, the primal region), the one in which all other regions of being are rooted, to
which, according to their essence, they are relative and on which they are therefore all essentially
dependent. The theory of categories must start entirely from this most radical of all ontological
distinctions—being as consciousness and being as something which becomes ‘manifested’ in
consciousness, ‘transcendent’ being—which, as we see, can be attained in its purity and be
appreciated only by the method of the phenomenological reduction. In the essential relationship
between transcendental and transcendent being are rooted all the relationships already touched on
by us repeatedly but later to be explored more profoundly, between phenomenology and all other
sciences—relationships in the sense of which it is implicit that the dominion of phenomenology
include in a certain remarkable manner all other sciences.”123

Of particular note here, for our purposes, is the repeated deployment of variants of
“being” and “ontological,” as well as the notion of a “realm” of “transcendental
consciousness.” Transcendental phenomenology is both an epistemology as well as
a kind of higher‐order ontology—a science, to modify Aristotle, of “being qua
known.”

IV. Concluding Reflections

Part of the deep appeal of Husserl’s phenomenology is its appeal to intuition,
to experience, and to evidence. This “evidentialism” (my word) gives philosophy a
mandate to be “responsible” to the facts, so to speak, and accordingly to the “things
themselves.” It is why Husserl could speak of phenomenology as the “genuine”
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positivism.124 On the other hand, Husserl’s definition of experience and intuition are
broad enough to appeal to non‐empiricists (and even Kantians), for whom sensory
experience is the only true form of intuition. Husserl includes such acts as categorial
intuition and ideation. We are able to “experience” logical entities and mathematical
ones, and, through acts of imagination and memory, non‐existent ones. There is only
one ultimate principle of evidence to which one must strictly adhere—the so‐called
“principle of principles”:

“No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every
originative presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily…offered
to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what is presented as being, but also only within the limits
in which it is presented there.”125

Husserl makes knowledge a much more “democratic” enterprise than was ever
before conceived—all intuitive evidence of any kind can take on cognitive validity.
At the same time, Husserl forces the phenomenologist to be disciplined by
remaining true to this evidence and only this evidence in making knowledge claims.
But if this is all that phenomenology consists in—evidentiary rigor and a
wide scope for cognition—then it is unlikely Husserl would have attracted so much
opposition by later (and contemporary) phenomenologists themselves. To
understand this reaction one must turn to the bold and challenging form of
intentional “idealism” that Ideas I erects. It is, essentially, an explanatory framework
for the possibility of knowledge in light of the seeming gulf between, as McDowell
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has memorably put it, “mind and world.”126 Husserl shows us that in fact, the two
are intertwined at all levels, even though eidetically distinct. But how is this
possible? How can there be a world that gives itself to us even while this givenness is
subject to strict rules governed by the life of an essentially un‐worldly Ego? How is
this not to be thought of as anything more than an arbitrary positing of a quasi‐
Leibnizian “pre‐established harmony”? What is the essential, inner law that would
make the fusion of the real and the ideal an actuality, and not a blind hope?
It would seem that Husserl’s “transcendental ego” does not so much offer a
solution as it literally gives a name to just this hope—it is a promise, an earnest,
rather than a solution. It does not improve on Hegel’s “Absolute Spirit” and in fact
lacks the latter’s univocal (in this case, ideal) nature. Husserl’s theory asks for a
separation of essence from fact, real from ideal, transcendental from natural—all
the while insisting that no such cleavages compromise his vision of pure and direct
cognition of the “things themselves.” This is a tough sell. For is there not an
unavoidable tension between any form of transcendental idealism and the notion of
“transcendent things”? So long as these are merely “immanent transcendencies,”
does not Husserl’s position veer precipitously towards subjective or absolute
idealism, albeit clearly against his own intentions? It is in fact the latter hidden
possibility—the possibility of an “absolute” idealism—that hovers constantly over
his work in the idealist phase. Yet there are even deeper reasons—reasons that the
structure of Husserl’s own system provides us with—to believe that Husserl’s
“transcendental idealism” is intrinsically oriented towards absolute idealism, by
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tendency that is. This can be seen through the inevitable logic of “attitudes” that
Husserl leaves for the most part inexplicit.
Husserlian transcendental idealism, as we have seen, depends on the crucial
distinction of the natural and transcendental attitudes, and hence on the possibility
of a transcendental reduction. In this respect it is exceedingly important to regard
the two attitudes—natural and transcendental—as being at different levels. That is,
the natural attitude is not merely replaced by the transcendental; from the natural
attitude, we trade up to the transcendental attitude. On its own, the natural attitude
is false, since it makes assumptions about the indifference of mind and world that
are themselves false. The natural attitude has to be overcome and replaced by the
transcendental if we are to do real philosophy and hence “know” the world around
us. So much is merely review. The transcendental attitude is the one in which reality
is known as it really is; the natural attitude is but a prelude. Yet, do we ever stop
being “naïve realists”? Is there not an “everydayness” that pervades even the
transcendental philosopher’s existence? It is impossible in Husserl’s system to have
both attitudes at once, however, since the natural attitude contains commitments
that have to be given up in the transcendental attitude; they are mutually exclusive.
Yet if they were merely incommensurable, one could not be called superior to
another, and the result would be a form of relativism. But since the transcendental
attitude is clearly superior for Husserl, who was strongly anti‐relativist we might
add, it would seem to me that it is only logical to conclude the following: that the
transcendental attitude is at a higher level than the natural, but also contains all the
truth and legitimacy (basically, the raw intuitivity, without for example the mistaken
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theoretical assumptions regarding the real existence of intuited objects) of the
former, and in such a way as to sublate it. Thus we can still experience the natural
attitude legitimately, so long as we subordinate it to the transcendental as soon as
we are in a position to begin to truly understand what we experience “naturally.”
The transcendental attitude is thus an improvement over the natural attitude; it is a
clear‐eyed view of the bilateral constitutive nexus of experience and that‐which‐is‐
experienced, grounded in intuitive evidence which comes to us “naturally.” And so
the natural attitude is thus overcome by the (phenomenological) philosopher, who
goes beyond it while retaining the first‐order experiential data, morphic and hyletic,
disclosed in its domain.
What does this picture tell us, finally? It explains exactly Husserl’s own
conviction that the transcendental attitude, which is itself the attitude of
transcendental consciousness, discloses a self‐standing realm of being that includes
but overcomes the being of Nature, which is merely dependent on the “pure” Being
of Consciousness. External existence in the “naïve‐realist” sense, so to speak, is
revealed to be a fiction native to the natural attitude. It is not to be taken seriously
by those that know better, namely that “external existence” is itself only a “meaning”
generated in and through consciousness—namely perceiving consciousness. I call
this “absolute idealism” not simply to echo Hegel or the German Idealists but to
draw on Husserl’s own language—he himself uses “absolute” to describe the being
of consciousness (qua phenomenological residuum). The phenomenological
reduction is thus akin the opening of an eye, a delivery from darkness. It is no mere
modification of the psyche—indeed, it leaves the psyche itself behind!
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There is a pressing general question, therefore, regarding the “bracketing”
procedure, or at least the way Husserl employs it in Ideas I, namely whether it
necessarily entails a sort of subjectivism from which there is, properly, no return.
Husserl’s transcendent world is preserved nominally after the reduction, but only as
a “meaning.” Husserl’s understanding of transcendence is complex, and it may
legitimately be wondered whether he has truly repelled the ghost of subjectivism
from entering his system. This has been perceived as a lack of appreciation of the
depth of the “alterity” of things, much in the way Husserl has been similarly
criticized for not sufficiently explaining the otherness of other people.
Another question that arises in reading Husserl regards the very possibility
of transcendental phenomenology in the first place. This is the source of one of the
great puzzles and challenges of transcendental phenomenology. That is, how can we
overcome the natural attitude, as Husserl insists that we must in order to enter into
knowledge, if it is already so successful, by its very nature, in binding us to its doxic
spell? Husserl frames the task of breaking free as a matter of being disciplined and
rigorous, but the question really has more to do with principle than with degree. For
just how is it that it is even possible to know one’s experiential life as it is lived
without remaining somehow in that very experientiality—that is, in the “natural
attitude”? This is not merely a question of the possibility of “reflexivity.” For
reflexive consciousness can still be explained within the natural attitude: I can think
about my thinking, treating it as an object like anything else. The transcendental
attitude involves more than this; it involves a reflexivity blended together with a
thoroughgoing “bracketing” of the whole world I take for granted in everyday life. It
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involves the rejection of naïve realism in the most categorical of terms. So how is
transcendental phenomenology itself possible?
It is in connection with this question that we come to a characteristic
hermeneutic difficulty in Ideas I and transcendental phenomenology generally.127 To
be able to see the natural attitude as such, to be able to form the essential concept of
it and make it a theme of reflection, is to have to presuppose the self‐transcendence
of the natural attitude. One is already in the transcendental attitude, in other words,
from the very beginning of the text of Ideas I—or at least, one has to be there to
properly grasp its contents. Yet how are we to get there, without first using the
phenomenological method, that is, without first bracketing our own assumptions,
etc.?
The phenomenological reduction has a distinct “double meaning.” There is an
obvious and important sense in which the epoché involves a kind of “withdrawal”
from the world. It is an exclusion, or “bracketing,” of the natural “factual” world, a
flight to a level of “pure” insight. But transcendental phenomenology is also a move
away from the “theories” developed in the “natural attitude” and hence a return to a
more primordial and authentic layer of experience—of the natural, factual world! To
over‐emphasize the former aspect is of course to push Husserl into mysticism, while
the latter presses him too deeply, potentially, into the bowels of nature, the dreaded
zone of opaque “fact.” Yet unless we accept a story of sublation, in which Husserl
comes dangerously (to his mind) close to absolute idealism, there would seem to be
an unresolved tension between transcendental subjectivity and the “natural order”
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at the heart of Husserl’s system.128 It is my considered view, then, that Husserl must
be an absolute or unmitigated idealist—one who denies any co‐ultimacy of “natural”
reality with transcendental consciousness/subjectivity—on pain of the potential for
his system to dissolve into incoherence and permanent vacillation between
transcendence and transcendentality.

Some contemporary Husserl commentators, for example Donn Welton, have argued that it would
be a shame to base one’s entire understanding on Husserl’s transcendental project on Ideas I. In
Welton’s words, the “Cartesian” approach of this text is “trapped in transcendental psychologism,”
and should be contrasted with the much more promising “Kantian” approach Husserl later
(insufficiently) developed. (Welton, p. 287) This may be so, but as we have seen already, even Welton
recognizes that there are multiple and parallel paths in Husserl’s own thinking. Whether Husserl ever
truly resolved the tensions I speak of is an open question.
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Chapter Two: The Constitution of Nature, Body, and
Spirit in Husserl’s Ideas II129

“If philosophy begins with the natural attitude, will it ever leave it behind, and if it could, why would
it? Such are the questions that bother Husserl, and which explain the contradictory positions that he
took on the constitution of Nature.”
‐‐Maurice Merleau‐Ponty130

I. Introduction

If Ideas I aims through the epoché and reduction to introduce Husserl’s
transcendental‐phenomenological method, then Ideas II aims to show us the being
of the world as revealed by this method. The latter text is thus, one might say, the
ontological complement to its more epistemological‐methodological predecessor,
while the brief Ideas III131, the final piece in the triad, is a kind of hybrid of both. The

Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book:
Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Trs. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1989. (Hereafter Ideas II.) The present chapter covers both Ideas II and Ideas
III. (Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Third Book:
Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences. Trans. Ted Klein and William E. Pohl. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980. Hereafter Ideas III.) But I will talk less frequently of the latter,
owing to its brevity and relative lack of substance, as compared to either of the first two volumes. It
does, however, contain some useful material for our purposes. Brief attention will also be given to
one of Husserl’s lectures from 1919. (Husserl, Edmund. Husserliana Materialienbände, Band IV. Natur
und Geist: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1919. Ed. Michael Weiler. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2002. Hereafter Husserl 1919.)
130 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France. Compiled and with notes
from Dominique Séglard. Tr. Robert Vallier. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 2003
(p. 79)
131 It is of course the middle, much longer and denser text that is the primary subject of this chapter.
129
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latter two volumes presuppose a prior performance of the epoché and reduction,
along with the transcendental‐idealistic turn that go with them. This allows Husserl
to dive into the burning question, left wide open after Ideas I, as to just what the
world is supposed to look like once the reduction has taken place—not only the
world, of course, but the world‐occupying self who, in its transcendental guise, has
made these new vistas possible.
Ideas II is thus both an extension as well as a deepening of its nominal
predecessor, though it’s true that the two texts hardly have a comparable history of
development. Although much of it was written around the same time (1912‐1915)
as Ideas I, Ideas II was being revised throughout Husserl’s life, and he was never
satisfied to have it published.132 Ideas III also remained unpublished in Husserl’s
life‐time, but it was revised hardly at all between the time it was first drafted and
Husserl’s death.133 The published and author‐endorsed Ideas I was hugely
influential, both positively and negatively, but amazingly, so was the long‐
underground Ideas II. No less than Heidegger and Merleau‐Ponty were shaped
decisively by the work, while many others—Alfred Schütz, Paul Ricoeur, etc.—felt
compelled to comment on the work and respond to its remarkable contents.134 As

Some make much of the fact that Edith Stein gave a good deal of the shape (and overall title) to the
work in her 1918 redaction. I will address one particular scholar’s (Elizabeth Behnke’s) thoughts on
the matter in the next chapter.
133 For detailed information on the publication history of Ideas II, see the Translator’s Introduction to
the English edition of the work (Ideas II, xii‐xvi).
134 The case of Merleau‐Ponty is clear and obvious from his own writings, as we will see in this and
subsequent chapters. As for Heidegger, Nenon makes a convincing case that Heidegger was “directly
and immediately” influenced by Husserl’s notions of the “personalistic attitude” and “Umwelt.” (See:
Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II. Eds. Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1996, p. x. Volume hereafter referred to as Issues.) Luckily, a lengthy synoptic study has
been done by Paul Ricoeur, whose numerous judicious observations we will have multiple occasions
to consult and interpret in the course of the present study. See: Ricoeur, Paul. Husserl: An Analysis of
His Phenomenology. Trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree. Evanston: Northwestern
132
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for the relative dearth of literature on the book and its rings of influence, in the
words of the editors of a recent collection of essays on the work, “there is an almost
inverse proportion between the influence that Husserl’s Ideas II exercised on
important philosophical developments in this century and the attention it has
received in secondary literature.”135
The fact is that Ideas II is an amazing, as well as fearsomely complex, foray
into a large array of problems, among them the mind‐body problem, the so‐called
problem of the human sciences (what they are and how they differ methodologically
and regionally from natural sciences), the problem of personal identity and
motivation, and many others, all united in tenuous ways under the banner “studies
in constitution.” Ideas II complements Ideas I but also goes well beyond it in many
regards. It can fruitfully be read as a supplement to or foreshadower of all phases of
Husserl’s later thought. For example, it anticipates and even partially develops some
of the main themes of the Cartesian Meditations (intersubjectivity, empathy,
“monadology”) as well as the Crisis of the European Sciences (the life‐world, or, as it
were, the “surrounding world”—Umwelt), and while mostly “static” (like Ideas I), it
begins to incorporate elements of genetic phenomenology as well, at least in its
third part. It stands on its own, however, as well. It features the most detailed
examination of the body Husserl ever produced—this being the probable root of its
singular impact on subsequent Continental thought. It is also the source of

University Press, 2007. (pp. 35‐81) Hereafter “Ricoeur.” There is also a shorter but important early
essay on Ideas II written around the same time by Alfred Schütz, which I will unfortunately not have
time to address in this chapter. See: Schütz, Alfred. “Edmund Husserl’s Ideas, Volume II.” In Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 13: (pp. 394‐413)
135 The editors are Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree. (Issues, p. ix)

76
numerous insightful distinctions between nature, soul, spirit, Ego, and person—
though these are often impossible to reconcile with one another harmoniously, as
we will see. For ultimately, Ideas II is simply too stuffed with good ideas to make a
single consistent argument (or, phenomenologically speaking, a consistent set of
eidetic descriptions), which may be one of the reasons Husserl was never fully
satisfied with it. Indeed, much that is introduced and partly developed in Ideas II is
not developed all the way, even by Husserl’s standards. The history of the text and
its editing by multiple hands (Husserl, Stein, Landgrebe) also means that it is highly
uneven and disorganized in places, and can hardly be said to have a conventional or
even logically sound structure.
It is wise then, on the one hand, not to treat Ideas II as a unified whole so
much as a collection of investigatory strains. On the other hand, the skeleton of Ideas
II as a text is the closest we will come to a glimpse of what might be called a
complete “Husserlian (regional) ontology.”136 Husserl’s constitutional analyses,
taken at their face value as grounded intuitively, are meant to reveal to us the being
of the whole world of positive being, of “what is” (panta ta onta), from the lowest or
most foundational stratum, that of “physicalistic” nature, to the highest, the
reflecting personal (or “spiritual”) Ego, along with its collective cultural formations
(“personalities of a higher order”). And all of this has intrinsic philosophical interest
for a myriad of questions usually understood as “metaphysical”—materialism and

Husserl distinguishes between formal ontology and regional ontology. In this chapter we are
concerned with the latter, that is, with the kinds of beings that make up the world, specifically the
“ontological regions” of material nature, animal nature, and spirit. (See: Drummond, John J. Historical
Dictionary of Husserl’s Philosophy. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2008, pp. 78‐9, 151, 180.
Hereafter “Dictionary.”)
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the mind‐body problem, for example—in the same way, perhaps, that the
phenomenological theories of intentionality or perception address classical
questions of “epistemology.” As I will argue in this chapter, I read the text to be a
continual balancing‐act—which resembles more so a see‐saw—between naturalistic
and anti‐naturalistic strains in Husserl’s philosophy, both of which are strongly on
display in the text. The contradictions of the text are useful for the study of Husserl
generally because they are reflective of the deepest underlying tensions of his
phenomenological system. They go to the very issues—the nature of idealism and
the transcendental ego, the nature‐spirit divide and the division of natural and
human sciences in their relation to phenomenology—that occupied Husserl, and
remained unresolved, until the end of his life.
Of course, these are also the very issues that concern us in our study of
Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty on the question of the meaning of nature and its relation
to “spirit” and consciousness. Ideas II (and III) teach a confusing double lesson—on
the one hand, the “spirituality of nature” (as Husserl puts it in another text137),
particularly in the form of the living, feeling organism as living; and on the other
hand (and this is what dominates Husserl’s account, all things considered), the strict
bifurcation of nature and spirit, not necessarily in terms of distinguishing the
transcendental ego (consciousness in its “irreal” iridescence) from reality, but in
terms of carving out two separate ontological orders within the realm of the “real”
itself (and within which the “body” figures very differently in each respective
sphere). Combined with these difficulties is the equally central confusion between
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the nature of “spirit” vis‐à‐vis that of “consciousness” or “transcendental
subjectivity,” the latter of which of course figures so ubiquitously in the scheme of
Husserl’s project as a whole. This particular issue goes to the heart of the ambiguity
between Husserl’s distinction between ontology and phenomenology, the real and
the transcendental, and, in addition to the prior ambiguities about nature and the
body, make it possible to see where Husserl’s transcendental‐phenomenological
project starts to unravel somewhat from within. Or more charitably speaking, these
problems seem to call for a transformation of Husserlian phenomenological project
in a more unified direction, one of which happens to involve a more immanentized
and embodied conception of the ego (which ought not be entirely aloof from
ontology) and a more ecstatic, “enworlded” conception of the body (which ought not
to be entirely aloof from the ego). This is the direction ultimately taken by Merleau‐
Ponty, for whom the transcendental ego must situate itself somehow (and never
wholly comfortably) in nature itself, namely as a power of finite reflection, capable
of a certain “eidetic seeing” but incapable of absolute transparency or a final victory
over its all‐too‐natural Grund. Thus, Merleau‐Ponty’s entire original project, one
might say, is first made possible by the volatile ruptures of Ideas II.138 But we will
have to wait before we examine this “second half” of the story in more detail, in
Chapter 3 (and briefly, in the conclusion of the present chapter).
In part II of this chapter I will provide a detailed outline of the general
ontological matrix sketched out by Husserl in Ideas II (and continued in III),

Of course, here it is well to keep in mind Voltaire’s highly appropriate maxim about the mistakes
of “true genius”: “C’est le privilège du vrai génie et surtout du génie qui ouvre une carrière, de faire
impunément de grandes fautes.” (Siècle de Louis XIV, ch. 32)
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accompanied by some critical commentary. Then, in part III, I will produce a textual
analysis in which I both lay out what I take to be the most interesting problems—in
both the neutral and pejorative senses of the terms—of Husserl’s presentation. I will
conclude with some reflections on Ideas II and, as mentioned above, some thoughts
on how Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy can be understood as a response to and
development of the themes (and tensions) of text. Ultimately I will argue that what
emerges from Husserl’s ontological matrix (in combination with the position
already stated in Ideas I) is a complex, and finally self‐inconsistent, combination of
ontological dualism and phenomenological monism, in spite of an otherwise
promising foray into the hybridity of the living body.

II. The Ontological Matrix of Ideas II/III

A. Introduction
As we have already indicated, Ideas II/III concerns the “constitution” of
reality. In the words of one commentator, “Ideas II can be regarded as the attempt to
regain [after Ideas I] reality by catching it up in the same net with pure
consciousness.”139 That is, whereas the subject (in the sense of “topic”) of Ideas I is
consciousness and its general intentional structure, that of Ideas II is the reality
Tymieniecka, Anna‐Teresa. “From Husserl’s Formulation of the Soul‐Body Issue to a New
Differentiation of Human Faculties.” In Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology: Man and Nature
(Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XVI). Ed. Anna‐Teresa Tymieniecka. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands,
1983 (p. 4)
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constituted in consciousness, a reality which has its own various kinds, strata, and
types of givenness to be distinguished and related. In this way, reduction and
constitution eventually emerge as two complementary poles of phenomenological
method140, and they have remained so ever since.
But what, precisely, is “constitution”? Defining it is a bit tricky. As Dermot
Moran explains, it is more of an “operative” as opposed to “thematic” concept in
Husserl, and thus it typically remains undefined by him.141 One could, however,
define it roughly in terms of the spontaneous production (in the sense of “making
available,” not “creation”) of objects. One speaks, for example, of consciousness’
constitution “of the material world,” for example, or again of “other people” (in the
sense of intersubjectivity)—in the sense that consciousness makes such beings
available. Thus, the notion of constitution emphasizes the “objective” aspect of the
“correlational a priori” of consciousness and object, while reduction, by contrast,
emphasizes the subjective, or “constituting” aspect. Now the principle of
constitution is what allows us to speak of Husserl’s “ontology,” that is, of the “being”
of things “in themselves,” in terms of what they fundamentally (essentially) are, so
long as we remember, in the words of Cobb‐Stevens, that “transcendental
philosophy refuses to be absorbed either by a sociology of personal reciprocity or a
philosophy of objective spirit.”142 That is, we can speak of Husserl’s understanding
of the “being” of things (broadly speaking) but only in terms of their noematic

Dictionary, 54‐5
Moran, Dermot. Introduction to Phenomenology. New York: Routledge, 2000 (p. 164)
142 Cobb‐Stevens, Richard. “Body, Spirit, and Ego in Husserl’s Ideas II.” Soul and Body in Husserlian
Phenomenology: Man and Nature (Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XVI). Ed. Anna‐Teresa Tymieniecka.
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1983. (p. 252) Hereafter “Cobb‐Stevens.”
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“sense,” itself revealed via the phenomenological (and obviously eidetic) reductions.
Husserl’s ontology is therefore the study of reality‐as‐constituted‐in‐transcendental‐
consciousness.143 This is noematic, as opposed to noetic, phenomenology.144 (At any
rate, the disciplines of phenomenology and ontology are parallel for Husserl,
differing only through “shift in view”—that is, the phenomenological reduction.145)
Ideas II presents an exhaustive ordering of the various sense‐layers of
objectivity—materiality, animality, humanity, sociality, etc., plus many intermediate
layers—that are constituted by consciousness.146 Both Ideas II and III have the same
order of presentation, in terms of starting first with the “lowest” (and self‐
independent, in purely material “things”147) stratum of material nature, and moving
“upwards” to pure spirit. This ordering is curiously the exact inverse of the
“ontological priority” Husserl gives to spirit and the “spiritual attitude” in which
things are first constituted not as purely material at all. But this is just one of the

Thus while “naïve realism” is destroyed through the reduction and the transition to the
transcendental attitude, it is important to keep in mind that phenomenology is not phenomenalism;
it does not reduce reality to appearance, it studies reality in its appearing (as well as the subjectivity
to which reality appears, which can in turn be studied for its own sake as well).
144 A more technical definition of “constitution” is offered by Ricoeur: “To constitute signifies only to
interrogate a sense by explicating the significational intentions to which the sense correlates. Hence,
the job of constitution remains below the level of interpretation.” (Ricoeur 65) Overgaard offers
perhaps the simplest way to understand the relation between reduction and constitution: “…the
actual relation between constitution and transcendental phenomenological reduction can be
described as one between what we want to understand and the method by which we are able to
understand what we want to understand.” See: Overgaard, Søren. Husserl and Heidegger on Being in
the World. Dordrecht: Springer, 2004 (pp. 59‐60) Hereafter “Overgaard.” Gadamer offers this:
““Constitution” is nothing but the “movement of reconstruction” [Wiederaufbaubewegung] that
follows after the reduction has been performed.” (Cited by way of Overgaard, 59.)
145 “But all clarifying ontological insight executed in the framework of axiomatic clarity that is not
directly phenomenological becomes such by a mere shift of view, as conversely in the whole of
phenomenological insights there must be those which become ontological through a mere shift of
view.” (Ideas III, 90)
146 Although this is not discussed in as much detail, consciousness also constitutes itself, insofar as it
makes itself an object of observation and (self‐)perception.
147 See fn 27, below.
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many paradoxes of the text.148 It is also important to note that from the very
beginning of the text, Husserl’s examination of ontological regions is correlated with
a type of scientific or theoretical activity—for example, pure nature with physics,
the soul with psychology, the living body with the (seemingly invented) science of
somatology, etc.—as well as, in most cases, an attitude, another central but
operative Husserlian concept or device, already discussed in our chapter 1 (pp. 8‐
11.) The ontological region of spirit, studied by the “human sciences,” is correlated
with the “personalistic” or “spiritual” attitude, and the regions of material and
animal nature with the “naturalistic” attitude. As Husserl now puts it in Ideas II, “A
change in attitude means nothing else but a thematic transition from one direction
of apprehension to another, to which correspond, correlatively, different
objectivities.”149

B. The Constitution of Worldly Reality

1. Material Nature
Ricoeur remarks that Husserl’s gesture in the reduction of Ideas I is to “reject
nature as ‘alien,’ as ‘another being.’”150 It does this, of course, to make way for a
sense of “consciousness” not reducible to that of “nature”—to effect a Kantian
“Copernican” turn, so to speak. In Ideas II, Husserl softens the “otherness” of nature
by giving both a “material” as well as “animal” dimension. Thus there are these three
It can actually be explained, however, in terms of what I will later call Husserl’s “naturalism”—his
implicit acceptance and adoption of the modern‐scientific conception of nature.
149 Ideas II, 221
150 Ricoeur, 57
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divisions of the text: “material nature,” “animal nature,” and “spirit.”151 Already from
this it is clear, however, that the underlying dichotomy in Husserl’s constitutional
analysis in Ideas II is that of “nature” and “spirit.” Husserl himself confirms the
impression when he announces: “…we have two poles: physical nature and spirit
and, in between them, Body and soul.”152
But what does Husserl mean by the term “nature” or “natural”153? Husserl
speaks of “nature” in a double sense,154 its referring on the one hand only to the
“physical,” and on the other hand to both the physical and psychic as a single reality
(the psychophysical, living‐ensouled, etc.). The former is “nature in the first and
original sense.”155 In the latter case, the psychic “stratum” is “founded” on the more
basic material sub‐stratum. This point is central to Husserl’s ontology and is
stressed by him in the following quote (from Ideas III):

Husserl addressed the “nature/spirit” divide repeatedly in his work, from his lecture “Logik als
Theorie der Erkenntnis” (1910/11) to his last full work, the Crisis (1936), usually in the context of
the question of the relations between the natural and human sciences, and between all such sciences
and phenomenology. For an overview of his treatments of these topics see Michael Weiler’s extensive
Editor’s Introduction to: Husserliana XXXII, Gesammelte Werke: Natur und Geist: Vorlesungen
Sommersemester 1927. Ed. Michael Weiler. Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, pp. XVI‐L.
(Volume referred to hereafter as “Husserl 1927.”)
152 Ideas II, 298
153 At this point, a further terminological note is in order. Several terms (and their cognates) must be
distinguished from each other, namely “nature/natural,” “physical” or “material,” and “real.” Husserl
assigns these terms more or less technical meanings. We may thus regard the relationship between
nature, reality, and physical (or material) in the following way: nature in the “first” sense is the
purely physical or material; nature in the second sense is the realm of animality or “embodiedness”
and “ensouledness”; nature, taken in its two senses together, is still not all of “reality,” for reality
encompasses nature and spirit, which, taken by itself, is strictly nonnatural in Husserl’s sense. Thus
for Husserl there is a distinction between “all there is”—the totality of “worldly” (or “intramundane,”
by another locution) reality—and nature as “the field of transcendent—specifically, spatiotemporal—
realities” that is “nature.” (Ideas II, 3). All of these distinctions will come into play abundantly as we
proceed.
154 Husserl’s expression: Ibid., 145
155 Ibid., 171. Compare: “the soul, too, is of course a persistent being. But this persistent being is no
‘nature.’” (Ideas II, 355) See also Husserl’s remark that “reality” is to be spoken of “in the first place as
nature” (Ideas II, 420)… He also refers to the former sense of “nature” as the “strict” sense. (See
Husserl 1919, pp. 136‐7) Unless otherwise specified, I too will use the term “nature,” in reference
specifically to Husserl’s views thereof, in this strict sense.
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“…psychic reality is founded in the organismal matter, but this is not conversely found in the psyche.
More generally we can say: the material world is, within the total Objective world that we call nature,
a closed world of its own needing no help from other realities. On the other hand, the existence of
mental realities, of a real mental world, is bound to the existence of a nature in the first sense, namely
that of material nature, and this is not for accidental but for fundamental reasons. While the res
extensa, if we inquire of its essence, contains nothing of mentalness and nothing that would demand
beyond itself a connection with real mentalness, we find conversely that real mentalness essentially
can be only in connection to materiality as real mind of an animate organism.”156

Husserl also regards nature to be (as is stated already in the first line of the work!)
the “object of the natural sciences.”157 Such an early and explicit invocation of natural
science, perhaps seemingly innocuous to some, in fact represents a huge and fateful
concession to the modern physicalistic world‐view, which Husserl will be at pains to
reverse in ways that compound the latent dualistic tendencies of his thinking. All of
this will hopefully become clearer as we proceed, especially in part III.158
Husserl’s notion of nature is thus at once scientific, in the sense of “Galilean‐
Newtonian,” as well as broadly “Kantian.” Nature is by its essence “extended,” has a
definite spatiotemporal location, is governed by the law of causality, is “in itself”
devoid of secondary qualities, etc.159 Though a species of the natural attitude, the
natural‐scientific or naturalistic attitude involves a kind of epoché and reduction of
its own, a bracketing in this case of all axiological and practical predicates.160 In this

Ideas III, 104
Ideas II, 3
158 It is not the purpose of the current chapter to offer an alternative conception of nature, but this
will come in chapter 4, which is devoted to this topic as it is developed by Merleau‐Ponty in his
Nature lectures and other later works.
159 Ideas II, 80‐2. It should be added that the full sense of “nature” is utterly intersubjective. That is, a
solipsistic subject cannot conceive of that basic natural entity, the “thing,” as opposed to what
Husserl describes at length (and for the first time in Ideas II) as the “phantom.”
160 Though it is not merely a matter of bracketing but of subordinating them: “From the standpoint of
nature, everything personal is subordinate.” (Ideas II, 194) Husserl does not give any indication that
the naturalistic attitude is—as it appears to some modern readers to be—thoroughly historical and
156
157
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way, “nature” purely speaking does not have any human significance, value, or
utility; it simply “is.”161 This will eventually lead to the need to place “spirit” above
“nature” in “ontological priority,” but this does not so much as dignify nature as
swallow it up in human cultural activity.162

2. Animal Nature, or the Body‐and‐Soul
When Husserl speaks of the body, he sometimes describes it in terms of a
“plus” that is appresented in some physical “things,” to which belongs the new sense
of “living beings” (or bodies), something more than mere materiality, though
something that is, again, also dependent on materiality as its “substratum.”163
Husserl generally treats the Body164 (Leib) in conjunction with the soul (Seele,
Psyche). However, it is important for us to distinguish this “psychophysical”
composite, i.e., the living “ensouled” organism, from the “body” regarded as a double
reality165—i.e., as that which is either “body” (Körper, body‐thing, Ding) or “Body”
(Leib, living body). In fact, the relevant distinctions to make are at least the following
five:

a) The body as a Janus‐faced “double reality,” to which pertain two lines of real
circumstances,” material and psychic. (I will refer to this as simply “the body.”)
conditioned by the vagaries of the epoch. Instead, he presents it as a “timeless” attitude, which even
the ancients, for example, may have performed, but simply did not have the right information to do.
161 Perhaps in the Sartrean sense of absurdly being “there,” de trop? This would help explain Sartre’s
own dualistic appropriation (“in itself” and “for itself”) of Husserlian (by way of Hegelian)
phenomenology.
162 See fn 106, below, and also fn 107.
163 Ideas II, 97‐99
164 I am following the useful convention of the English translators of Ideas II of signifying Leib with
“Body” and other references to the body with the lower‐case “body.” (Ideas II, XIV‐XV)
165 Ibid., 297
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b) The body as body‐thing, or slab of matter in space and time, subject to forces of
natural causality. (“body” when the context is clear, otherwise “Körper” or “body‐
thing”)
c) The body as a “thing” “inserted” between the rest of the material world and the
“subjective” sphere;166 also “own body”
d) The body as Leib, the living animate organism, or animal, which possesses a
psychical or soulish stratum, appresented with its material substantiality.
e) The soul or psyche itself, which forms the upper stratum of the Leib, the lower
stratum of which is material Nature.
Of course the picture is still more nuanced. For example, there is at the level of the
Body the level of sensations, including kinaesthetic sensations, which is the
“aesthesiological body,” while at a higher level there is the “volitional body,” which
is responsible for “acting” in the sense of “willing” and acting on the “I can.”167
Husserl’s treatment of the body‐soul relation is very interesting. The soul and
the Body are intertwined. Thus in this respect, Husserl sides with Aristotle, so to
speak, rather than Plato: “the soul is indeed ever one with the Body.”168 There can
indeed never be a separation of soul and Body, a point Husserl makes dramatically
through a detailed discussion of the a priori eidetic necessity for even a ghost to
have a Body. Without a body of any sort, no ghost, here by definition a “phantom” in
Husserl’s unique sense, could be perceived or apperceived (or for that matter
hallucinated); appresentation of the psyche always occurs through perception of
certain kinds of bodies.169 This sort of discussion in fact raises the interesting
counter‐image to that of the mind as a “ghost in the machine.” For in the case of

Ibid., 169
Husserl speaks of the “I can” as a practical to‐be‐able‐to that is prior to doing (e.g., Ibid., 273), an
“original consciousness of abilities” that helps us to constitute the world with which I may interact.
“What I can do, what is in my power, what I know myself capable of and am conscious of as such, that
is what a practical possibility is.” (Ibid., 270) It is only this that “can be a theme of my will.”
168 Ibid., 176
169 Ibid., 100‐2
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Husserl, the image couldn’t work: for the ghost, being already embodied, could not
be said to need yet another body (“machine”) to be “in.” In this way it becomes
obvious that Husserl’s conception of the “leibischseelisch” being, the psychophysical
organism, cannot be identified with, say, Plato’s or Descartes’ explicit remarks on
the separability of mental and physical substances, if we mean by this what Husserl
calls “soul” and “Body.”170
But does Husserl actually go too far in the direction of anti‐dualism of Body
and soul? There is a sense, for example, in which Husserl’s view is
epiphenomenalistic.171 Remarking for example that “the thing and the whole of
nature are sealed off,” he goes on to argue: “Psychical consequences are joined to
natural processes, just as psychical causes have consequences in nature, but they
are such that in truth they have no influence on nature.”172 Husserl seems to seal the
deal as he describes the nature of causality itself: “It is clear that causality of
physical nature has in fact a pre‐eminent sense. This causality is a constitutive idea
for the idea of nature, for the idea of a physical thing… For reasons of principle, the
psychic is outside this nexus.”173

We have already seen in the previous chapter how Husserl departs from Descartes in this respect;
as we will see, however, Husserl’s issues with ontological dualism remain, now with respect to an
alternate dichotomy of “nature” and ‘spirit.” Thus Husserl closes one door to dualism only to open
another. Ricoeur puts it well: “the psyche animating the body is not equivalent to the cultural and
communal realizations of man. In reintroducing the dimension of person and that of community
Husserl completes the ego‐psyche polarity with a new schema where spirit (Geist) is not the
empirical counterpart of the pure subject of phenomenology but is rather a sort of cultural equivalent
much more awkward to situate in the phenomenological structure.” (Ricoeur, 68‐9)
171 Cf. Ricoeur, 67
172 Ideas II, 355
173 Ibid., 353. See also: “the soul is a being that is related conditionally to Bodily circumstances,
related in a regulated way to circumstances in physical nature.” (Ideas II, 356) Nonetheless,
“epiphenomenalism” is not the only possibility for what Husserl is describing, which is also, for
example, consistent with a kind of Leibnizian parallelism.
170
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But before we further investigate Husserl’s notion of the soul, let us come
back to the body as (a), as double reality. Already at the level of its material
thinghood (b), the body is special. That is, it has a particularly high value and central
importance for the animal or human subject. It is, first of all, central to perception. It
governs the system of unfolding of adumbrations, for example, depending on its
position in space and time, the position of the eyes and limbs, and so on. As a thing
perceived, the own‐body is certainly a thing of a unique “type”—for example, as
being the center, or the Nullpunkt, of orientation, in reference to which all other
“things” are constituted in terms of their nearness or farness, aboveness or
belowness, rightness or leftness to my “absolute here.” The ‘subject of the Body” is
of course always “here” and “in the center,” even as the body as material thing is
constantly in movement.174 Furthermore, because “I do not have the possibility of
distancing myself from my Body, or my Body from me,” subsequently, the body is for
me, perceptually speaking, a “remarkably imperfectly constituted thing.”175 There
are parts of the body that I cannot see, some (such as my eyes, or my back) even in
principle. There is no other possible material object of which this may be said. As
“my” Körper, then, the own body is highly unique. And this is of course to say
nothing of its axiological and practical importance to us, matters which are
bracketed in the naturalistic attitude. It is not a thing just like other things, even
insofar as it is merely a “thing.”
As living‐body (d), however, the body is not a “thing” at all—its essence is
wholly other than this. Because the living body and the soul are intertwined, it is
174
175

Ibid., 166
Ibid., 167
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possible and even proper to speak of “myself” as a living body. (“I am hurt”—not
“this leg is impaired, but I am okay.”) As we have seen, what distinguishes the living
body from the sense of material thing is the element, or stratum, of soul. How is soul
first constituted? Essentially, it is first constituted by the solipsistic subject with
respect to the “own” body and, only later, extended through empathy to other
Bodies. The question of the constitution of the souls of others is essentially the same
question as that of intersubjectivity, which was to be dealt with more memorably
and extensively in the Cartesian Meditations (and the Intersubjektivität Husserliana
volumes).176
The way we experience the own body in its psychical aspect (indeed as one’s
own) is through the body’s being the “localized bearer of sensations.”177 This is
essentially the experience of tactility. Thus it is on my hand, here in this spot that I
can feel the warmth of a glowing light‐bulb, or back there in the middle of my back
that I can feel this twinge of pain. In this way, I come to know my body as a feeler of
sensations, and through these sensations—including kinaesthetic sensations—I can
in fact experience myself as being in space, occupying this or that region, my fingers
being in such and such position, etc. In this way, the Body is, in the first place,
“medium” or “organ” of perception.”178 Equally, however, my body is the “one and
only Object which, for the will of my pure Ego, is moveable immediately and
spontaneously and is a means for producing a mediate spontaneous movement in
Of course, Husserl’s notions of empathy vary. But in Ideas II, the emphasis on methodological
solipsism seems to be strong. Thus at the level of intersubjective apprehension, I see that “…my
appearances belong to me, his to him.” And thus we each belong to “subjective worlds” of our own.
And so on. (Ideas II, 166‐7)
177 Ibid., 152‐5
178 Ibid., 61
176
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other things…” Hence Husserl’s definition of the Body as “freely moved totality of
sense‐organs.”179 In any case, all of these definitions are ultimately to be (in effect)
subordinated to how the Body is constituted for consciousness in the spiritual
attitude, specifically as the “expression” of spirit.
Since so much in the distinction of Körper and Leib turns on the soul, we must
ask, what exactly is the soul? As a region of reality or objectivity, we have already
seen that it is inseparable from the Body. But it is also, Husserl says, a stratum
founded on material nature, and—in the classical Greek sense—it is what
“animates” this matter and invites us to apperceive a “motivating agent” behind it.
Husserl himself defines it formally (but circularly) as “…the bearer of a psychic life
together with the subjective possessions of that life, and as such it is a unity
extending through time (the same time in which the Body endures).”180 Ricoeur
cryptically describes Husserl’s psyche as “a constituted reality woven into the
surrounding world of the pure ego,”181 which is to say, that it is not to be confused
with the ego or the personal spirit. After all, even the lowest of animals (Husserl
says remarkably little about plants) has a soul but no ego or Geistigheit.182 Yet apart
from its interrelatedness with the Body, the status of Husserl’s “soul,” at least in
Ideas II, is more than a little murky.183

Ibid., 61
Ibid., 134 (my emphasis)
181 Ricoeur, 52
182 “The person as spirit, as person, has self‐consciousness or an Ego (which is the same); a soul does
not need to have self‐consciousness.” (Ibid., 361)
183 Ricoeur, too, sees a basic ambiguity in the soul (my letter‐designations of different meanings of
the body are in brackets): “Thus we are led to the ambiguity of the psyche. It participates in
subjectivity since it is the soul [e, in terms of the menu of body‐meanings above] that has its body [d],
and also in objectivity, since it is the body‐thing [b] that has sensations [c]. This body is a part of
things, and yet the psyche which inhabits it is the center around which the rest of the world is
179
180
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3. Ego
The question of the psyche is inseparable from that of the “ego,” especially in
human subjects.184 As we know from the turn towards the ego after the Logical
Investigations, the ego has been central to Husserl’s phenomenological concerns. In
Ideas II, Husserl argues that the ego “cannot be thought of as something separated
from… lived experiences, from its ‘life,’ just as, conversely, the lived experiences are
not thinkable except as the medium of the life of the Ego.”185 Husserl’s ego is also
described as a “ruling part” of the soul.186 It would seem, then, that the Ego being
discussed now is the mundane one, the “empirical ego” as opposed to the
“transcendental” one. This is certainly true of the following: “We can also
understand that in constituted nature, the Body and the Body‐soul unity are
constituted and that the empirical Ego is the Ego of Bodily‐psychic nature. The Ego
is not itself the Bodily‐psychic unity but lives in it. It is the Ego of the soul…”187
But the entire discussion in Ideas II of the ego as such is, in fact, framed
around what Husserl calls the “pure ego.” And the pure ego is, Husserl explains,
“immutable,”188 being clearly unlike either the soul or the Body. Much of what
Husserl says about in the ego in this vein is familiar from Ideas I, except that here, in
Ideas II, it is, again, the “pure ego” rather than the “transcendental ego” that is under
grouped.” (Ibid., 64). Husserl seems to be aware of the ambiguity insofar as he assigns the body a
“quasi‐nature” and “quasi‐causality.” (Ideas II, 145, 356)
184 “…the exploration of the psychic apperceptive Ego is only one level of the general investigation of
the psyche.” (Ideas III, 17)
185 Ideas II, 105
186 The “personal Ego…functions so‐to‐say as the ruler of the soul.” (Ibid., 150)
187 Ibid., 350
188 “…in itself the pure Ego is immutable.” (Ibid., 110) The “immutability” of the ego has nothing of
course to do with immortality, but means rather that “…instead of generatio and corruptio, to the
pure Ego there pertains only the essential property that has its stepping forth and its receding, that is
begins to function and hold sway actively and that it ceases to do so.” (Ibid., 110)
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discussion. But they are, finally, probably the same. Ricoeur tacitly acknowledges
this himself: “The distinction between the pure ego, product of the phenomenological
reduction, and the human ego, a reality of this world, is a constant in Husserl’s
thought; it separates phenomenology from psychology.”189 That the discussion of
the pure ego seems to be hard to distinguish from that of the transcendental, is
evident from passages like these:

“In fact, the pure Ego is indeed nothing other than what Descartes, in his marvelous Meditations,
grasped with the insight of genius and established as such once and for all, the being of which it is not
possible to doubt and which in any doubt would itself necessarily be found again as the subject of
doubt.”190
“Therefore it is not to be confused with the Ego as the real person, with the real subject of the real
human being. It has no innate or acquired traits of character, no capacities, no dispositions, etc.”191
“The Ego…does not appear…is given in absolute selfhood… As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden
inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear.”192

Husserl does not make things more clear when he identifies spirit with the ego
cogito (evidently then distancing spirit from person193), aligning it now with the
Cartesian “I think.”194 In that case, the “pure ego” would encompass both empirical
(spiritual) and transcendental poles. But we will leave the matter here until we take

Ricoeur, 52 (my emphasis)
Ideas II, 109
191 Ibid., 110
192 Ibid., 111
193 Cobb‐Stevens defines the person as the “full concrete unity of soul and body.” (Cobb‐Stevens, 250)
To say this of the transcendental ego would be to mundanize it in a way unacceptable to Husserl. On
the distinction of person and transcendental ego, Cobb‐Stevens writes: “the person is too involved in
the Umwelt by reason of pragmatic motivations to be completely identified with the philosophical
voice that describes the stratum of spirit.” (Cobb‐Stevens, 253)
194 See for example, Ideas II, 109.
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up in part III the question of the relation of the transcendental ego (consciousness)
with our next concept‐theme, “spirit.”

4. Spirit
Suddenly in Ideas II Husserl (or, if we like, the “narrator”) signals a radical
shift in perspective that will usher in the third section of already exhaustingly
demanding work: “the analysis of [material and animal] nature in our consideration
of nature thus proves to be in need of supplementation. It harbors presuppositions
and consequently points beyond to another realm of being and of research, i.e., the
field of subjectivity, which no longer is nature.”195 Thus, we enter into the realm of
spirit, home of the human sciences, culture, personhood, and everything that, in the
classical humanist‐philosophical tradition, makes human beings supposedly stand
out from nature qua nature, material or animal. Accordingly Husserl says of the
distinction of soul and spirit that it “is the fundamental one in this entire group.”196
This at first surprising remark (is not the distinction of “nature” and “spirit” in fact
the most important?) is motivated by the fact that the soul, while certainly not a
“thing” in the narrowest sense, is still enveloped in the closed circuit of the natural
order. The soul is still a natural being.
Related to this is the “personalistic” attitude as a variation, or rather a
privileged type, of “natural attitude.” In Ideas I, we were made aware only of a
division between natural and transcendental attitudes, and not of any internal
division or hierarchy within the natural attitude itself. But now, in Ideas II, we learn
195
196

Ibid., 180 (my emphasis)
Ibid., 181
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that the natural attitude is divided into at least these two: the “naturalistic,” which
takes its cues from natural science, and the “personalistic,” which is closer to the
everyday life and everyday world in which we naively, but meaningfully, exist. Thus
Husserl announces:

“[The] ‘naturalistically’ considered world is of course not the world. Rather, given prior is the world
as the everyday world, and within this arise man’s theoretical interest and the sciences related to the
world, among which is natural science under the ideal of truths in themselves.”197

Husserl adds immediately that “this pregiven world is investigated first [my italics]
with respect to nature. Then animalia have their turn, human beings before all
others.” Be that as it may, the scientific‐theoretic world of blosse Sachen is itself
“reduced” out of the raw material of lived, personal and interpersonal, functionally
and axiologically meaningful life, a life lived in what Husserl now calls the Umwelt
(“surrounding world”).198
It is evident from various supplemental sections199 that in Ideas II, Husserl is
developing his notion of “spirit” through a thinking‐through of the distinction of
natural and human—that is, cultural—sciences. Husserl’s so to say concession to
natural science, granting it free reign over the human soul in the forms of biology
and psychology, has seemingly triggered a certain need to regain for humanity a
dignity and singularity. After all, it is we who do phenomenology—or, it is in us that
Ibid., 219. Given Husserl’s position that both the natural and human sciences are theoretical, and
that the naturalistic and personalistic attitudes are correlated to them respectively, the claim that the
latter is prior to “theory” is confusing, but perhaps just more evidence of Husserl’s conflation of the
transcendental and spiritual attitudes. (See Part III below.)
198 Cf. Dictionary, 234‐4
199 Supplement XII, II, for example, makes it very clear the extent to which Husserl’s conceptions of
“spirit” and “the person” are developed in the context of distinguishing natural from human sciences.
(Ideas II, 351‐82)
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phenomenology occurs. Inasmuch as it is regarded as a founded stratum of the
Body, itself a “double reality” whose aspect as “material thing” places it squarely
within the “causal nexus” of “nature,” the human being is an object of natural
science. But Husserl wants to add to this picture by arguing that there is another
sense to the “human being,” a non‐naturalistic sense, that regards him/her as
“subject” of action, feeling, valuation, and so on, rather than as, say, thing or animal.
But once again, Husserl probably goes too far in the process of compensation (if that
is what he is doing). For from the perspective of the human sciences, natural science
is itself, as a whole, nothing but a cultural achievement, an accomplishment of
persons acting in concert. Husserl now completely supplants the independent
integrity of the natural sciences, which he elsewhere seemingly struggles to
maintain, and, as we will see below, falls into a pure subjective idealism.
As we have already seen, Body and soul, and hence animality, are excluded
from the realm of the strictly spiritual. Admittedly, “…Body and soul are “nature in
the second sense” properly speaking only according to the side turned toward
physical nature.”200 On the side “turned toward spirit,” Body is in fact the
“expression” of spirit, like the meaning of a word that is expressed by the letters on
a page. But just as ideality is not simply located in the words, neither is spirit
located, as is the psyche, in the living body. It is key to realize that when we discuss
spirit, we are already in the personalistic attitude. This is why, as Cobb‐Stevens puts
it, spirit is not simply grafted on soul, like soul on body.201 Spirit is not simply
another founded “strata” on material and psychic nature, in the sense that to
200
201
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constitute it is already to have shifted out of (so to speak) the naturalistic, and into
the “personalistic,” attitude, for which the psycho‐physical composite studied in
science simply does not appear in this form. It is perhaps for this reason that
Husserl says (relatively) little about the interrelation of the regions of “spirit” and
“soul,” but oddly, this is certainly not true about the relation of spirit to Body.
Indeed, Husserl’s remarks on this particular relation are some of the most
provocative but also confusing and contradictory in all of his ontological
investigations. On the one hand, it might seem as though Husserl wants to claim that
spirit and Body are to be distinguished in the strongest of terms:

“What we find then is ourselves as the spiritual Ego related to the stream of experiences—‘spiritual’
here is used in a mere general sense, referring to the Ego that has its place precisely not in
Corporeality; e.g., I ‘think’ (cogito), i.e., I perceive, I represent in whatever mode, I judge, I feel, I will,
etc., and find myself thereby as that which is one and the same in the changing of these lived
experiences, as ‘subject’ of the acts and states.”202

But upon scrutiny, it appears likely that the “spiritual Ego” being referred to here is
actually not human spirit at all, but the transcendental ego. Still, the mixing of the
language of “spirituality” with the “I think” in its non‐Corporeality is a clue of
difficulties inherent in Husserl’s conception of a “non‐natural” reality that is
nonetheless different than transcendental subjectivity.
At any rate, Husserl repeatedly states the view that Body has a distinct role to
play in the realm of spirit and (what amounts to the same) culture. “For
phenomenology…the Body plays an expansive role in the realm of spirit.”203 For one,
it is the “expression” of spirit in a most provocative sense. It is that by which one
202
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grasps the humanity of a human being, the “person there, who dances, laughs when
amused, and chatters…” And it is not the “apprehension of a spirit fastened to a
Body,” but the apprehension of the person through his body.204 Thus I can say of
man, in this attitude, that he “has a Corporeality, [he] has a body which is a physical
thing with such and such qualities…” Sometimes it is not clear whether Husserl is
speaking of soul or spirit, as in a nearby section he speaks of the fact that “each
movement of the Body is, as Body, filled with the soul through and through… Body is
full of soul.” Husserl’s point is that a personality emerges through, say, a particular
Body’s movements. Husserl points out that this is true not only of the corporeal
Body but of any “body” or “material thing,” such as texts, which are cultural
expressions of a uniquely significant kind.205 This is a useful clue that the relation of
Body and spirit that Husserl is outlining here is in fact a relation of spirit and body
as (a), namely as both Körper and Leib. That is, spirit is related to the materiality of
the body as well as to its soulish aspect, as Leib. The body as complex duality‐in‐
unity is transformed from a “natural” complex to a “spiritual” one through a change
in attitude, but in either case, it retains its Janus‐faced nature.206

Ibid., 252
Ibid., 248‐50. One may speak of art‐works or religious artifacts as well presumably.
206 In all of this we are focusing on individual spirits. Husserl himself recognizes what he calls
“personalities of a higher order” or, what amounts to the same thing, collective “spirits,” such as
nations, clubs, churches, families, and the like. (See for example: Ideas II, 377; or, for parallel talk of
individual and collective subjects, sees Husserl 1919, 135.) This resembles the Hegelian notion of
“objective spirit,” but for Husserl, communal subjectivity is founded on the interactions of individual
subjects. Out of these interactions, emergently perhaps, higher “wholes” or organic unities that
deserve the name of “persons” appear. Husserl seems to base this on the fact that we commonly
speak of the will, desires, attitudes, etc., of groups of people organized in coherent wholes, not only of
individuals. This is not merely analogous or figurative language for him. Now if true, it would
radically alter our conception of what counts as a “person” and could have real legal ramifications.
This would be relevant to the current debate over the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling on the legal
rights of “corporations” under the U.S. Constitution. (See: Citizens United v. FEC)
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Related to its sense as spiritual expression, the Body is the means by which
spirit “…in its freedom moves the Body and thereby can perform a work in the
spiritual world.”207 As Ricoeur notes, everything now is a “performance” of spirit.208
But this actually points to one of the more Platonist aspects of Husserl’s
understanding of the Body in the personal attitude, already hinted at above. The
Body is for me to “use” as “organon of my will.” And the Body in the spiritual
attitude is merely “mine”; I am not of the Body:

“It is absolutely out of the question that I am here encountering or intending myself as something in
the Body, as founded in it… the Body is my Body, and it is mine in the first place as my ‘over and
against,’ my object, just as the house is my object, something I see or can see, something I touch or
can touch, etc. These things are mine, but not as component pieces of the Ego…”209

Admittedly, this kind of description then becomes hard to square with what Husserl
calls the “unity of Body and spirit.”210 But the unity of Body and spirit in particular is
complex, in multiple senses (i.e. complicated, compounded) of that word:

“[The body] is at the same time a part of nature, inserted into the nexus of causality, and the spiritual
life, which we grasp through the Bodily expression and understand in its nexus of motivation,
appears, in virtue of its connection with the Body, to be conditioned itself by natural processes and to
be apperceived as something of nature. The unity of Body and spirit is a two‐fold one, and,
correlatively, a two‐fold apprehension (the personalistic and the naturalistic) is included in the
unitary apperception of the human.”211

What this indicates, perhaps, is that Body and spirit are “one” only to the extent that
the latter is apperceived through the former, namely via the Body’s appearing as an

Ideas II, 295
Ricoeur, 75
209 Ideas II, 223. This language is already in the early part of the text: see “my material Body,” p. 111.
210 For example, Ibid., 259
211 Ibid., 259
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expression of Spirit. This itself occurs in the personalistic attitude, but it is with the
naturalistic addition that we come fully to grasp spiritual life as belonging to the
natural causal order—which, without naturalistic interference, is not in fact the
case. For spirit is defined by motivation and freedom, not natural causality. The
body in this way is the “point of conversion from spiritual causality to natural
causality.”212

III. Analysis: Philosophical Difficulties of Ideas II/III

A. Introduction: Phenomenological Monism, Ontological Dualism
Throughout the Ideas volumes, and his philosophy generally, Husserl makes
a firm distinction between phenomenology and ontology.213 Sciences of (regions of)
“beings” presuppose a “transcendental sense.”214 Thus phenomenology is first in
methodological priority, being the “maternal‐ground of all philosophical method: to
this ground and to the work in it, everything leads back.”215 Because of this clear
prioritization and talk of a “ground,” elsewhere described as the transcendental ego,
it becomes possible to think of Husserl as a kind of “monist,” namely a
phenomenological (or transcendental) monist. At the same time, Husserl’s “ground”
Ibid., 299
Cf. Ideas III, 117: “For in itself…ontology is not phenomenology.”
214 Ibid., 66‐7
215 Ibid., 69. Husserl goes on to indicate that phenomenology allows “ontologically founded
investigation” to “unfold its full power” and “receive its full certainty.” But phenomenology is more
fundamental, and “owes nothing” to ontologies!
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is not a “part” of the “world”—a “tag‐end” like Descartes” non‐transcendental
“cogito”—and therefore cannot be understood in terms of an ontological monism.
The realm of world‐ontology remains relatively under‐thought in Husserl, and
though no single consistent position can be teased out of Ideas II, in my view the text
comes closer to a form of ontological dualism than Husserl would have wanted to
admit. Some of the evidence for this view has already been furnished above, but
more will be provided below. Much of the remainder of this chapter is devoted to
discussing some of the underlying philosophical issues and pressures which lead to
the dualistic position, as well as some of the ways in which Husserl’s text seems to
veer away from such a result, generally without success.
The charge of “dualism” is an old one as applied to Husserl, and it should not
be bandied about carelessly. For one thing, there is a certain nebulousness in the
question of Husserl’s dualism because of the question of which “dualism” one is
referring to. In my view, the kind of dualism in Husserl, at least in Ideas IIII, is that
specifically of nature and spirit, not (for instance) of body and soul, or of
consciousness and reality. We have already seen how inseparable Body and soul are
from one another; indeed, Husserl stresses the point when he claims that “what we
have to oppose to material nature as a second kind of reality is not the ‘soul’ but the
concrete unity of Body and soul, the human (or animal) subject.”216 Now even this
dichotomy, that between “thing” and “animal”—including human being as

Ideas II, 146. This would seem to rule out a separable ‘soul‐substance,” but Husserl does not allow
this to prevent him from speaking, in the mode of imaginative variation, of the “departure” of the
“soul” (Ibid., 100), which leaves only “dead matter” behind. Here Husserl’s point is that it is the
soulish or psychic dimension of the human or animal being that makes it such, as opposed to simply
“material nature.”
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psychophysical composite—is not technically a dualism, because “thing” and
“animal” both go under the genus, so to speak, of “nature.” Finally, consciousness
and reality do not comprise a dualism for the reasons already indicated; the first is
the ground of the second, and thus they have no parity. There is no reality or world
without consciousness; but there is at least conceivably consciousness without
reality or world (cf. the world‐annihilation experiment, which Husserl upholds in no
uncertain terms in both Ideas II and the Epilogue to the Ideas volumes).217
Rather, nature and spirit are dualistic because neither can be exhaustively
explained through the other, and they do not overlap. They are both “absolutes,”
correlated to alternative versions of the natural attitude, each retaining pride of
place in its respective attitude.218 This is not to say one cannot find talk of an overlap
between nature and spirit in Husserl; but when Husserl speaks of this, of a
“spirituality in nature” for example, he is typically referring to “animal nature” and
does not lose sight of the fact that such animality is a founded stratum on material
nature, or, more importantly, that such “spirituality” is fundamentally outside of the
realm of “culture” or the personalistic attitude, in which the body becomes mere

Ideas II, 303. From the Epilogue (written as late as 1930/31): “the non‐existence of the world ever
remains thinkable…” (Ideas II, 420) Husserl here draws the familiar lesson from this: “…the being of
transcendental subjectivity has the sense of absolute being, that only it is ‘irrelative’…whereas the
real world indeed is but has an essential relativity to transcendental subjectivity, due, namely, to the
fact that it can only have its sense as being only as an intentional sense‐formation of transcendental
subjectivity.”
218 To claim that Husserl is a phenomenological monist is simply to affirm the fact that Husserl was
never unclear about his prioritization of “transcendental” or “phenomenological” or “pure”
consciousness over “reality,” which, taken “on its own” so to speak, lacks all sense and “being” in the
fullest sense, and is hence consciousness‐dependent. Husserl’s commitment to transcendental
subjectivity, which was first formally introduced (in print) in Ideas I, never wavered. But for Husserl,
it had always been somehow pre‐ or trans‐ontological; “ontology” comes to have a restricted sense in
Husserl, already prefiguring Heidegger’s distinction between the “ontic” (beings) and “ontological”
(for Husserl, something like “transcendental consciousness,” the source of all meaning—though
falling short of “Being” in Heidegger’s sense).
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organ of spirit. The foregoing remarks are nonetheless not without counter‐
examples in the course of Ideas II and III. But we will examine all of these things in
more detail in the sections below.

B. Husserl’s Naturalism
Husserl’s opposition to scientific naturalism is legendary—so how can one
speak of his views as “naturalistic”? The answer has to do ultimately with the
parallelism of phenomenology and ontology; all that differentiates them is the “shift
of view” that is brought about through the epoché and phenomenological reduction.
Thus it is entirely possible in Husserl’s framework to accept the meaning science
gives to “nature,” its “object of study,” while also claiming to find the source of this
meaning in transcendental subjectivity, which is revealed through the
phenomenological reduction. And this is just what Husserl does, as I will now try to
show.
As mentioned in part II of this chapter, one of the important features of
Husserl’s concept of nature is its tacit acceptance of the definition of nature given by
those who could be described as scientific “naturalists.” In Dastur’s words, “[In]
Ideas II…science is considered as a definitive though indirect continuation of
perception.”219 As Overgaard notes, moreover, Husserl claims elsewhere220 that the

Dastur, Françoise. “Husserl and the Problem of Dualism.” Soul and Body in Husserlian
Phenomenology: Man and Nature (Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XVI). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands,
1983. Ed. Anna‐Teresa Tymieniecka. (p. 72) Hereafter “Dastur.” Dastur claims in this same quote that
the Crisis does the same thing, but this is a controversial point. The relevant material to interpret
includes this telling line from the latter work: “the contrast between the subjectivity of the life‐world
and the ‘objective,’ the ‘true’ world, lies in the fact that the latter is a theoretical‐logical substruction,
the substruction of something that is in principle not perceivable, in principle not experienceable in
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natural conception of the world is in no need of correction, a remark which
Overgaard rightly notes should be taken “very seriously.”221 This sort of affirmation
of the scientific conception is indeed manifest throughout Husserl’s “eidetics” of
nature in Ideas IIII, since he defines nature’s essence precisely in terms of that
which is the subject of “natural science”; in other words, nature is an ontological
region with a strictly prescribed essence, known by the sciences already at their
own level:

“…what underlies natural science is always an idea of the essence of nature, if only an implicit one.
Correlatively, the consciousness which functions as natural‐scientific experience, and thus also as the
thinking pertaining to natural‐scientific experience, has its essential phenomenological unity, and
this consciousness has its essential correlate in nature.”222

Husserl goes on to say in the quoted passage that the task of phenomenology is
merely to “bring…to clarity” the “natural‐scientific sense” already so implicit in
natural scientific consciousness itself. And later on he states:
“To make all these things clear and to outline a priori the form of a possible determination of what is
in itself true of nature, a determination which is relatively true and relatively necessary for every
stage of experience—this is the theory of natural science; as method: the theory of natural‐scientific
method.”223

Yet in perhaps an even stronger statement than all of the above, Husserl’s declares:

“But it must be understood from within, from phenomenological sources, that this abstraction from
predicates belonging to the spheres of value and practice is not a matter of an arbitrary abstraction,
its own proper being, whereas the subjective, in the life‐world, is distinguished in all respects
precisely by its being actually experienceable.” (Crisis, 127)
220 Husserl, Edmund. Husserliana XIV, Gesammelte Werke: Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität.
Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil. 1921‐28. Ed. Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973 (p.
278)
221 Overgaard, Søren. Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World. Dordrecht: Springer, 2004
222 Ideas II, 3‐4
223 Ibid., 305
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left to one’s own discretion, for as such, it would in fact produce no radically self‐enclosed idea of a
scientific domain and thus also no idea of a science self‐contained a priori. Yet we do gain such an a
priori closed idea of nature—as the idea of a world of mere things…”224

The argument that a “world of mere things” is an “abstraction” for Husserl and
therefore can be downplayed does not carry much water, because an abstraction is
not necessarily distortive or arbitrary, and in the case of nature Husserl makes it
clear that such an “abstraction” is in fact grounded in the essence of nature itself.225
The reason for emphasizing all of this here is to establish what we have been
seeing inchoately all along, namely the implicitly “naturalistic” bent in Husserl
himself. Indeed, consider the all‐encompassing extension assigned by Husserl to the
concept of material nature: “Nature…in its forms of space and time, encompasses all
factual realities but also includes, obviously on essential grounds, all apriori possible
realities as well.”226 And again: “What we have here is the one “Objective” world,
with the one space and the one time, in which “everything” is ordered—persons as
well, who, in union with their Bodies, lead their personal lives.”227 Because all
realities are constituted as higher “strata” of materiality, whose basic causal
commerce defines the natural and animal worlds, nature in the pure, physicalistic
sense has the sense of being the substrate of any other type of being whatsoever.

Ibid., 27
Husserl 1919, 132. There is, admittedly, some dissent on the question of how closely Husserl
adheres to the scientific notion of nature. Thus Theodorou, in a recent article argues that “…in Ideas
II, nature‐things are described from a phenomenologically legitimate theoretical attitude that does
not necessarily adopt the verdicts of natural scientific theories about what is ‘mere nature.’” See:
Theodorou, Panos. “Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl’s Analysis of “Nature‐Thing” in Ideas
II.” In The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Volume 5, eds. Burt
Hopkins and Steven Crowell. Seattle: Noesis Press, 2005 (p. 169) As the author fully admits, however,
Husserl is unclear from the beginning about this question, and presently this is the more important
fact.
226 Ideas II, 30; emphasis added
227 Ibid., 219; emphasis added
224
225

105
“Nature” has the sense of being the ground of “all that is” because of the fact that
anything else that is perceived, co‐perceived, or apperceived must be a higher
stratum of a reality that must be, at its most basic level, “natural” in the sense of
“material.” And again, what is key here is asymmetry. There cannot be a purely
spiritual being, with no material substrate, but there can be and of course are
material things with no higher stratum. All of this will make it very hard to
understand Husserl’s sudden declaration of the “ontological priority of spirit over
nature” (the “Priority Thesis” as I will be calling it for short).
Yet Husserl would surely respond that all of this is supposed to be predicated
on the naturalistic attitude solely, not the personalistic. The danger then becomes
that of dualism. It is here that the actual role of the Priority Thesis can be properly
ascertained—namely to avoid just such a dualism. For under the spiritual attitude,
the natural‐scientific view and its implicit naturalistic bias (which is somehow valid)
can be assigned a decisively subordinate status228:

“It is the character of the human sciences to posit subjectivity as absolute, to acknowledge nature
only as the intuitively existing surrounding world, or as represented, thought, and intended
surrounding world of persons, and to take mathematical Objective nature, which previously was the
‘true reality,’ only as (what in fact it merely is) a theoretical though rational construction on the part
of man as the subject of scientific activities…”229

And again:

“It is not the natural sciences but the human sciences that lead into the ‘philosophical’ depths; for the
philosophical depths are the depths of ultimate being.”230
See also Husserl 1927, 192‐5
Ideas II, 374
230 Ibid., 376
228
229
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Ironically, it is along these lines that commentators like Ulrich Melle and Steven
Crowell in fact develop favorably humanistic interpretations of Husserl’s ontology.
Nature “matters,” for Husserl, because it has significance—utility, beauty,
goodness—for human beings. From this point of view, a respect for human spirit
emerges indirectly as the last hope for a rescue of the environment. Thus Melle
remarks:

“…it is clear that nature plays only a subordinate role for Husserl. Husserl’s idealistic conception of
the relationship between nature and spirit is radically spirit‐centered. Nature in itself and
independent of spirit and its meaning‐giving acts is first of all only an abstraction and secondly a
mere substrate for the meaning‐giving acts and goal‐directed activities of spiritual beings….
Protection of nature for nature’s sake would therefore not make any sense to Husserl, and any
naturalistic axiology and ethics is nonsensical for him.”231

In an interesting book‐length study of Husserl and the body Dodd comes to a similar
conclusion, comparing Husserl’s view (favorably, one might add) to that of Plato
from the Phaedo: “For, I would like to suggest, there is much in this passage [Phaedo
66b‐67b3] that should remind us of Husserl, and there is much in Husserl’s analysis
of the body that should remind us of Plato, or at least of a tradition that sought to
put some sort of distance (of whatever type) between body and whatever can be
identified as that which we most truly are.”232
For his part, Crowell celebrates Husserl’s “disenchantment” of nature as a
triumph of ethical thinking. States Crowell: “Critics of Husserl (e.g. Merleau‐Ponty)
have suggested that the meaningless nature of the naturalistic attitude is an
Melle, Ullrich. “Nature and Spirit.” In Issues, p. 34
Dodd, James. Idealism and Corporeity: An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserl’s
Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997 (p. 119)
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abstraction, that genuine nature is the primordial realm of an originary logos, the
origin of meaning. To this sensibility, Husserl’s rather traditional gnosticism seems
out of place. But perhaps Husserl is right… Husserl’s critics seek to revive a mythical
conception of nature…”233 Crowell criticizes Merleau‐Ponty for suppressing the
“absolutism of reality” and he opposes him unfavorably to Levinas, who thankfully
“vindicates the disenchantment of nature” found in Husserl!234 Crowell interprets
Merleau‐Ponty to be arguing for a view of nature such that “nature already harbors
a certain sensuous meaningfulness, a certain mythical ‘fulness’ that enraptures and
fascinates and is not at all a ‘mere’ thing experience…”235 He then observes that
Merleau‐Ponty’s view is incompatible with Husserl’s “phenomenological account of
nature” in most of Ideas II, which itself signifies a “break” with the mythical fulness
of meaning “adumbrated in the sensuous.” Again, for Crowell, this break is
necessitated by the discovery of the “ethical,” which it is Levinas’ great achievement
to have reminded us of: “For Husserl [as for Levinas] it is the destiny of this
separation to leave nature behind altogether, and so it is important to ask whether
what lies at its origin—the reversibility of touch—is sufficient to account for the
Crowell, Steven Galt. “the Mythical and the Meaningless: Husserl and the Two Faces of Nature.” In
Issues, p. 82. Article hereafter referred to as “Crowell.” Crowell means something specific by
“mythical.” The mythical is borne out of a desire to suppress the “absolutism of reality” that forces
itself upon us as human beings. (Crowell, 84)
234 Ibid., 85. Crowell goes on: “Merleau‐Ponty sought to trace the origin of meaning to the element.
His elemental nature—as “wild meaning,” an “ideality that is not alien” to the flesh—evinces a
mythical imagination.” (Crowell, 94) It is interesting to note that Ricoeur, who disagreed with
Merleau‐Ponty’s “existential” appropriation of Ideas II (see Ricoeur 41, 69), would not, with his
characteristic sense of moderation, go this far. In contrasting Ideas I and II, Ricoeur states, “the style
of Ideas I requires subordinating the union of consciousness with reality through incarnation [which
is what is done in Ideas II] to its union with reality through perception.” (Ricoeur, 55) Of course, the
“union” that Ricoeur speaks of may just be better spoken of as a “disjunction”—that is, Ideas I
provides us with the disjunction of subjective immanence and objective transcendence, Ideas II and
III with that of nature and spirit. But the point is that Ricoeur sees an attempt at a fusion that is closer
to what Merleau‐Ponty has in mind than what Crowell does.
235 Crowell, 94‐5
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radicality of the break.” Merleau‐Ponty makes much of such “reversibility,” as we
will see in subsequent chapters. He also will try to account for the “radical break” in
terms that can nonetheless explain how it is possible in the first place to have
identified with nature; one cannot break from that to which one is not already
attached. Merleau‐Ponty’s use of “paradoxical thinking” will ultimately be employed
in the service of this difficult problem.

C. The Priority Thesis
The Priority Thesis is one of the most problematic positions advanced by
Husserl in the text. The priority of spirit over nature follows from the privileging of
the “personalistic attitude,” and while it certainly circumvents dualism (by dint of its
very title), it raises other perplexities. For one thing, it squares badly with the notion
that spirit is somehow itself dependent on “reality” as determined primarily by
materiality. Husserl can maintain this position or the Priority Thesis, but not, I think,
both. Consider the following claim: “In its spiritual acts, the spirit is dependent on
the soul… The spiritual Ego is dependent on the soul, and the soul on the Body….
Consequently the spirit is conditioned by nature…”236 Husserl even goes so far as to
state outright that spirit “belongs to nature,” though what he means here is not
clear, as he also refers to nature and spirit as “two realities.”237
A second reason and deeper reason to suspect the Priority Thesis is that it
would appear to commit Husserl to an ontological monism of a highly subjectivistic
sort. Husserl’s own words make the dangers immediately evident:
236
237

Ideas II, 295
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“The realm of nature is the realm of the ‘phenomenal’; that means here the realm of the real unities
constituted in or by means of ‘presentation.’ The realm of spirit, however, is the realm of the realities
given in absolute manifestation (self‐manifestation and manifestation through comprehension),
realities having behind themselves only the pure Ego as the irreal, absolute substrate of all
manifestations of reality.”238

It is very possible that, as some writers have commented, Husserl has in mind
something like a modified (transcendentally purified) monadological idealism along
the lines of a Leibniz, whose very idea of the monad he adopts, at least in part, not
only in Ideas II but most memorably in the Cartesian Meditations. But the passage
just quoted does not present us with a transcendental idealism, insofar as it stresses
the realm of spirit; here, we are only at the level of the natural attitude and,
correlatively, reality. It goes without saying that the “dogmatic” idealism of the
Leibnizian variety and the “transcendental” idealism Husserl is aiming are two
radically different things, at least from Husserl’s stated perspective. The final
reference to the “pure Ego” is itself unclear, due to the ambiguities in this very
concept, discussed already above.
A related confusion arises over how Husserl interprets the superiority of
spirit in the following quote:

“Nature is a field of relativities throughout, and it can be so because these are always in fact relative
to an absolute, the spirit, which consequently is what sustains all the relativities. … That is to say, if
we could eliminate all the spirits from the world, then that is the end of nature. But if we eliminate
nature…there always still remains something: the spirit as individual spirit.”239
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He is saying now of “spirit”—a sector of constituted reality—what he normally says
only of transcendental subjectivity, for example in the world‐annihilation
experiment. I will further address these unsettling conflations below (section D).
Aside from the other problems with Husserl’s argument, the basic mystery at
the heart of his view as stated in the Priority Thesis is this: how are we to
understand how scientists could have arrived, simply from the spiritual attitude, at
naturalistic conceptions of nature and matter and its absolute status—unless they
were simply wrong about this, say out of a certain arrogance? By defining the
essence of nature as purely material, and nature as the basis of reality, Husserl
himself has ensured that the scientific conception of nature could not truly be
supplanted by another, except by recourse to the seeming invention of a “new” and
“different” “natural attitude”—a bifurcation that reinforces rather than softens his
dualistic stand.

D. Spirit and Consciousness
The Priority Thesis is so flawed, in fact, that its very existence presents a
profound hermeneutical mystery. What is it doing in Husserl’s philosophy at all? I
think the reason becomes clear upon some reflection of what the supposed
advantage of spirit over nature is supposed to lie in, namely subjectivity. The
personalistic attitude is subject‐centered, integrating meaning and subject‐relative
values, feelings, and so on, into the matrix of perception and action. In this way, it
begins to turn in the direction of phenomenology itself, especially when one
considers that phenomenology is a human, cultural, and hence “spiritual” activity. It
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is easy, in fact, to see Husserl’s Ideas II concepts of the personalistic attitude and
Umwelt240 as crucial anticipations of the life‐world and life‐world
phenomenology.241 The trouble, however, is that in Husserl’s own view, a huge gulf
separates phenomenology from other sciences, i.e., from reality. Struggling with this
problem, Ricoeur offers his best attempt to reconcile spirit and transcendental
consciousness: “…Geist is [perhaps] nothing other than the ego of phenomenology,
but without the light of the phenomenological reduction.”242 But if true, this would
have serious consequences. First of all, Husserl in fact takes pains to distinguish the
human sciences from (transcendental) phenomenology throughout his writings. If
spirit and transcendental ego are roughly equivalent, then the natural attitude
would not have two sub‐species—naturalistic and personalistic—but would be
univocal. At least, the personalistic attitude would have to be sub‐divided into
“natural” and “transcendental” aspects. But as things stand, the former option would
concede the natural attitude entirely to the natural sciences, given the authority
Husserl cedes them over the “natural” world, while the latter, more plausible option
would nonetheless make the the need for the reduction hard to understand. Doesn’t
the personalistic attitude already interpret the world as a world of sense, rather

Thomas Nenon concurs: “the Ideas II shows [sic] that the concept of Umwelt, which would be
replaced by that of the lifeworld in the 20’s and 30’s…” (Issues, x; emphasis added)
241 The word “Lebenswelt” can, surprisingly, be found in Ideas II. See, for example: Ideas II, 187. In the
“Translator’s Introduction” to the English‐language version of Ideas III, Ted Klein and William Pohl
claim that, in their understanding, the life‐world is present from the beginning of that text as well.
(Ideas III, viii‐ix)
242 Ricoeur, 80. Ricoeur identifies the “spirit/consciousness” ambiguity as a central mystery of Ideas
II—or in his more blunt words: “As we are going to see, this pre‐eminence itself [referring to the
Priority Thesis] is what poses the most embarrassing question of Ideas II: that of situating what in
this work Husserl calls spirit (Geist) in relation to that which his works generally call ‘consciousness,’
the subjective life of consciousness reached by the phenomenological reduction.” (Ricoeur, 76)
240
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than of mere “things”? Ultimately, the natural attitude itself is in need of a radical
rethinking.243
The fundamental and well‐known ambiguities of the “life‐world” are rooted
in the ambiguities of the spiritual attitude and the notion of “spirit” itself. Spirit is a
realm of reality, the realm of persons, culture, and societies or social structures—as
well as their historical (diachronic) dimension; consciousness in the
“transcendental” and “phenomenological” sense is none of these. The “pure Ego” of
Ideas II now appears to be almost purposefully ambiguous: at once having a foot in
“personhood” and another outside it. We have already asked whether the “pure Ego”
is the same as the “transcendental Ego,” as constituting consciousness itself, and
decided that it probably has to be. On the one hand, one wants to infer that when the
phenomenologist comes upon the pure Ego, he/she comes upon himself/herself, as
transcendental ego, in the act of self‐constitution and self‐reflection. This would
essentially comprise a performance of the reduction. (Husserl does after all call the
pure Ego the “irreal, absolute substrate of all manifestation of reality.”244) But as we
have seen, Husserl describes the Ego in terms of spirit, and as the “ruler of the soul,”
for example, so its role as a “real” component of the objective world sits uneasily (or
too easily) alongside its “transcendentality.”

I suspect that this is why David Carr, in his “Translator’s Introduction” to the Crisis, distinguishes
sharply between the “natural attitude” of Ideas I (and therefore, I would say, Ideas II and III as well),
which is still “theoretical,” and what he terms the “primordial natural attitude” of the life‐world. See:
Crisis, xxxix. Between the naturalistic natural attitude and the personalistic (itself being vaguely
transcendental) attitude, there seems to be no true natural attitude in the Ideas volumes. The task of
phenomenology as a phenomenology precisely of the natural attitude becomes much more subtle
and elusive than before, since it becomes a task of elucidating the pre‐theoretical world, what
Merleau‐Ponty will for his part call the “tacit logos” of nature. We will say more about this in
subsequent chapters.
244 Ideas II, 337
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A life‐world connection does, however, allow us to re‐interpret Husserl’s
Priority‐Thesis‐engendered “spiritual monism” in the safer (or more familiar)
direction of transcendental monism, the standard Husserlian position that all reality
is constituted in and by transcendental consciousness, the source of all meaning and
being. Under this interpretation, then, in elevating the “human sciences” above the
natural sciences, what Husserl is in fact doing is imprecisely expressing his
conviction in the superiority of phenomenology, as the study of consciousness, to the
study of reality, which, Husserl seems to feel, has been monopolized by the natural
sciences. The elevation of the human sciences can be seen as a protest against this
naturalistic bias, but to that extent it overstates the case and ultimately makes all of
perceived material reality the province of subjective Umwelten, which cannot have
been Husserl’s intention. It becomes increasingly apparent that the “problem of the
natural and human sciences” was one that became grafted onto phenomenology
after it became known to Husserl through contact with the works of Dilthey. It turns
out to be hard to synthesize these very different types of discourse in a single
framework.245
Thus in light of the foregoing, the Crisis’ investigations into the life‐world
may now appear in a new light, namely as an attempt (itself admittedly groping) at a
final solution to the ambiguity of spirit and consciousness. The transcendental

What is at stake in all of this is more than just the “paradox of subjectivity,” that is, what Husserl
later calls the phenomenon of “real” egoity combined with ‘transcendental” egoity. For that problem,
addressed at length in the Crisis (Crisis, 178‐85), concerns the duality of empirical and transcendental
egos, not the specific problem of the ambiguous ontological status of the transcendental ego itself, a
transcendental ego both worldly and non‐worldly, so to speak, at the same time. In Ideas II,
consciousness belongs to Egos, and these Egos are part of the “real” order of the world, namely the
summit of its “spiritual”. Thus transcendental subjectivity can be said to both belong to the world and
constitute it “from outside,” so to speak.
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reduction to the life‐world preserves what was crucial in Ideas II’s discussion of the
Umwelt and the personalistic attitude, namely its involvement in the axiological and
practical spheres of meaning—even in assigning them priority over a conception of a
purely “meaningless” nature.246

E. The Question of the Body
Husserl’s depicts the living body or animal organism as its own ontological
region, distinct from pure “materiality” on the one hand and pure “spirituality” on
the other. Husserl elsewhere calls the body a “connecting bridge” in this respect.247
However, these could actually be seen to represent two very different claims, which
can nonetheless be easily conflated. This is exactly what occurs in a recent
(schematic) attempt to develop a recent unified interpretation, by Luis Rabanaque,
of Husserl’s idea of the living body. Rabanaque draws on both Ideas II and Husserl
1919248 to argue that the body in Husserl can be understood as a “third noematic
region” between nature and spirit (or culture). On its own this is not controversial
(depending, crucially, on how one understands the interrelations of the “regions,” as
I will address below), but the paper equally draws on the “connecting bridge”
metaphor between subjectivity and physical thinghood. The full quote from Husserl,
in which this metaphor is used, goes as follows:

But where exactly, then, does the life‐world leave the role of the human sciences and the “spirit”
specifically as such? This question is beyond the scope of this chapter or dissertation, but it may have
to do with the “ontology of the life‐world” that Husserl hints at but never fully develops in the Crisis.
(Crisis, 173)
247 See fn 127.
248 Rabanaque, Luis. “The Body as Noematic Bridge Between Nature and Culture?” In: Epistemology,
Archaeology, Ethics: Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus (Eds. Pol Vandevelde and Sebastian
Luft). New York: Continuum, 2010
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“We see thereby already that, phenomenologically considered, subjectivity (soulish spirit) in the
world and physical thinghood in the world are not two separate and externally related groups of real
occurrences, but rather that there is produced in the form of Corporeality, which in itself has its own
deepest layer of being in sensibility and free mobility, a connecting bridge, which, through the
singular spirituality in nature, can have a position in the realm of physis.”249

The metaphor of a bridge in this context is a powerful one because it seems to offer
a possibility of resolving or at least softening the otherwise stark disparity between
physical thinghood and human spirit. It is not surprising that Husserl should look to
animality to fill the role of “missing rung” in the Great Chain of Being‐like ladder he
has built. But in Rabanaque’s reading, the “body qua body” is a “third noematic
region” that “cannot be assimilated to either nature or spirit.” In other words, the
body is somehow different, in an irreducible manner, from egoic consciousness as
such and physical thingliness as such. First of all, Husserl himself states quite to the
contrary that the body is a part of nature (“animal nature,” nature in the “second
sense,” etc.). And secondly, Rabanaque seems to have tacitly combined the notions
of a plurality of noematic regions on the one hand and an “integrated” (his word)
totality—with the body as “midpoint” between extensio and cogito, sharing in
“features common to both the lower and upper regions”—on the other. In doing so
he proves of course the dictum that it is possible to be too faithful to a text. For the
idea of the body as a “bridge” between nature and spirit, and its being an irreducible
“third noematic region” in addition to the natural and the spiritual, are obviously
two very different, and mutually incompatible, claims. In the first case, we might
have a case of ontological monism—a sliding scale of being, perhaps from the most
249
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inert to the most “enspirit‐ed.” This would be reminiscent of the Neoplatonism‐
tinged ontology of some German Romantics, or perhaps distantly of Spinozism. But
if spirituality and physicality fuse or blend in the middle—in the body as “midpoint”
of extension and thought, in Rabanaque’s image—then it would seem that the notion
of “noematic regions” in the plural must be dispensed with altogether. For in that
case material thinghood and psychic egoity would not be two distinct noematic
regions at all in the first place, let alone leaving room for a third, the body.
The first, monistic view suggests a kind of vitalism, or panpsychism, that
Husserl expressly rejects with respect to Leibniz (and Bruno).250 Furthermore, this
would be a case in which Leiblichkeit would define the whole continuum of which
extension and thought are merely poles on either end. Yet this would clearly be
unacceptable to Husserl, as it would call into question the founding‐founded
relationship of the physical and psychical, the latter of which being founded on the
former, as well as remove the privileged perch of the Cartesian “I think.” The fact is
that Husserl did posit multiple irreducible (the Priority Thesis aside) “ontological
regions”—two in particular, nature and spirit. The body falls in the former column.
Of course, there is one more provocative thought experiment to consider. In talking
about the relation between the psyche and the body, Husserl invokes the following
image:

“Let us imagine a consciousness… which would stand in relation to a locomotive, so that if the
locomotive were fed water this consciousness would have the pleasant feeling that we call satiety; if
the locomotive were heated, it would have the feeling of warmth, etc. Obviously, the locomotive
would not, because of the make‐up of such relationships, become ‘animate organism’ for this
consciousness. If, instead of the thing that I at the time call my animate organism, the locomotive
250
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stood in my consciousness as the field of my pure Ego, then I could not call it animate organism also,
for it simply would not be an animate organism.”

The image has intuitive appeal, but why? Husserl immediately goes on to explain the
reason the locomotive and my consciousness would not make up an animate
organism at this point:

“…a considerable part of the large content‐class belonging to the sphere of consciousness under the
title ‘material of consciousness’ is so intimately at one with the material animate organism that in the
intuitive givenness not merely connection but precisely unity is shown.”251

Not merely connection but unity. This seems a very strong statement indeed. An
animate organism is already more than a material thing in its essence. It has a
“stratum” of the psychic, belonging to the whole of the organism “from the outset.”
But really, all this means is that the animate organism is such that in it, its Body and
soul are one. We have gone through all of this already. In spite of this “unity,” there
is also, still, a founded‐founding relation between the first and second (“psychic”)
stratum; they’re not equal, in this sense. This is what allows Husserl to speak of the
body as a “sensing physical thing” that is “covered or filled with feelings.”252 Its
materiality is primary, its psychic dimension an add‐on, albeit one woven into the
essence of some beings, the “animate” ones. So unfortunately, the unity of Body and
soul fails to provide the needed evidence of either a radical union of or a “middle
region” between nature and spirit.253 Indeed, it is arguable that Husserl’s treatment

Ideas III, 104
Ideas II, 105
253 Further (indirect) evidence of this is the unconvincing treatment of “somatology” as its own
discipline in Ideas III, for example.
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of the body is itself dualistic, having the two sides, material and psychical, but in
truth, this would probably be to use the term “dualistic” too loosely.254

IV. Conclusion

I hope to have shown that Husserl’s acceptance of the natural‐scientific sense
of material nature as the absolute basis of reality, the substrate upon which higher
strata of reality are “founded” in a unidirectional way, has severe consequences that
reverberate throughout the Ideas series and maybe Husserl’s philosophy as a whole.
It pushes the body and living nature into the purview of the inherently reductive
“natural sciences,” all the while precipitating a crisis whereby “spirit” must be
rescued from the clutches of brute materialism—and hence must be dualistically
sealed off from “nature” itself. Husserl’s world is bifurcated in such a way that the
unity of the world cannot be found in it, but only in the fact that both sets of realities
are constituted in common through the transcendental ego, i.e., phenomenologically.
If the transcendental ego and phenomenological monism fail, the world does not
have the resources to maintain internal cohesion. This view is highly Platonic in a
certain very specific sense, that is, in reference to a split universe whose unity is

Taylor Carman argues that the Körper/Leib distinction is dualistic. (See: Carman, Taylor. “the Body
in Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty.” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 27, No. 2, Fall 1999, p. 206. Hereafter
“Carman.”) I do agree with both Carman and Dastur that Husserl’s overall position is dualistic in
some important sense. (Carman, 208 and Dastur, 73)
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provided by something from “above,” “participating” in what is “below.” In Husserl’s
case, the transcendental ego is not a “thing” like the Forms, it is rather an attitude, a
kind of consciousness. But to call Husserl’s view “transcendental Platonism,” while
being more accurate, does not drain the comparison of its present relevance.
But if Ideas II promises more than Husserl himself delivers, that is also
because it promises so very much. It harbors the sorts of fertile ambiguities that
have led quite naturally to the ontological shift in phenomenology that took place
through Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau‐Ponty, among others. And over the Crisis
and other later (at least among published) writings, genetic or static or both, it has
the advantage, ironically, of greater inconsistency and thus a greater sense of
possibility. Much of this possibility arises out of Husserl’s justly influential treatment
of the body. The body had already been a major concern of Continental philosophers
like Bergson, Marcel, and Scheler (who was influenced by Husserl, albeit), but
through the vehicle of Ideas II its place in the horizon of foundational philosophical
problems, at least in the Continental tradition, was permanently established.
In all of this, Husserl of course does not seem either to recognize the tensions
in Ideas II as fundamental ones or to realize that the question of nature poses a
radical problem for the transcendental‐phenomenological method itself. As we have
seen, he presents a kind of “ontological gambit” directed against the naturalistic or
physicalistic philosopher. If Husserl’s gambit fails, it will have in the process
conceded so much to natural science and, in the wake of the failure of
transcendental phenomenology, there would be only the naturalistic‐physicalistic
option left. Something has clearly gone wrong. At its best, the examination of the
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body in Ideas II raises the possibility of a rethinking of phenomenology and the
natural attitude, an uncovering of evidence that shows powerfully that there is a
kind of deep inter‐connectivity and overlap of nature and spirit. There is a certain
volatility in Husserl’s handling of these concepts, a volatility that reappears in
intermittent bursts throughout Ideas II. Thus, like intentional consciousness itself,
Ideas II as a text points necessarily beyond itself.
For his part, Merleau‐Ponty adopts many of Husserl’s insights as his own but
goes with them in a different direction. We might put it this way: whereas for
Husserl nature has to be explained in terms of its “constitution” in transcendental
consciousness, for Merleau‐Ponty, it is this very consciousness which needs
explaining, in light of its obvious origination in the primordial experiences of the
natural lived‐body. The body becomes the site of a paradox that will never be
“resolved,” because it is definitive of the human condition. Ontologically, the body as
Leib blurs the line of subjectivity and objectivity in a way even more decisive than
(theoretical) intentionality, since it has no “directionality,” and it is not simply the
“body‐subject” (as Merleau‐Ponty himself came to recognize) but something like the
criss‐crossing or intertwining of being with itself—a knot at the heart of the
universe. The intimacy of nature and spirit allows philosophy, and not just natural
science, to have a say in defining what it is, even while itself being susceptible to
having to revise its own beliefs in light of these explanations. In Merleau‐Ponty,
“naturalism” is defeated, paradoxically, by becoming transformed through a much
more robust definition of “nature” than scientists have traditionally permitted. This
is no victory of a higher idealism or spiritualism. Contrary to what some have
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claimed, Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy does not “re‐enchant” nature so much as
remove any hard, essentialist barriers between the various—real—divisions within
“being.” It is in this sense precisely a philosophy of “promiscuity,” to use Merleau‐
Ponty’s word, rather than of romantical unity.
Let us now turn to Merleau‐Ponty’s own multi‐faceted appropriation of
Husserl’s thought, Ideas II included.
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Chapter Three: MerleauPonty’s Organic Appropriation of
Husserlian Phenomenology

“We know that Husserl never made himself too clear on these questions.”
‐‐Maurice Merleau‐Ponty255

I. Introduction

The question of what phenomenology is—and what its ultimate tasks are—
has never ceased to be posed ever since its inception. Naturally, people have looked
to Husserl, the effective founder and pioneer of this philosophy, for answers to such
questions—but while some find them here, others see only more questions.
Merleau‐Ponty was unique, in this regard: he found an answer, but it happens to be
one that continues to surprise us because of its counter‐intuitivity. On Merleau‐
Ponty’s reading, Husserl’s questions are ultimately those of human existence, the
paradoxes of incarnate subjectivity, the finitude of human knowledge—none of
which the “textbooks” at first suggest to be central to the German philosopher’s
agenda. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that ever since Merleau‐Ponty introduced his
Husserl to the world, phenomenology has not been able to stop wondering over the
enigma that is the Merleau‐Ponty/Husserl relationship.
Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. “The Philosopher and His Shadow.” (Hereafter “PS.”) In Signs. Tr. Richard
M. McCleary. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964 (p. 165)
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The stakes are as high as ever, as evident from a (relatively) recent account
like this one by Lester Embree:

“It is daunting to recall the historical era in American phenomenology of our youth that is best called
‘Phenomenology and Existentialism’ if only because, in that great upsurge of energy, Husserl was,
incredibly, read by so many as the father of existential phenomenology, a paternity that still needs
challenging.”256

There are many, particularly on the “Husserlian” side (hopefully this sort of label
will mean less by the end of this chapter), who share Embree’s disenchantment with
what they perceive to be Merleau‐Ponty’s misappropriation of Husserlian
phenomenology.257 There are also those from the “Merleau‐Ponty side” of things
who lament the French philosopher’s constant references to Husserl, finding them
unnecessary and misleading given the ultimately trans‐phenomenological nature,
they claim, of Merleau‐Ponty’s undertaking. Others, of course, stress the indissoluble
link between the two philosophers.
It is certainly hard to deny that a significant link exists, but the precise
relation between Merleau‐Ponty and Husserl is an uncannily difficult code to crack.
“Does Merleau‐Ponty get Husserl right?” is just the first of many questions that arise.
Others include: Is there a “right” Husserl—a “true” Husserl, at all? Should Merleau‐
Ponty’s self‐described fidelity to Husserl’s ideas be trusted? Should we see Merleau
Ponty as a kind of Husserlian, finally, and even Husserl (or one of possibly several
“Husserls”) as a protoMerleauPontian?

Quoted in: Bernet, Rudolf; Iso Kern; and Eduard Marbach. An Introduction to Husserlian
Phenomenology. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1993 (p. xi) I reproduce and respond
to a fuller version of the same quote below.
257 For example, Elizabeth Behnke, as discussed further below.
256
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To start at the end and work backwards, so to speak, my quick answers to
these questions, respectively, would be: yes, Merleau‐Ponty gets something
profoundly right about Husserl, that is a particular strain of him that must be
separated carefully from the rest; no, there is no “true” Husserl, since many live
possibilities remain open in his cavernous thought; yes, Merleau‐Ponty’s self‐
understanding as a phenomenologist of a Husserlian vein is grounded in truth; and
finally, yes, there is a sense in which Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty are reciprocally
intertwined, such that, to use the latter’s words when speaking of himself and
Husserl, “it is not possible even in principle to decide at any given moment just what
belongs to each.” (PS 159)
This is a lot to show, however, in a dissertation chapter, so I have limited my
goals presently to these four: First, to briefly sketch the historical background of the
relationship; Second, to provide an overview and critical assessment of a variety of
positions taken on this relationship in the recent secondary literature; Third, to
show, through a study of the relevant texts, how I understand Merleau‐Ponty to read
and appropriate Husserl; and Fourth, to suggest ways in which his relationship258 to
Husserl exemplifies and embodies certain Merleau‐Pontian (but also, implicitly,
Husserlian) “figures of thought.” That is, I will want ultimately to show—and here is
at least one clue as to why some readers don’t accept Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of
Husserl—that Merleau‐Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl follows the same pattern as

Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty did not have a personal acquaintance, so by “relationship” I have of
course been referring (and will continue to refer) throughout this chapter to the relationship
between their philosophies.
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his general philosophy, such that to accept one is, to a large degree, to accept the
other—or at least to be prepared to do so more readily.259
Merleau‐Ponty did not begin his philosophical career strictly as a
“phenomenologist,” but he gradually grew into the role. He was interested in
Husserl as early as 1934, but even as late as his first book, The Structure of Behavior,
his primary focus seemingly lies elsewhere. However, reading Husserl (or about
him, as through Eugen Fink’s important Kantstudien article of 1933260) evidently
had a great cumulative impact on him, such that, as one chronicler notes, “[his]
attention to Husserl increases rather than diminishes over the course”261 of the
progression from The Phenomenology of Perception (PP), his well‐known 1945
masterpiece, to The Visible and the Invisible (VI), which was left unfinished at the
time of the author’s untimely death. Unlike Eugen Fink, Martin Heidegger, Aron
Gurwitsch, and other students of Husserl’s, Merleau‐Ponty did not have a personal
relationship with Husserl, although he may have attended at least one of his
lectures.262 Complicating matters further, Husserl was clearly only one of many
influences on the sponge‐like French thinker. This is because Husserl’s
An important but deliberate omission from this discussion is any extended discussion of
hermeneutics for its own sake. For example, I touch only indirectly the perennial question of whether
there is in fact such a thing as a “correct” interpretation of a work, or even whether there is such a
“work” to begin with. (Besides, Merleau‐Ponty’s is a case in which it is not the meaning of individual
texts that are usually at stake but the tendencies and “inner logic” of the thinker’s corpus as a whole,
an even more elusive animal.) These are surely questions that deserve replies and would have
significant bearing on the present inquiry, but they also lie just outside its necessarily restricted
scope.
260 See: Fink, Eugen. “Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen
Kritik.” In: Fink, Eugen. Studien zur Phänomenologie 19301939. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1966
261 The chronicler is Ted Toadvine. See “Merleau‐Ponty’s Reading of Husserl: A Chronological
Overview.” In: MerleauPonty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree. Dodrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 (p. 228). Hereafter “Toadvine.” (The essay collection as a whole is
referred to hereafter as “Reading.”) Toadvine’s chronicle has been extremely useful for this section.
262 Ibid., pp. 227‐33
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phenomenology, largely through the influence of Sartre, was only one of many
dominant philosophical options in 1940s France, when Merleau‐Ponty forged the
core of his philosophical vision.263
Nevertheless, Husserl’s influence turned out to be the most decisive in the
end. In the “Preface” of PP, Merleau‐Ponty adopted the fundamental Husserlian
insights and concepts, working them into his own brand of “existential”
phenomenology, and he was the first so‐called “outsider” to be granted private and
in‐depth access to Husserl’s archives in Louvain, which were at that time filled with
reams of unpublished material that Merleau‐Ponty happily devoured and
communicated, fragmentarily, to a wider circle of scholars and intellectuals.264
Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of Husserl is critical of some of Husserl’s tendencies,
particularly what have been variously labeled and identified as his rationalism,
idealism, essentialism, and foundationalism. Merleau‐Ponty disliked each of these
“styles” of thinking, but he clearly regarded Husserl as “more than the sum” of these
philosophical parts. It is also true, however, that each of the above labels can be
challenged as overly simplistic stereotypes when applied to Husserl, as they all
apply chiefly (though by no means exclusively) to the early published works of
Husserl during his, primarily, “static phenomenology” period—most especially,
For example, Alexandre Kojève had memorably re‐introduced Hegel to French students, including
Merleau‐Ponty. Heidegger and Scheler and their criticisms of Husserl were also influential to
Merleau‐Ponty, as were Sartre’s existentialism, Bergsonianism, (eventually) Marxism, and other
philosophies—to say nothing of the central impact of Gestalt Psychology on the young thinker. On the
(mostly) negative side, the influence of French Neo‐Kantianism should be mentioned. I will further
address Merleau‐Ponty’s consistent opposition to Kantianism in later sections.
264 According to Dan Zahavi, it was in fact Ideas II, the then‐unpublished sequel to Ideas I, that had
had the greatest impact on Merleau‐Ponty. (Zahavi, Dan. “Merleau‐Ponty on Husserl: A Reappraisal.”
In MerleauPonty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree. Dodrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2002. (p. 6—hereafter “Zahavi.”) This idea is supported indirectly by the way
Merleau‐Ponty essentially reconstructs his own philosophy on the basis of “some lines” of Ideas II in
PS.
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Husserl’s Ideas I, which we have examined in the first chapter. Merleau‐Ponty
recognized in Husserl’s thought over time a distinct philosophical maturation, as
well as a movement away from the style of Ideas I. Merleau‐Ponty thus divides
Husserl’s thought into three distinct periods: logicist, idealist (or simply “middle”),
and existentialist phases.265 Merleau‐Ponty sides with the third, “existentialist”
phase in Husserl’s thought, but the fact is that he never denied the complexity and
even contradictoriness of Husserl’s philosophy even at the end—though given his
temperament and penchant for l’ambiguité, he almost certainly admired Husserl all
the more for this than not.

II. MerleauPonty’s Relationship to Husserl: An Doxographical Overview and
Critique

A. Introduction
To raise the question of Merleau‐Ponty’s relationship to or reading of Husserl
is to do so against the backdrop of a lively and vigorous debate, one that begins
early266 and continues to this day. Here I will examine the parameters of this debate,

Two distinct places in which he advances the idea show how enduring it was in Merleau‐Ponty’s
mind: PP, p. 317, fn 274; and, much later, PSM 46 and 48. See also fn46, below.
266 As of 1964, Edie reports accusations against Merleau‐Ponty, for example by Maurice Natanson,
that had already begun to arise over the accuracy or reliability of Merleau‐Ponty’s citations of
Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences (particularly quotes to the effect that for Husserl
“transcendental subjectivity is an intersubjectivity”). Surely James Edie was presciently correct in
musing: “That Merleau‐Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl has been and will continue to be contested
is beyond doubt.” See the Preface of: Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Primacy of Perception. Ed. John
Wild. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964 (pp. xvii‐xviii, fn10) The namesake essay
(actually a lecture and a discussion) from this volume is referred to hereafter as “Primacy.”
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beginning also, through a critique of some of the extant literature, to offer my own
interpretation. The positions I will address cannot necessarily be placed on a single
spectrum, since there is no single question that they all address in the same way.
Some authors, for example, discuss the extent of the influence of Husserl over
Merleau‐Ponty, while others concentrate on the fidelity of Merleau‐Ponty to Husserl
on given issues (or as a whole). But my goal is not to analyze this discussion into
their individual components but to provide a more or less holistic overview of the
discussion itself, for all aspects of it are relevant to any general assessment of
Merleau‐Ponty’s relationship to Husserl.
I have divided various views as either “strong” or “weak.” Weak views, on
this definition, tend to downplay the philosophical association between the two
thinkers, while strong views tend to emphasize and attach great importance to it.
Some readers, of course, like Stephen Watson, combine both aspects in their
considered view. As a general rule, weak readings are more common than strong
ones, for a variety of reasons. I touch on some of the notable exceptions first—
relatively briefly, since I generally agree with the strong orientation myself and seek
to be offering one of my own as I proceed. That is, instead of rehearsing positive
strong accounts already made, I have deemed it more important finally to answer
weak readings instead.267

My placement of a treatment of the secondary literature first, before a direct analysis of the
primary texts, is motivated by my hope that it will be useful to have the context in which the
signficance of such an analysis can be duly measured. The review is restricted mostly to recent
literature, both for reasons of limited space as well as to make it as current as possible.
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B. The “Strong View”: Zahavi, Smith, and Barbaras
Dan Zahavi, while acknowledging differences between the two thinkers,
surprisingly (given his strong “Husserlian” credentials) stresses the continuity
between them and argues that Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of Husserl is in many ways
prescient and ahead of its times.268 For his part, A. D. Smith argues that Merleau‐
Ponty’s ideas in PP are fundamentally Husserlian, though stated with a different
emphasis and through different rhetoric. He also argues that Husserl has the
resources to account for the special signficance accorded by Merleau‐Ponty to the
“bodily schema,” against the view of Shaun Gallagher, for example.269 Both Zahavi
and Smith have in common a vast command over the Husserliana archives, and
hence call upon material that cannot be expected to be known by even some
advanced phenomenologists. The pivotal Ideas II has come to be increasingly well‐
known, of course, but there are on this front detractors of the Stein‐ and Landgrebe‐
edited volume we have before us today.270
In addition to Zahavi and Smith, who write primarily on Husserl, there is also
the case of a Merleau‐Pontian who fully acknowledges the profundity of the link
between the two philosophers, namely Renaud Barbaras. Thus in the conclusion of
his book De l’être du phénomène, Barbaras states: “…Merleau‐Ponty’s ontology does
Text cited above as “Zahavi.” For an instance of his spirited defense of transcendental subjectivity
in Husserl, see for example, Zahavi, Dan. Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to
the LinguisticPragmatic Critique. Tr. Elizabeth A. Behnke. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001
269 Smith, A. D. “The Flesh of Perception: Merleau‐Ponty and Husserl.” In Reading MerleauPonty: On
the Phenomenology of Perception. Ed. Thomas Baldwin. New York: Routledge, 2007 (pp. 1‐22) Note in
particular the summary remark, “…I have suggested that there is nothing radically new in Merleau‐
Ponty, as compared with Husserl. They occupy the same terrain in philosophical space.” (p. 20)
270 See for example: Behnke, Elizabeth. “Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontological Reading of Constitution in
Phénoménologie de la perception.” In MR, p. 34; hereafter Behnke. Behnke argues that Stein had
already “steered” Ideas II in a realistic direction, one more congenial to Merleau‐Ponty’s intentions
than to Husserl’s own.
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not break with phenomenology; it is rather phenomenology’s most significant
achievement…”271 Of course, Leonard Lawlor and Ted Toadvine, in the
“Introduction” to their English translation of the book describe it as having as one its
main aims to “confront Husserl’s phenomenology” and that it concerns the
“transformation of Merleau‐Ponty’s phenomenology into ontology.” Importantly,
however, these remarks pertain to Barbaras himself, rather than to Merleau‐Ponty.
For Barbaras tacitly admits that Merleau‐Ponty did not fully effect the desired
“transformation” himself, and has benefited from his own efforts to finally do so.272

C. “Weak” and “Mixed” Views: Lefort, Richir, Madison, et al.
Notwithstanding the positions of the three eminent scholars just mentioned,
the opposite view is rather much easier to find. This is true of Merleau‐Ponty’s one‐
time student Claude Lefort, for example, as well as March Richir, both of whom
speak of Merleau‐Ponty’s ultimate “break” with phenomenology.273 Still on the

The Being of the Phenomenon. Trs. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2004 (p. 312) Barbaras’ full quote bears almost exact resemblance to something
Merleau‐Ponty had written before. Barbaras: “Also, Merleau‐Ponty’s ontology does not break with
phenomenology; it is rather phenomenology’s most significant achievement. It aims to recognize
what Husserl had foreseen, namely, ‘a type of being which contains everything’; it aims to make a
return from an objective world to a Lebenswelt in whose continual flux are borne Nature and the
objects of perception, as well as constructions…” Merleau‐Ponty, from a lecture on the “life‐world”:
“…the return from an objective world to a Lebsenwelt in whose continual flux are borne Nature and
the objects of perception, as well as the constructions through which we grasp them with Cartesian
exactness.” (Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France 19521960.
Tr. John O”Neill. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 1970, p. 108. Hereafter
“Themes.”)
272 Ibid., ix
273 See: Lefort, Claude, Sur une colonne absente: Ecrits autour de MerleauPonty (Paris: Gallimard,
1978) and Richir, Marc, “Le sense de la phénoménologie dans Le visible et l”invisible,” in Esprit, no. 66
(June 1982), p. 125. I get these citations by way of Bettina Bergo’s “Philosophy as Perspectiva
Artificialis: Merleau‐Ponty’s Critique of Husserlian Constructivism.” Printed as the “Afterword” of:
Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology. Ed. Leonard Lawlor with Bettina
Bergo. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 2002, p. 178. This article is referred to
hereafter as “Bergo.”
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Merleau‐Ponty side (so to speak), there are the cases of Gary Madison and M. C.
Dillon, both of whom underplay the role of the phenomenological reduction in
Merleau‐Ponty.274 For Dillon, even the early Merleau‐Ponty “uncritically
appropriated” Husserlian terminology for different purposes.275 Such sentiments
are common among Merleau‐Ponty scholars. In his book on Merleau‐Ponty, for
example, Lawrence Hass argues that Merleau‐Ponty goes beyond Husserl definitely
from phenomenology to “expression”276, while Hubert Dreyfus comments that
Merleau‐Ponty’s anti‐dualism conflicts directly with what makes the transcendental
reduction in Husserl possible277. Taylor Carman and Françoise Dastur, both from
very different perspectives, both agree on a certain “dualism” in Husserl which
clashes with Merleau‐Ponty’s anti‐dualist agenda. Argues Carman, for example:

“Unlike Husserl, but like Heidegger, Merleau‐Ponty looks beyond the subject‐object divide to try to
gain insight into the concrete structures of worldly experience… Indeed, taking the problem of
embodiment seriously, as Merleau‐Ponty does, entails a radical reassessment of the very conceptual
distinctions on which Husserl’s enterprise rests.”278

For his part, Xavier Tilliette reinforces this divide when he remarks that
“…Husserl was not an instructor of Merleau‐Ponty as much as an initiator and a
274Gary

Madison, The Phenomenology of MerleauPonty: The Search for the Limits of Consciousness
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981), 194‐5 and 332‐3, and Martin Dillon, MerleauPonty’s Ontology
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 71‐2, 120 (hereafter “Dillon”). Cited by way of: Sara
Heinämaa, “From Decisions to Passions: Merleau‐Ponty’s Interpretation of Husserl’s Reduction.”
(Hereafter “Heinämaa.”) In “Reading” (pp. 127‐148)
275 Dillon, p. 83. Dillon does however note on p. 87 the “usual” way in which, almost as a kind of
modus operandi, Merleau‐Ponty picks up and develops a “seminal thought” of Husserl’s.
276 Hass, Lawrence. MerleauPonty’s Philosophy. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008 (pp.
198‐9)
277 Dreyfus, Hubert. “Merleau‐Ponty’s Critique of Husserl’s (and Searle’s) Concept of Intentionality.”
In Rereading MerleauPonty. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2000 (p. 37)
278 Carman, Taylor. “The Body in Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty.” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 27, No. 2, Fall
1999, p 206. For Dastur’s similar but slightly more nuanced position, see: “Husserl and the Problem
of Dualism.” In Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology: Man and Nature (Analecta Husserliana,
Vol. XVI), ed. Anna‐Teresa Tymieniecka. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1983 (pp. 65‐77).
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revealer,” going on to add that “Merleau‐Ponty has traced out new furrows,
concerned to free up the implicit Husserl who resembled him like a brother,”279 an
interesting twist of course in which Husserl is said to resemble MerleauPonty, as
opposed the other way around!280 Tilliette is ambiguous, however, about the issue
of Merleau‐Ponty’s originality, as when he writes, “In reality, [Merleau‐Ponty] did
not carry out detailed pioneer work, but rather picked out passages and formulas
that electrified his own meditation. He was not and did not want to be a scholiast
nor even an historian of philosophy.” Did he carry out pioneering work or didn’t he?
In a recent essay, Stephen Watson offers something like an intermediary
position, a “mixture” of the strong and the weak ingredients.281 On the weaker side,
he emphasizes the critical aspect of Mereau‐Ponty’s engagement with Husserl:
“Merleau‐Ponty has given up on phenomenology as a strictly foundational science in
order to articulate phenomenology as part of our conceptual history and coherence,
a situated knowing and a situated knowledge.”282 Watson seems to suggest that
Merleau‐Ponty’s radical rethinking of the role of history, factuality, and generally
the “relation of structure and sense,”283 while still perhaps “phenomenological” in a
loose sense, is sufficiently radical to indicate a profound disengagement from the
Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Texts and Dialogues. Ed. Hugh Silverman and James Barry, Jr. Tr. Michael
Smith et al. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1992 (p. 162)
280 We also must be careful in following him as he continues this passage, however: “He approached
Husserl with ulterior motives, knowing by divination what he would find there…” (Cited by way of
Lester Embree’s Preface to “Reading,” p. xiii) Tilliette admits to have acquired this latter insight
second‐hand from a former colleague of Merleau‐Ponty, who knew him as of 1938. His belief that
Merleau‐Ponty chiefly brought out the hidden “implications” of others” thoughts is not incorrect, but
if one does this at a masterly enough level, it becomes unclear who is more responsible for the fully
developed thought—the original author or the commentator.
281 Watson, Stephen H. “Merleau‐Ponty’s Phenomenological Itinerary From Body Schema to Situated
Knowledge: On How We Are and How We Are Not to ‘sing the World.”” Janus Head, Winter/Spring
Issue, 9.2, 2007. Amherst, NY: Trivium Publications. (pp. 535‐549)
282 Ibid., 544
283 Ibid., 545
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original, more positivistic version of phenomenology that Husserl had laid out. “We
must conclude that on its own phenomenology is not explanatory [in the way
Husserl had claimed]. It attains no explanatory ‘role’—certainly not that of
determining our concepts—without being brought together with the facts and their
history.”284 Watson’s rich argument, which itself combines historical fact and
systematic analysis in tracing Merleau‐Ponty’s critical break from elements of both
Husserl’s and his own earlier phenomenology, nevertheless makes a compelling
indirect (and, for lack of a better word, performative) case for the inextricability of a
comprehension of Merleau‐Ponty’s task without reference to Husserl as a kind of
permanent horizon—much in the same way perhaps that Merleau‐Ponty (cited by
Watson) argues for the dialectical‐relational importance of science to
phenomenology.285 It is this that can be said to comprise the “strong” element in
Watson’s reading of the Merleau‐Ponty/Husserl relationship.

D. Four Weak Readings: Embree, Behnke, Seebohm, Bergo
In the rest of this section I will deal at greater length with the “weak” views of
three phenomenologists of high repute: Lester Embree, Elizabeth Behnke, and
Thomas Seebohm. I quote these authors at length in order to deal with their claims
in close detail.

Ibid., 545
Ibid., 540. The original citation is from Primacy, 29. Watson also cites Gurwitsch’s well‐known
remark to the effect that the “life‐world” in Husserl cannot be understood apart from its polemical
relation to the scientific attitude.
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For Embree’s view, I will simply reproduce an expanded version of the quote
provided at the outset of this chapter:

“It is daunting to recall the historical era in American phenomenology of our youth that is best called
‘Phenomenology and Existentialism’ if only because, in that great upsurge of energy, Husserl was,
incredibly, read by so many as the father of existential phenomenology, a paternity that still needs
challenging. That was challenged chiefly on the basis of what Merleau‐Ponty confected in reference to
a book whose English title actually is The Crisis of the European Sciences. No competent reader can
study the present work [an introduction to Husserl’s phenomenology] and fail to comprehend (a)
that Husserl’s was from about 1905 through to the end of his life a transcendental philosophy and (b)
that Husserl’s focus was in the philosophy of science. Existential phenomenology is not
transcendental and, although not lacking in interest in science theory, is more concerned with human
existence.”286

Several things can be said to challenge these sentiments, though none definitive. For
example, on one reading, Merleau‐Ponty does not renounce the transcendental
attitude, and at times in fact embraces it explicitly.287 On this view, it is the
“absoluteness” or “priority” of it that he challenges, not its rightful place in
phenomenological praxis. Also, it is arguable that Merleau‐Ponty’s intensive
engagement with the sciences—at least at the first‐order level (meaning, the
creative interpretation of its “results”)—not only matches but surpasses that of
Husserl himself.288 Finally, to argue that Husserl was concerned with “science” as
opposed to “human existence” might be a false dilemma, especially in Merleau‐
Quoted in: Bernet, Rudolf; Iso Kern; and Eduard Marbach. An Introduction to Husserlian
Phenomenology. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1993 (p. xi)
287 See for example the following passage on p. 63 of PP: “But now that the phenomenal field has been
sufficiently circumscribed, let us enter into this ambiguous domain and let us make sure of our first
steps as far as the psychologist is concerned, until the psychologist’s self‐scrutiny leads us, by way of
second‐order reflection, to the phenomena of the phenomenon, and decisively transforms the
phenomenal field into a transcendental one.” (italics added) Reference provided by Heinämaa (p. 129)
See also Ted Toadvine’s article, also in MR (pp. 71‐94), entitled “Leaving Husserl’s Cave? The
Philosopher’s Shadow Revisited.” Toadvine argues that the PS is an example of Merleau‐Ponty’s
“reformulating the relation between the transcendental and the mundane.” (p. 71)
288 And he is no stranger to the “philosophy of science” as such, either. See for example what Merleau‐
Ponty says about science in his Eye and Mind (In The Primacy of Perception, tr. Carleton Dallery. Ed.
John Wild. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964) pp. 159‐61.
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Ponty’s case, but also, arguably, in Husserl’s. Embree, one of the most eminent
scholars of phenomenology today, is obviously aware of all of this, so this is more
than a matter of lining up citations to prove one side or the other. As I will try to
argue later, how one reads the Merleau‐Ponty/Husserl relationship is partly a
function of one’s receptivity to the kind of “ambiguity”—a good ambiguity, mind
you289—that Merleau‐Ponty wants to introduce to philosophy and hermeneutics
alike.
Behnke begins a recent essay by arguing that “Merleau‐Ponty’s ‘reading’ of
Husserl is simultaneously a ‘writing’ of Husserl—a writing that appropriates and
develops, but also deforms and occludes.”290 It is interesting to note that Merleau‐
Ponty himself endorses the notion that it is a false dilemma to say that
“interpretation is restricted to inevitable distortion or literal reproduction.” (PS
159) Yet one wishes to ask how it is possible to develop someone’s ideas by
deforming them? Does not the notion of “development” presuppose a certain lack of
completed form, and hence a malleability or “potentiality” that makes it hard to
define in the first place? With this ominous phrasing, Behnke goes on to explain why
she faults Merleau‐Ponty’s approach and manner of appropriation, as in this telling
quote:

“On the whole, then, Merleau‐Ponty’s Husserl‐reading is characterized by an interpretive
engagement with the content of Husserlian texts rather than a concern for adopting a
phenomenological attitude, consulting experiential evidence for ourselves, and carrying Husserl’s
research tradition further. …And since Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of Husserl has had a profound
influence on the way Husserl’s work has been received in general, the overall effect has been to
For the expression “good ambiguity,” see Primacy, 11.
“Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontological Reading of Constitution in Phénoménologie de la perception.” In MR,
p. 31
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perpetuate a climate of interpretation in which Husserlian themes and terms are typically
approached in light of received philosophical problems and received ways of posing them, all at the
expense of the possibility of appropriating phenomenology as a living research horizon.” (Behnke,
49‐50)

Read closely, this emerges as a particularly stinging critique of Merleau‐
Ponty, at least qua “phenomenologist.” By not consulting “experiential evidence for
ourselves” or, what Behnke mentions just before, cleaving to “description” rather
than “explanation” (Behnke, 49), Merleau‐Ponty is perhaps not so much a
“phenomenologist” at all, but closer to a simple dogmatist, that is a metaphysician
who engages in “received philosophical problems and received ways of posing
them.” Behnke’s sticking point is Merleau‐Ponty’s abandonment of Husserl’s strict
methodological directives, something neither he nor I would entirely dispute.
Behnke adds yet another dark twist, however, by suggesting, like Embree, that the
reception of Merleau‐Ponty as a representative phenomenologist has damaged
Husserl’s legacy. Obviously Behnke is not trying to cast aspersions on Merleau‐
Ponty himself, but simply to describe what she sees as a case of all‐too‐successful
appropriation (her word) of Husserl’s program. But Merleau‐Ponty has, in Behnke’s
words, performed a “disservice” to Husserl’s work.291 There is perhaps a certain
assumption here that Husserl’s own self‐defined project—without intervention by
Merleau‐Ponty—is vital on its own, a powerful philosophical system or
methodology that has been overshadowed by an inferior product. However, it is not
clear in this case that Merleau‐Ponty would have marked out any sort of
Behnke singles out that “major element of Husserl’s work as a whole” that is “constitution.”
(Behnke, 48) Behnke’s remarks here are somewhat surprising given her intensive engagement with
Merleau‐Ponty, particularly over the issues of embodiment and nature, in recent years. See for
example: “From Merleau‐Ponty’s Concept of Nature to an Interspecies Practice of Peace.” In Animal
Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life. Albany: State University Press, 1999 (pp. 93‐116)
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“development” of Husserl’s thought, so much as wrong‐headedly misconstrued what
Husserl was finally up to.
These sorts of sentiments stand of course in significant contrast with
Merleau‐Ponty’s understanding of his own relationship to Husserl’s thought, which,
as we will see in the next section of this chapter, is closer to the strong views briefly
covered above. It is in light of this self‐interpretation of Merleau‐Ponty’s that
Thomas Seebohm develops an interesting psychological hypothesis, suggesting that
Merleau‐Ponty knew of the distance at some level in his mind, but tried in any case
to “cover up” this distance. Why would he do this? Again, a long but rich quote:

“As in the case of Fichte and Kant, the topos serves as a cover‐up of a critique, and this critique has
the character of deconstruction. Fichte showed with respect to Kant, and Merleau‐Ponty with respect
to Husserl, that what they believed to be the last word in philosophy is built on ‘unthought’
suppositions. These lurk behind the hidden contradictions of the criticized position… The new task is
the recognition and explication of these presuppositions, thus asking for the possibility of the
criticized positions. A deconstructive critique has, taken for itself, the character of a more or less
complete rupture and radical rejection of the positions in question. But the goal is also to claim some
kind of continuity.”292

And he adds elsewhere,

“Merleau‐Ponty is in every respect honest in his attempts to ‘save the face’ of his honored master in
the light of the new developments introduced by him and others.”293

Thus Merleau‐Ponty overplayed the connection between himself and Husserl in at
least one way: for the (ironically) benevolent purposes of disguising certain jarring
discrepancies between the two. (Merleau‐Ponty evidently wanted to save Husserl’s

Seebohm, Thomas M. “The Phenomenological Movement: A Tradition without Method? Merleau‐
Ponty and Husserl.” In MR (p. 59)
293 Ibid., p. 55
292
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face by giving him a kind of “face‐lift”!) If it is being implied that this kind of face‐
saving, well‐intentioned as it may be, is nonetheless counter‐productive, because for
example it tends to mislead readers as to what Husserl really meant, then we come
full circle back to Behnke’s criticism about legacy and occlusion. The “face‐saving”
hypothesis is tempting, given Merleau‐Ponty’s generally non‐confrontational style of
engaging friends and enemies alike, but it faces a real difficulty: why should
Merleau‐Ponty have felt obliged to discuss Husserl in the first place, and to the
extent that he does? Out of some strange emotional attachment to Husserl, a man he
had never met, and whose work he had every reason to downplay with respect to
figures like Heidegger, Hegel, and others?294 This does not seem wholly convincing.
If there is any personal responsibility Merleau‐Ponty would feel towards
Husserl, it would probably be as a grateful student to a (virtual) teacher. Having
benefitted from reading Husserl’s private meditations in the Husserl archives,
concealed to most of the public, and which often conflicted with the tendencies of
the published works, Merleau‐Ponty probably felt increasingly responsible to
revivify Husserl in the eyes of a public that remembers him in a one‐sided way. This
is the distinct impression that I get as I read the opening of the PS. He did not have to
cite Husserl as often as he does, but not to have done so would have eventually
appeared, to many, as a bit dishonest, given the role Husserl plays in his own
thinking. And if it is true that Merleau‐Ponty’s thought is a kind of “deconstruction”
of Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty himself does not really give this indication. Even when he

The reference to “deconstruction” should not be ignored, as it goes to the issue of Merleau‐Ponty’s
manner of interpreting philosophers, but we will come to this in the next section when we examine
PS in detail.
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claims to expose a contradiction in Husserl himself,295 for example, he quickly adds
that Husserl was at least semi‐aware of it and moving towards a satisfactory
resolution of it, namely in the last phase of his philosophy. Merleau‐Ponty is not
deconstructing so much as reconstructing Husserl—from out of Husserl’s own
writings, no less.
Bettina Bergo’s interpretation of the Merleau‐Ponty/Husserl relation builds
on something Merleau‐Ponty himself comments on, namely a certain tension in
Husserl’s thought, which, says, Bergo, “lies between the search for a ground, a
unifying principle... and, on the other hand, the conviction that the ground…is
ultimately never wholly reducible and so cannot serve as an epistemic foundation.”
(Bergo, 159) On Bergo’s view, Merleau‐Ponty effectively chose sides (my words) by
taking the “an‐archic phenomenological option.” (Bergo, 160) The tension Bergo
cites is real, yes—but she, unlike Merleau‐Ponty, expresses it here in solely “static”
or “synchronic” terms. Merleau‐Ponty, instead, provides a more diachronic account,
according to which Husserl’s texts were emerging into a certain “an‐archism” quite
on their own.296 If this is true, then Merleau‐Ponty’s autonomy as a “chooser” is
diminished; he is following Husserl’s lead even in thinking against Husserl. That,
indeed, is a fitting way to characterize the depth of Husserl’s influence over
Merleau‐Ponty, if by a circuitous route. Bergo interestingly calls this influence into
question over the issue of Husserl’s late text Erfahrung und Urteil, a text that has
See for example: Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France.
Compiled and with notes from Dominique Séglard. Tr. Rober Vallier. Northwestern University Press:
Evanston, Illinois, 2003 (p. 79)
296 One instance of Merleau‐Ponty’s position comes at the conclusion of a long assessment of
Husserl’s thinking in PS: “Originally a project to gain intellectual possession of the world, constitution
becomes increasingly, as Husserl’s thought matures, the means of unveiling a back side of things that
we have not yet constituted.” (PS 180)
295
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been shown to have many parallels with (or anticipations of) Merleau‐Ponty’s
writings. But because Merleau‐Ponty was not aware of the text’s existence, Bergo
concludes that the coincidence says more about Merleau‐Ponty’s independent train
of thought than Husserl’s influence on Merleau‐Ponty. However, a third option
seems to be that Merleau‐Ponty was at some point “keyed in” to a certain logic of
Husserl’s thoughts, and so could anticipate many of the things Husserl might have
said, without having actually had acquaintance with them. I am not sure Bergo has
convincingly foreclosed this possibility.

E. Concluding Thoughts
Notwithstanding its many twists and folds, the Merleau‐Ponty/Husserl
debate’s dominant undercurrent is something like whether Merleau‐Ponty should
be understood as a “thing apart” from Husserl or somehow a continuation, even a
mere echo, of the latter. One of Bergo’s intriguing ideas, drawn from some accounts
of Lefort, is that Merleau‐Ponty is a peculiar sort of reader of philosophers generally,
one whose appropriation of others on distinctly Merleau‐Pontian terms is so
seamless as to make one believe that the source author “really meant,” all along,
what Merleau‐Ponty says they meant. (Bergo, 158‐9) Of course this might be said of
many philosophers; I am sure, for example, that Aristotle’s students were convinced
by his tendentious treatment of the pre‐socratics. But I think the claim is that
Merleau‐Ponty is particularly effective in effacing himself from the equation, almost
in terms of a sort of “appropriation by stealth”—as opposed to an overt Aristotelian‐
Hegelian teleologism (“all of this leads to my theory.”) An image that is brought to
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mind is one of a planet (Merleau‐Ponty) whose pull brings philosophers (Hegel,
Heidegger, Bergson, Schelling, Scheler, Marx, etc.) and non‐philosophers (Uexküll,
Proust, Freud, Cézanne, Valéry, etc.) alike into its orbit, revealing them to be (or
bending them to become) just so many compliant moons. All of this may be true in
the case of the figures just listed, but it is not true, I would insist, with respect to
Husserl. It would go too far to say Husserl is to Merleau‐Ponty what a star is to this
planet, so perhaps a more fitting image is that of the twin stars of the binary Sirius
star system, working in tandem to produce a potent luminosity in the night sky.

III. MerleauPonty’s Husserlian Phenomenology: By Text

A. Introduction
I would like to begin this section with a (second) epigraph of sorts, an early
(1947) quotation from Merleau‐Ponty which sets the stage for the rest of his
(prematurely curtailed) philosophical career.

“When philosophers wish to place reason above the vicissitudes of history they cannot purely and
simply forget what psychology, sociology, ethnography, history, and psychiatry have taught us about
the conditioning of human behavior. It would be a very romantic way of showing one’s love for
reason to base its reign on the disavowal of acquired knowledge. What can be validly demanded is
that man never be submitted to the fate of an external nature or history and stripped of his
consciousness.”297

See: “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences.” (Tr. James Edie) In
“Perception,” p. 24. This was a talk (and ensuing discussion) originally recorded in 1947, shortly after
the publication of PP. Hereafter “Primacy.”
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In a certain way, this passage conveys the essence of Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy of
man298: the enigmatic nexus of the inner life of consciousness and the outer being of
Nature, the ambiguous middle‐space in which human existence unfolds and
(partially) finds itself. In Merleau‐Ponty’s view, Husserl saw the same enigma, and
increasingly came to see that it could not be solved through an appeal to “absolute
consciousness,” a reflective‐constitutive “possession” of the world,299 any more than
it could be solved by scientific naturalism and its deterministic laws. Hence the
“existential” thrust of Merleau‐Pontian phenomenology and the persistent Merleau‐
Pontian claim that Husserl himself enters “existentialism” in the third, “life‐world”‐
themed phase of his philosophy. But how does Merleau‐Ponty get all of this from
Husserl, and how does he parlay it into a new vision of “human reality”?
The current section is one of two that reconstruct Merleau‐Ponty’s
philosophy as a “Husserlian” phenomenology. Because Merleau‐Ponty generally
writes pieces and not piecemeal (a reflection of his largely becoming an essayist
between PP and VI), it is important to examine this material text by text; but at the
same time, this approach tends to occlude the genuinely systematic way he engages
with the principal themes of Husserl’s phenomenology, such as the two reductions. I
have thus tried to combine both approaches—textual‐historical and thematic‐
systematic—by organizing the second section around the same material discussed

Here as elsewhere, I use “man” instead of “humanity” only in order to reflect the style of the
source author. I do of course use the latter term wherever I am representing my own views alone.
299 “Originally a project to gain intellectual possession of the world, constitution becomes
increasingly, as Husserl’s thought matures, the means of unveiling a back side of things that we have
not yet constituted.” (PS 180) See also Merleau‐Ponty’s warning in the same essay: “To think is not to
possess the objects of thought; it is to use them to mark out a realm to think about which we
therefore are not yet thinking about.” (PS 160)
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in the first, only now by theme. Different things become apparent through each
approach.300

B. Husserl in PP
PP is dominated by the preoccupations and methodological innovations of
phenomenology. And Merleau‐Ponty makes it clear in his famous “Preface” that it is
Husserl’s version of phenomenology that he has chiefly in view.301 Most if not all of
the major issues in the Husserl/Merleau‐Ponty nexus, and Merleau‐Ponty’s manner
of interpreting Husserl, are present in at least germinal form in the short but
pregnant “Preface.” Merleau‐Ponty enumerates the three major themes of
Husserlian phenomenology—the phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction,
intentionality—and, one by one, endorses and repackages them in “existential”
terms. Thus we learn that the phenomenological reduction in fact “belongs to
existentialist philosophy.”302

In terms of texts, I will draw primarily on the “Preface” to PP, the essays PS and “Phenomenology
and the Human Sciences” (In The Primacy of Perception. Ed. John Wild. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1964; hereafter “PSM”), and VI. (Note: I will be citing from the paperback edition of
the Smith translation of PP; amazingly, page numbers of the hardcover and paperback editions for
the most part do not align.)
301 After all, he explicitly relegates Being and Time (Heidegger being the other major
phenomenological alternative to Husserl, excepting Sartre, who himself appropriates Husserl and
Heidegger) to the status of a detailed development of Husserl’s own philosophy. This stated
preference for Husserl over Heidegger (and Scheler) is repeated elsewhere, for example, in PSM:
“Husserl, who defined philosophy as the suspension of our affirmation of the world, recognized the
actual being of the philosopher in the world much more clearly than Heidegger, who devoted himself
to the study of being in the world.” (PSM, 94) Merleau‐Ponty calls Heidegger “dogmatic” in the same
passage. This attitude towards Heidegger suggests that Merleau‐Ponty is, in a way, “taking Heidegger
back” for Husserl. Thus when Merleau‐Ponty uses a term like “being‐in‐the‐world” or “facticity” in
the “Preface,” it is always, ironically, to the benefit of Husserl. Against those who would argue for an
equal Husserl and Heidegger (at least the Heidegger of Being and Time) influence on the thinker, I
think these indications help dispel that impression, though there is admittedly much room for debate
on the matter.
302 Lest we imagine this to be a veiled attack on Husserl, we need only consult a later footnote later in
which Merleau‐Ponty defines Husserl himself as “existentialist”—in his last or “third” period of
300
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On what basis does Merleau‐Ponty argue for a specifically existentialist
understanding of phenomenology? In a footnote (one of many with revealing
remarks about Husserl) later in the book, Merleau‐Ponty explains the link as
follows:
“Husserl’s originality lies beyond his notion of intentionality; it is to be found in the elaboration of
this notion and the discovery, beneath the intentionality of representations, of a deeper
intentionality, which others have called existence.” (PP 141n)

This “deeper intentionality” is of course what Merleau‐Ponty variously calls “motor
intentionality” or “operative intentionality,” the spontaneous, pre‐conscious (or
“anonymous”—another Husserlian word) intentionality of the body oriented
towards its environment. Husserl himself had a great deal to say about such
“operative intentionality”—it is in fact his idea. Thus Merleau‐Ponty is—under this
meaning of “existence”—merely emphasizing a certain line of Husserlian
investigation.
One of the consistent themes of Merleau‐Ponty’s thinking—it is, in fact, one
of the fundamental premises of his general philosophical outlook—is his opposition
to “idealism.” The reason—or one of them—is that of the “opacity” of the world to
consciousness. Idealisms (speaking now especially of the “transcendental” rather
than “phenomenalist” sort) manage to render consciousness “transparent” to the

philosophizing, that is. Indeed, this “tripartite” division of Husserl’s thought becomes, as we have
already seen, a regular motif in Merleau‐Ponty’s Husserl‐interpretation. For as in PP, in PSM Merleau‐
Ponty singles out for their importance Husserl’s “last ten years” (PSM 46), though he also claims that
“from the beginning to the end of his career, Husserl tried to discover a way between logicism and
psychologism” (PSM 48)—that is, between strict logical necessity and the pure contingency of facts.
Thus it is useful to note that already in the “Preface” Merleau‐Ponty makes reference to Husserl as a
contradictory philosopher. (PP viii)
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world.303 Merleau‐Ponty’s opposition to “idealism” is therefore clear, but whose
“idealism” he is referring to—Kant’s or Husserl’s, for example—is not. There are
some who take it to be motivated against Husserl304, but A. D. Smith, to take an
excellent recent example, shows convincingly that it is only a Kantian (or Neo‐
Kantian) kind of idealism—which Merleau‐Ponty targets repeatedly throughout PP
as the quintessential form of “intellectualism”—that threatens to imply this kind of
transparency, namely by building it into perception as a condition of any sort of
experience at all.305 Husserl’s opposition to Kantian “humanist” constructivism in
fact paves the way for Merleau‐Ponty’s own appreciation of perception as an
“openness” to the world. (PP xix) We are open to the world, but it is not enclosed
within us or pre‐fitted to our categorial thought. This is exactly why the
determination of the world through essences is always fraught with peril and shot
through with contingency.306 But it is also why Husserl’s return to the “things
themselves” is so important and revolutionary.

“…a logically consistent transcendental idealism rids the world of its opacity and its
transcendence.” (PP xiii)
304 See, for example, Bergo, 162: “It seems fair to conclude that Merleau‐Ponty set about to clear any
idealist residue from the path of the later Husserl, and, in so doing, pushed numerous concepts of his
own.” Is this sort of characterization right? I, at least, certainly don”t read Merleau‐Ponty as having
‘set about’ to re‐interpret Husserl; on my reading, he simply set about to philosophize, and Husserl
gave this philosophizing its shape and texture.
305 Smith, A. D. “The Flesh of Perception: Merleau‐Ponty and Husserl.” In Reading MerleauPonty: On
Phenomenology of Perception. Ed. Thomas Baldwin. New York: Routledge, 2007 (pp. 10‐11)
306 Merleau‐Ponty’s strong emphasis on “opacity” and “contingency” does, of course, expose him to
the dangers of skepticism and relativism, both of which he confronts as necessary threats to face. He
sides with the skeptics like Hume and Montaigne up to a point—arguing that they are nevertheless
“too timid in the return to the positive aspect after their skeptical criticisms.” (Primacy, 29) He
addresses the challenge of relativism and the threat of scientism exhaustively in PSM, which we will
come to below. (We might wish to keep in mind that the same “soft relativism” that emerges in
Merleau‐Ponty may have begun to creep into Husserl already in the latter’s investigation into the
multiplicity of historical and cultural “life‐worlds”—the Zulu, etc.)
303
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As a general rule, most of Merleau‐Ponty’s declarations in the “Preface” can
be seen to be in conflict with many features of, say, the Husserl of Ideas I, though
much less so with the “genetic phenomenology” of Husserl’s later period. Take, for
example, Merleau‐Ponty’s statement that phenomenology is a “phenomenology of
origins,” or that it captures meaning “as it comes into being.” (PP xxiv) This is
nothing but Husserl’s “Sinngenesis,” as Merleau‐Ponty himself ackowledges. (PP xxi)
And while it is hard to see Husserl saying “the world is not what I think, it is what I
live through” (PP xix) using just these words, what does come to mind is Husserl’s
intensive later investigations into “passive synthesis”—the pre‐thetic constitution of
the world. That is, I “live through” the world even as I constitute it because I
constitute it “anonymously,” much in the way I so orient myself to the world
through “bodily intentionality.”

C. Husserl in MerleauPonty’s Later Work
It is only appropriate to begin here with PS, which chronicles the lasting
philosophical significance of Husserl (and his “shadow”). By itself it demonstrates
much of what I am trying to show in this chapter, namely the inseparability of
Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophical contribution and his reading/appropriation of
Husserl.
The piece begins with some crucial remarks on Merleau‐Ponty’s own
hermeneutical approach to past philosophers like Husserl, some of which have been
cited already above. Merleau‐Ponty warns against our being seduced into “reducing”
a philosopher strictly to what he said—to what is “objectively certified” of him.

147
Merleau‐Ponty’s “middle way” in this particular case is between “objectivism,” on
the one hand, and pure arbitrariness, on the other. Thus: an “objective” history of
philosophy would “rob” great philosophers of “what they have given others to think
about.” Yet neither should we engage in “meditation disguised as a dialogue.” He
points out (as we indicated above) that it is a false dilemma to claim that
interpretations of others’ work leads either to “inevitable distortion” or “literal
reproduction.”307
Merleau‐Ponty then quotes favorably from Heidegger on the “unthought‐of”
elements in philosophers’ works; in Husserl there is an “unthought‐of element in his
works which is wholly his and yet opens up onto something else.” (PS 160, my italics)
Note the paradoxical “is wholly his” and “onto something else.” Merleau‐Ponty is
tracing out Husserl’s own process of self‐transcendence—and thereby making
manifest what is latent, but of course the full “manifestation” turns out to be (more
immanent in) the texts of MerleauPonty. The boundaries of “self” and “other” are
porous indeed. The “unthought‐of” in Husserl is thereby given voice in Merleau‐
Ponty, but it is important to realize that there is no clear dividing line between
“unthought‐of” and “thought‐of” in this, or perhaps in any other, case. Thus in
Husserl, existential phenomenology is half‐thought, or somewhat‐thought, while in
Merleau‐Ponty it is more‐fully‐thought or re‐thought.308

PS 159‐161. Both of these positions have the common premise of “positivism”—here, another
word for “objectivism”—according to which, I take him to mean, there is some fully determinate and
finished text before us, which we may either duplicate or distort, but nothing in between.
308 Reading Merleau‐Ponty on the “unthought,” Bergo echoes the common view when she states that
“the question of Merleau‐Ponty’s reading… is a question of finding the latencies in the text and
developing them such that they appear to bring to light an unthought dimension.” (Bergo 158‐9)
Taken on its own, this is too simplistic. This becomes evident when one observes the sheer volume of
307
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As we have seen already, Merleau‐Ponty consistently maintained the belief
that Husserl evolved over time into the “existential” Husserl of the “life‐world”
philosophy. In reference to Husserl’s idea of the life‐world Merleau‐Ponty urges:

“These late analyses are neither scandalous nor even disturbing if we remember everything which
foretold them from the start. They make explicit that ‘world’s thesis’ prior to every thesis and theory,
this side of understanding’s objectifications, which Husserl has always spoken of, and which has
simply become in his eyes our sole recourse in the impasse into which these objectifications have led
Western knowledge.” (PS 180)

He knows that Husserl would protest. Hence, later on, we encounter this revealing
phraseology: “Willy‐nilly, against his plans and according to his essential audacity,
Husserl awakens a wild‐flowering world and mind.” (PS 188‐9, my italics) Husserl’s
later thought—very much building on the earlier—suggests a new direction without
necessarily fully taking it. Merleau‐Ponty revels in showing through liberal
quotations that in Ideas II, Husserl freely grants ontological priority to material
Nature over Spirit in one breath, even as he prioritizes transcendental
consciousness in another. (PS 164‐5, 171) From these and other hints he concludes
that: “Husserl’s thought is as much attracted by the haecceity of Nature as by the
vortex of absolute consciousness.” (PS 165) Merleau‐Ponty then stresses the mutual
“encroachment” (PS 176) and reciprocal Fundierung (PS 173, 176‐7) of different
orders of being, sensible and ideal,309 citing Husserl’s own words again to seal the
case. (PS 177)

quotations Merleau‐Ponty uses in a way that employs their literal and overt meaning. One is tempted
to say that so many of Husserl’s “latencies” manifest themselves quite well!
309 It would of course take a detailed study of Ideas II (as undertaken in Chapter 2) to confirm
Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of it; but even a noted Husserl scholar like Steven Galt Crowell concedes
that there is at least the appearance of this sort of paradox in the text: “In the course of his attempt to
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PSM, an essay from 1961, offers a more prosaic but also thoroughly
revelatory assessment of Husserlian thought and his own self‐circumscription
within its berth. It represents the thinker’s mature conclusions on one of the major
themes of phenomenology since its inception, namely its precise relation (or non‐
relation, as the case may be) to the sciences—both natural and “human.”310 It is
primarily psychology that Merleau‐Ponty is concerned with, not surprisingly (given
his long engagement with Gestalt psychology in particular). The central problematic
here is the “paradox” of essence and fact. The essay is particularly illuminating
because of the way it demonstrates Merleau‐Ponty’s strategy of striking a “middle
way”—through, and not despite Husserl—between historicism and relativism, on
the one hand, and essentialism (and, implicitly, determinism), on the other. What
Merleau‐Ponty wants to maintain, and claims that Husserl himself achieves even if
belatedly, is truth in the midst of indeterminacy, essence within existence, and,
strikingly, “eternity” along with “contingency.” (PSM 92) In all of this, he views the
human sciences sympathetically (and in fact all sciences—there is no clear
separation made here between natural and human sciences ontologically speaking,
even if their methodologies differ). The reason for this sympathetic view is that
determine the idea of nature in Ideas II, Husserl encounters an apparent “vicious circle”… Are
persons “components of nature,” then, “subordinated” to it, or does the very constitution of nature
presuppose the non‐natural realm of spirit?” See: Crowell, Steven Galt. “The Mythical and the
Meaningless: Husserl and the Two Faces of Nature.” In Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II. Eds. Thomas Nenon
and Lester Embree. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 (p. 81).
310 By the “sciences of man” Merleau‐Ponty has primarily psychology and, to a lesser degree,
sociology and ethology in mind. Another lecture course entitled “Phenomenology and Sociology”
focuses on some other aspects of the same problem, this time emphasizing the namesake science,
though it uses much of the same language as PSM, and is much shorter. Of course, what is arguably
most important of all for Merleau‐Ponty is the relation of philosophy to history. But although we call
history one of the “humanities” as opposed to “social sciences,” it is precisely the empirical,
contingent factor of historicality that makes it akin to the human sciences in Merleau‐Ponty’s sense.
This is also why he treats the threat of “historicism” along with that of “relativism” as he opens the
essay.
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human sciences, in their own way, are doing precisely the same balancing act, albeit
without the self‐reflective anxiety that philosophy brings with it. It is in this sense
that Merleau‐Ponty declares that there is no clear dividing line between the two.
(PSM 72) Once again he seems to be at odds with Husserl, who insists on the
separateness of transcendental phenomenology from all sciences, but Merleau‐
Ponty tells a different story that relies, as usual, heavily on “evolutionary
developments” within Husserl himself. Merleau‐Ponty sees a burgeoning
recognition in Husserl of the “reciprocal envelopment” of psychology and
phenomenology but also, more broadly, fact and essence. Thus he makes several
detours to chronicle the story of Husserl’s “profound development” away from
absolute essentialism, for example with the case of language311. (PSM 80)
In PSM, what is key to note in all of this is not just what Merleau‐Ponty says
but why he is saying it: he draws Husserl into his own fight against the naturalism of
psychology and the empirical sciences, invokes him to make his own case—indeed,
to defend his own phenomenological approach to the questions at hand. It is in this
light that we can appreciate Merleau‐Ponty’s description of phenomenology itself as
a negotiated mean between skepticism and absolutism. Merleau‐Ponty does not so
much want to modify the phenomenological method as bring it into living contact
with the rest of the intellectual conversation:

“Husserl is seeking to reaffirm rationality at the level of experience, without sacrificing the vast
variety that it includes and accepting all the processes of conditioning which psychology, sociology,
and history reveal. It is a question of finding a method that will enable us to think at the same time of
Thus for the later Husserl, argues Merleau‐Ponty, “There is no question any more of constructing a
logic of language, a universal grammar, but rather of finding a logic already incorporated in the
world.” (PSM 82)
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the externality which is the principle of the sciences of man and of the internality which is the
condition of philosophy…” (PSM 52)

Husserl thereby finds the “roots of reason in our experience” (PSM 52)—just as
Merleau‐Ponty, we might add, finds his own roots in Husserl.
VI is the hardest of Merleau‐Ponty’s works to assess in terms of its
relationship to Husserl. Partly this is because the work is unfinished, with explicit
references to Husserl lying in a large number of “Working Notes” whose proper
interpretation is anything but clear312; but also because its references or allusions to
Husserl are by now so interwoven in Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophical imagination
that they come and go veiled or unannounced. This is not the case entirely: the last
page of the final famous chapter “The Intertwining—the Chiasm,” for example, has
fulsome praise for the German founder.313
Nonetheless, at least two of the chapters, the first and third—“Reflection and
Interrogation” and “Interrogation and Intuition”—can be read fruitfully as critical
meditations on Husserl. Just as one could easily say that PS deals primarily with the
phenomenological reduction and PSM with the eidetic, the same, I think, can be said
for chapters 1 and 3 of the VI, respectively. Once again it becomes clear, when one
sees it this way, just how systematic Merleau‐Ponty’s reading and re‐readings of
Husserl truly are. The substance of the VI chapters will be brought out throughout
the following section.

312I

have tried presently to avoid the use of the fragmentary “Working Notes” that accompany these
chapters due to their indeterminate nature. I have also stayed away from the important but slightly
over‐exposed (no pun intended) notion of “the flesh.” There is luckily plenty of remaining relevant
material for the present task from the rest of the text.
313 “In a sense the whole of philosophy, as Husserl says, consists in restoring the power to signify, a
birth of meaning, or a wild meaning, an expression of experience by experience…” (VI 155)
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IV. MerleauPonty’s Husserlian Phenomenology: By Theme

A. The Phenomenological Reduction
It is a bromide by now that there is no issue more important in Husserl’s
thought than the phenomenological reduction (and epoché).314 So suspicions have
arisen over Merleau‐Ponty’s having supposedly curtailed or compromised the purity
of the reduction, chiefly and most famously in the “Preface” of PP:
“…we must break with our familiar acceptance of it [the world], and also, from the fact that from this
break we can learn nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world. The most important lesson
which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction.” (PP xv)

But these famous or infamous sentences do not, in Merleau‐Ponty’s eyes, indicate a
break from Husserl. They merely stress consciousness’ “…dependence on an
unreflective life which is its initial situation…” (PP xvi) According to Merleau‐Ponty,
again, Husserl already thematized this life as the problem of the “life‐world,” having
stressed the primacy of facticity and existence over the once‐ or twice‐removed
approaches of, say, scientific empiricism, on the one hand, and Kantian idealism, on
the other. The point of the passage is to reveal the paradoxicality of the reduction,
namely, the fact that it is only through an act of total commitment to reflective life
that the impossibility of such a commitment is revealed. In this way, the reduction

Again for this chapter, as for the rest of this dissertation, I am not making a distinction, as
Merleau‐Ponty did not, between the “phenomenological” and the “transcendental” reductions, but
rather am treating them as one.
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gives us over to our existential selfhood. And this is why the phenomenological
reduction “belongs to existentialist philosophy.”
I don’t think we should undervalue the fact that Merleau‐Ponty endorses the
phenomenological reduction. Indeed, he regards it as central to his philosophy. It is,
after all, the reduction that brings us to the “natural attitude” before “naturalism”
and its blosse Sachen. (PS 163) It is what allows us to “slacken the intentional
threads which attach us to the world” ever too tightly to see ourselves. (PP xv) He
later describes the reduction in similar terms as “the link, which is indeed a
schism[,] established by life between our thought and our physical and social
situation,” adding that it nevertheless “never leads us in any way to negate time or
pass beyond it into a realm of pure logic or pure thought.” (PSM 49) In other words,
then, Merleau‐Ponty accepts even the “schismatic” aspect of the reduction315, so
long as it is not taken to mark a total departure from the finitude of lived horizons.
Merleau‐Ponty’s reduction consists in two movements: the movement “out
of” nature—that is, the moment in which one breaks out of one’s “natural”
condition, the passive slumber of everyday life; and the movement back into it, that
is, to a recognition of one’s finitude.316 Initially, through bracketing and the shift
from the natural attitude to the transcendental attitude, I “see” or “gain possession
of myself”; reflection sharpens my consciousness and brings it into self‐

Indeed, Merleau‐Ponty insists elsewhere that “the sensible order is being at a distance” (PS 167‐8)
in order to stress the futility of teleological accounts of the world that bind the “inner” and the
“outer” by a secret “aim.”
316 One might call this a “circle of finitude” which, moreover, bears obvious and open affinities with
aspects of Hegelian thought.
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consciousness. But the self is not apart from nature; in some way it cannot account
for itself, it belongs to nature even as it (apparently) transcends it.
The second part of this movement is what Merleau‐Ponty thinks must be
reasserted against certain trends—and not just those of “transcendental Husserl”:
“…the essential difference between my point of view and that of a philosophy of understanding is
that, in my view, even though consciousness is able to detach itself from things to see itself, human
consciousness never possesses itself in complete detachment and does not recover itself at the level
of culture except by recapitulating the expressive, discrete, and contingent operations by means of
which philosophical questioning itself has become possible.” (Primacy 40)

Closely tied up with the phenomenological reduction is the dialectic of the
“natural attitude” and the “transcendental attitude.” Merleau‐Ponty’s understanding
of these attitudes preserves elements of both continuity and discontinuity between
them, in keeping with the paradoxical nature of the reduction.317 On the one hand,
the reduction takes us beyond natural attitude, but this is only “half the truth.” (PS
162) Merleau‐Ponty’s considered judgment is that “It is the natural attitude which,
by reiterating its own procedures, seesaws in phenomenology. It is the natural
attitude itself which goes beyond itself in phenomenology—and so it does not go
beyond itself.” (PS 164) The transcendental attitude is not abandoned or declared
nonsense; but one attitude does not relate to the other as “false” to “true.”318 In the

Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France 19521960. Tr. John
O”Neill. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 1970. (p. 108) Hereafter “Themes.”
Merleau‐Ponty approvingly speaks of the moment when “philosophy becomes the enterprise of
describing living paradoxes.”
318 It is interesting in this regard to note that Husserl had already been writing—privately—of “Der
“transzendentale Idealismus” als Synthesis von natürlicher und transzendentaler Einstellung.”
(Husserl’s emphasis) See: Husserl, Edmund. Husserliana XXXIV: Zur Phänomenologischen Reduktion
(Texte aus dem Nachlass 19261935). Ed. Sebastian Luft. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002, p. 15 (Hereafter
“Husserl”)
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end, we must embrace the “contradictory characteristics”—which, says Merleau‐
Ponty, Husserl himself purposefully assigns it—of the reduction. (PS 161)
It is true that Merleau‐Ponty cannot accept some of what Husserl regards to
be the consequences of the reduction, such as the privileged perch of “absolute”
(reflective) consciousness.319 After all, the “incompleteness” of the reduction also
means the limitedness, in that sense, of reflective thought. But in reading the later
Merleau‐Ponty in particular, it becomes increasingly clear to one that he has
essentially folded the transcendental attitude, the stand‐point of phenomenological
consciousness, onto that of self‐consciousness or “reflection” as such. This is neither
mere semantic sloppiness nor an obvious transgression against Husserl himself. It is
a consequence of his rejection of the strong division between psychology and
philosophy, manifest throughout PSM, for example; reflection is not merely a
“naturalistic” psychic act, to be sharply delineated from the heroic heights of the
transcendental reduction. Given this re‐orientation, Merleau‐Ponty’s attacks in VI on
the “philosophy of reflection,” as he calls it (VI 43), appear to be directed not at
Husserl as such but at a kind of idealism that Husserl sometimes affirms, but which
stems more originally from Kant.
At first, this is admittedly not obvious. Take the following passages:
“A philosophy of reflection, as methodic doubt and as reduction of the openness upon the world to
‘spiritual acts,’ to intrinsic relations between the idea and its ideate, is thrice untrue to what it means
to elucidate: untrue to the visible world, to him who sees it, and to his relations with the other
‘visionaries.’” (VI 39)

and again:
Merleau‐Ponty critiques the annihilation of the world experiment (see, for example, PS 173‐4) but
otherwise gives even the description of the reduction in Ideas I a warm reception. (See PSM 56)
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“…let us repeat that we reproach the philosophy of reflection not only for transforming the world
into a noema, but also for distorting the being of the reflecting ‘subject’ by conceiving it as ‘thought’—
and finally for rendering unthinkable its relations with other ‘subjects’ in the world that is common
to them.” (VI 43)

It may seem now that Merleau‐Ponty, after years of “face‐saving” acrobatics, is now
“finally” jettisoning Husserl for good. But the fact is that none of Merleau‐Ponty’s
criticisms here are new. Merleau‐Ponty has already rejected transcendental
idealism in PP, with its assumptions of the “transparency” of the world to reflective
thought.320 Indeed, the ghost of the “Preface” haunts this chapter of the VI in more
ways than this: “It is essential to the reflective analysis that it start from a de facto
situation” (VI 44) and “The search for the conditions of possibility is in principle
posterior to actual experience…” (VI 45) are nothing more than restatements of the
“existential” turn taken in PP and already discussed above.
But a careful reading of this chapter reveals that Merleau‐Ponty’s real target
is Kantian constructivism, which he gives credit to Husserl for piercing through:
“This is what Husserl brought frankly into the open… that is: every effort to comprehend the
spectacle of the world from within and from the sources demands that we detach ourselves from the
effective unfolding of our perceptions and from our perception of the world, that we cease being one
with the concrete flux of our life in order to retrace the total bearing and principal articulations of the
world upon which it opens.” (VI 45)

Indeed, Merleau‐Ponty is not so much against “reflection” (or the transcendental
attitude) as he is against a certain philosophy of reflection which effectively excises
all consideration for the role of the “pre‐reflective” in epistemological life. This is the

“A logically consistent transcendental idealism rids the world of its opacity and its
transcendence.” (PP xiii)
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heart of his opposition to Kant and, indeed, the Kantian inflections of Husserl’s own
self‐styled “transcendental” phenomenology.321 A philosophy of reflection by itself
“…leaves untouched the twofold problem of the genesis of the existent world and of the genesis of the
idealization performed by reflection and finally evokes and requires as its foundation a hyper
reflection where the ultimate problems would be taken seriously.” (VI 46)

This, in effect, is Merleau‐Ponty’s identification of the “limits of phenomenology”—
and a fulfilment of his promise to make of phenomenology a “phenomenology of
phenomenology.”322 But because the “foundation” Merleau‐Ponty refers to is in fact
less determinate than reflection, and more of an exploration of its never‐fully‐
recoverable under‐side, it is not a replacement of what is provided by the
“existential Husserl” but is in fact merely a further development of it. Merleau‐
Ponty’s disagreement is with “pure correlation” of “subject and object,” at least in an
idealistic or quasi‐idealistic construction (VI 47), and again with the notion of a
“universal mind” (VI 49). But he sees Husserl as on the path of questioning these: “In
recognizing that every reflection is eidetic and, as such, leaves untouched the
problem of our unreflected being and that of the world, Husserl… agrees to take up
the problem which the reflective attitude323 ordinarily avoids—the discordance
between its initial situation and its ends.” (VI 46; compare: PS 163 and 179)

Merleau‐Ponty announces his position clearly already in the “Preface” of PP: “Descartes and
particularly Kant detached the subject, or consciousness, by showing that I could not possibly
apprehend anything as existing unless I first of all experienced myself as existing in the act of
apprehending it.” (PP x) Merleau‐Ponty calls this the “idealist return to consciousness” which he
expressly disavows. See also: “Husserl’s transcendental is not Kant’s…” (PP xv) It is of course the
Kant of the first “Critique” that Merleau‐Ponty has in mind in such remarks. He is far more
sympathetic and even indebted to the third “Critique.”
322 Husserl’s phrase, in fact. See Husserl, p. 176
323 Note the terminology—”reflective” for “transcendental.”
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Merleau‐Ponty finally comes to the idea—by way of Schelling, it would
seem324—that philosophy as “reflection” must ultimately give way to a thinking of
the rich middle between the knowable and the unknowable, the ideal world of
thought and the real world of “wild being.” For this is the spring of human spirit, the
soil of the self. Remarks Toadvine, “This state of continual beginning, of the need for
continual reexamination of the paradoxical foundations of a reflection that attempts
to grasp its own unreflective origins, could be considered the orienting theme of
Merleau‐Ponty’s own phenomenological method.” (Toadvine 240) It can scarcely be
missed that this sort of method converges with Merleau‐Ponty’s own “re‐
examination” of Husserl, the origin of phenomenology itself, and the (at least
hitherto) “un‐reflected.”

B. Essences and the Eidetic Reduction
Commentators are divided over whether Merleau‐Ponty accepts the eidetic
reduction, but the evidence is plain that he was deeply preoccupied by the
Husserlian notion of “essences” from first to last. It is true that he has little patience
for the intuitionist resonances of Husserl’s Wesenschau, which he here calls a “myth”
(VI 115‐6) and there redescribes as the “emergence of truth in and through the
psychological event.” (PSM 53) What becomes clear is that Merleau‐Ponty is seeking
a middle way between essentialism and nominalism, and he thinks Husserl, in the
Schelling is discussed in detail in Merleau‐Ponty’s lectures on “Nature.” (Nature: Course Notes from
the Collège de France. Compiled and with notes from Dominique Séglard. Tr. Robert Vallier.
Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 2003, esp. pp. 36‐52) For an excellent treatment of
Schelling’s role in Merleau‐Ponty’s later philosophy see: Patrick Burke, “Creativity and the
Unconscious in Merleau‐Ponty and Schelling.” In Schelling Now: Contemporary Readings, ed. Jason M.
Wirth. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005
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end, was doing exactly the same. This is why he cites the Husserlian distinction
between “exact” and “morphological” essences (PSM 67), the unlikeness of
mathematics to phenomenology (PSM 67), Husserl’s own strict parallelism between
the realms of the eidetic and the empirical and a random passage to this effect in
“Die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” (PSM 72) and so on. Furthermore:
“[Husserl’s] notion of an experienced essence, or an eidetic experience, contains in
germ the consequences I have just drawn from it.” (PSM 72)
What Merleau‐Ponty is communicating is a shift he sees in Husserl from a
pure philosophy of reflection—an orientation towards the logical, theoretical,
transcendental, eidetic—to a philosophy of existence in which, we find out,
reflection plays a crucial but non‐foundational325 role. It is in this light that Merleau‐
Ponty understands both the phenomenological and eidetic reductions. To take the
latter first, Merleau‐Ponty explains that phenomenology is about not only “essences”
but also “facticity.” This follows from phenomenology’s being about “achieving
direct and primitive contact with the world.” (PP vii) Ideality is now characterized in
purely instrumental terms: the eidetic reduction “prevail[s] over facticity” through
ideality, though the “prevailing” is for the sake not of ideality but rather for a
grasping of the things themselves—the “fish” that are caught in the “fisherman’s
net.” Surely Merleau‐Ponty is right that we do not reach the things by dwelling only
in essences. We may not reach the things as completely as we wish, but there is
something between absolute knowledge and total ignorance. In this respect it is

In a strictly ontological sense, that is—reflection is still for Merleau‐Ponty the foundation of the
activity of philosophy, since “unreflective experience is known to us only through reflection…” (PP
49) It is this sort of insight that sets the stage for the later notion of “hyper‐reflection.”
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helpful to remember that Husserl himself embraced a version of the term
“empiricist,” which must have meant that he privileges facts over essences, but was
vaguely aware of the fact that reflection can only know essences—hence
engendering the most enduring epistemological paradox of Merleau‐Ponty’s
meditations.326
Just what are essences? Essences are the manner and style of being only: the
Sosein and not the Sein. And just as there is an essential “incompleteness” with
respect to the phenomenological reduction, so there is a limit also on imaginative
variation—thus there is no pure eidos, no “total variation.” Furthermore, eidetic
variation is not just done in phenomenology, but in all sciences. In one place
Merleau‐Ponty admits: “In presenting the matter as I have, I am pushing Husserl
further than he wished to go himself.” (PSM 72) Merleau‐Ponty wants to admit of a
“fundamental homogeneity” of the “inductive and essential” modes of knowledge,
which Husserl always maintained was impossible. But Husserl’s own thinking,
including his focus on the concrete and lived stream of life, forces on us an
“inevitable dialectic of the concept of essence.”
All of this allows Merleau‐Ponty finally to say:
“…we can say that the problem with which we were concerned at the beginning [of PSM]—must we
be for fact or for essence, for time or eternity, for the positive science of man or philosophy?—was
bypassed in the later thought of Husserl. Here he no longer considers essence as separated from fact,
eternity from time, or philosophic thought from history.” (PSM 93)
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V. Concluding Reflections

I began this chapter by suggesting an integral relationship between Merleau‐
Ponty’s philosophy and his reading of Husserl. I hope to have shown this through
the course of my recapitulation of and commentary on this reading, but these may
now be supplemented and reinforced with some analogies. Thus, Merleau‐Ponty
stands to Husserl, I want to say, much as humanity, in Merleau‐Ponty’s Husserlian
philosophy, stands to the “world,” that is “the…pre‐existent Logos” (PP xxiii) or “that
jointing and framing of Being which is being realized through man” (PS 181). Or
again, Merleau‐Ponty is to Husserl as language (or logos—the “theme of
philosophy”) is to the “pre‐language of the mute world” (VI 126), or finally, as Spirit
is to Nature, the first finding a voice in the second, the second finding its depth in the
first. The holistic vision that emerges here—of man and world, spirit and nature—is
only prefigured or sketched in outline in Merleau‐Ponty’s writings, but it is
determinate enough to show how Merleau‐Ponty could have ascribed so much of his
philosophy327—in my view validly—to another philosopher, Husserl, who for his
part nevertheless went so much of the time in a contrary direction. Merleau‐Ponty’s
views of reciprocity and reversibility, identity and difference, paradox and the
“between”—they are all relevant to and implicit in his developmental—and
organic—appropriation of Husserlian thought.

Obviously I do not make a sharp distinction between the philosophies of the “earlier” and “later”
Merleau‐Ponty. The material presented in the present chapter alone afford, I think, ample (though
perhaps not sufficient) evidence that this is so.
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Is Merleau‐Ponty finally, in the end, just a mere “reader” or “commentator” of
Husserl? This is the wrong question to ask. Should Plotinus be relegated to being a
commentator of Plato and Aristotle? Should Averroës be dismissed as a
commentator of Aristotle? Surely great philosophy can be done through
commenting, bringing as it were “new truths into being,” as Merleau‐Ponty himself
puts it. The commentator is not likely to be celebrated as a trailblazer, but without
good commentators, it is unlikely that any coherent “trails” could be discerned from
the dense, sometimes contradictory outpouring of a thinker like Husserl. All the
same, Merleau‐Ponty does not merely comment—he has the talent to develop, to
take further and radicalize and see the hidden implications of, the texts he analyzes.
The texts speak to him, and he speaks back.
Merleau‐Ponty’s “version” of phenomenology has been disavowed by certain
Husserlians, but it must be said that their “Husserl,” while consistent for the most
part with Husserl’s own self‐declarations of the nature and consciously stated
intentions of his own philosophizing, is not always easy to defend philosophically. A
narrow interpretation of Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty would argue, would fatefully turn
its back on Husserl’s own underlying sensitivity to the inadequacies of his own
earlier conceptions, as he himself surged forward. In other words, the “strict
Husserlian” would fall well short of Husserl’s own level, to say nothing of expanding
on him! Some Husserlians have of course embraced Merleau‐Ponty, but selectively,
if only to demonstrate that Husserl either anticipated or fully explicated the same
things Merleau‐Ponty discusses, and perhaps in an even better way. Merleau‐Ponty
would of course have been happy to acknowledge his debt (egotism is not one of his
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vices), but he would also insist that Husserl himself remains too inconsistent for us
to try to rely on him exclusively as the “voice of phenomenology.” There are too
many strains in him, and it is necessary to editorialize, to edit and to bring to light
what is true and false, necessary and dispensable in his thinking.
There are obvious but fateful consequences to this sort of reading of the
Merleau‐Ponty/Husserl relationship. If we accept Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of
Husserl, we implicitly reject much of Husserl’s self‐interpretation—his stated
intentions, and his framing of the transcendental‐phenomenological project. But is
this not familiar hermeneutical territory? It is indeed an invoking of the
hermeneutic topos of “knowing the philosopher better than he/she knew
himself/herself.” But even this is not so simple, since, on Merleau‐Ponty’s account,
Husserl already knew what Merleau‐Ponty “knows” about Husserl, just not with the
same clarity or univocity. It is to Merleau‐Ponty’s lasting credit that, decades before
Donn Welton’s The Other Husserl328 , the French thinker had already painted a vivid
portrait of the inner conflictedness of Husserl’s thought. He had already identified
and embraced “the other Husserl,” who he knew already as the “pre‐jection” (my
word, but Merleau‐Pontian in spirit) of himself. It is true that Merleau‐Ponty does
not feel himself constrained by the history of “traditional” interpretation of
Husserl’s works, or by what Husserl may have believed he himself was
accomplishing through his own philosophizing. But in this way Merleau‐Ponty’s
attitude towards Husserl is much like that of a healthy child towards its parent:

See: Welton, Donn. The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology.
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000.
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adulation is balanced by critical judgment, emulation by creative initiative. Would
we want anything else?

In one place Merleau‐Ponty nicely summarizes his understanding of the
meaning and progress of Husserl’s philosophy:
“Thus, a philosophy [Husserl’s] which seemed, more than any other, bent upon understanding
natural being as the object and pure correlate of consciousness rediscovers through the very exercise
of reflexive rigor a natural stratum in which the spirit is virtually buried in the concordant
functioning of bodies within brute being.”329

Traditionally, the plausibility of Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of Husserl has been
thought to turn on this: whether one sees Husserl as a self‐divided, Janus‐faced
figure, working progressively to an adequately transcendental‐existential
conception of phenomenology, or whether one sees him rather as a more or less
consistent Olympian thinker of absolute consciousness. But what I have tried to do,
in my small way, is to say rather that what makes Merleau‐Ponty’s reading plausible
is an acceptance of Merleau‐Ponty’s own style and substance of thought. But this
brings out a kind of special paradox, whereby the line between the two thinkers
becomes wholly blurred, exactly as if we were entering the “intermonde” Merleau‐
Ponty writes about in the later works.330 For if Merleau‐Ponty is right that he is (in
so many words) a Husserlian thinker—at least, a thinker of Husserl’s inner
thoughts—then it turns out that to accept Merleau‐Ponty’s “Husserl” under the
banner of accepting him (Merleau‐Ponty) is to have already accepted Husserl. This

Themes, p. 83
He uses the term in VI (48, 84) The term is mentioned already at the time of PP, but in a slightly
different sense. See also the reference to “intercorporeality” in PS (168)
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might for some be hard to believe, but then again, perhaps, in its own way, it may
only be the radical fulfilment of the idea of a “hermeneutic circle”!
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Chapter Four: MerleauPonty’s Mature Ontology of Nature

“We will show how the concept of Nature is always the expression of an ontology—and its privileged
expression.”
‐‐Maurice Merleau‐Ponty331

I. Introduction
Some of Merleau‐Ponty’s most important final writings, I would argue, are
found in The Visible and the Invisible332, which Merleau‐Ponty had been working on
as a major statement of his philosophy at the time of his sudden death. The goal of
the present chapter is to convey some of the essential features of Merleau‐Ponty’s
ontology, as developed in the aforementioned work, as well as his increasingly
“dialectical” understanding of nature and spirit, all the while emphasizing the
“(semi‐) naturalistic” element therein. Accordingly it will undertake a detailed
examination of the Nature lectures of 1956‐1960 (as they come down to us, mostly
in the form of meticulous student notes), in conjunction with VI, exploring the ways
in which Merleau‐Ponty thinks through the questions of being, consciousness, and
their reciprocal relationship with the help of an intensive investigation of “Nature,”
particularly in the biological sciences and the history of philosophy.
Merleau‐Ponty’s treatment of “nature” is to this day little known, despite the
fact that the Nature lectures collectively comprise a volume of roughly equal length

Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France. Compiled and with notes
from Dominique Séglard. Tr. Rober Vallier. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 2003.
(p. 204) Hereafter designated as “N” in all citations, and “the Nature lectures” inside the body.
332 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Visible and the Invisible. Tr. Alphonso Lingis. Northwestern
University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 1969. Hereafter “VI.”
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to VI. It is true that the lectures were not intended to be published as a book
precisely in the form we have them, but it is also true that Merleau‐Ponty intended
to use much of the material from them as parts of his published writings, including
sections of VI itself.333 From a detailed examination of both texts I conclude that
Merleau‐Ponty’s often commented‐upon rejection of dualism—which of course
hardly distinguishes him in the history of philosophy both before and after
Descartes—is in fact most properly characterized as a philosophy of
complementarity, one that seeks to understand the principles of identity and
difference, both in the broadest of ontological contexts as well as narrower ones
(such as the ontology of the body), in a way that does justice to the role that each of
them plays in the structuration of Being, that is, the structure of the
“visible/invisible” world. This discussion will also take us well into the fifth chapter
and dissertation conclusion, which ascertain the “upshot” of Merleau‐Ponty’s
dialectic for the phenomenological method.
It is my view that Merleau‐Ponty’s phenomenology is “dialectical” but in a
wholly new sense, one that is driven by the exigencies of thinking the “natural”
origins of subjectivity (in the sense of spirit, or human consciousness) from within,
and of thereby recasting the phenomenological project as one that inheres in
“ontology” in a broader sense. From the course and progression of the Nature
lectures, one can see Merleau‐Ponty’s thought grow more organicist—concerned
See for example: N, xvi (from the “Translator’s Introduction” by Robert Vallier). Some of the
material does in fact make it into various essays, such as “Bergson In the Making” and the already
examined “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” and certain concepts—the “flesh,” for example—are
discussed in both texts in some detail, as we will see below. See: Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. “Bergson in
the Making.” Tr. Richard C. McCleary. In Signs. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press,
1964. (pp. 182‐191); Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. “The Philosopher and His Shadow.” Tr. Richard M.
McCleary. In Signs. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964 (pp. 159‐181)
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with the principle of “wholeness” and its realization in the “organic forms” of “life.”
Of course the “naturalism” Merleau‐Ponty espouses is not the “naturalism”
embraced by scientifically‐minded modern writers, whose form we also find in
Husserl’s writings, but another, more at once phenomenologically‐rooted and
romantically‐inspired kind, which develops throughout the Nature lectures
explicitly and in the rest of Merleau‐Ponty’s other work implicitly. Ontology will, it is
true, “take precedence,” in a certain way, but not because it is the “foundation” of
phenomenology, in the way Husserl conceived phenomenology to be the foundation
of ontology. Merleau‐Ponty’s intention is not to invert this order of dependence, but
rather to make phenomenology answer to its existential situation, which now comes
to mean, to bear the shadow of its natural, wild, and pre‐reflective origins.

II. Nature and the Ontology of the Nature Lectures

A. Introduction: The Nature Lectures, The Visible and the Invisible, and the Project of
“Ontology”
In the Nature lectures, Merleau‐Ponty declares, “The ontological problem is
the dominant problem, to which all other problems are subordinated.” (N 134) What
exactly is the ontological problem? Merleau‐Ponty does not answer this question
directly, but we have some telling clues. What Merleau‐Ponty wants to avoid, he
indicates, are at least three “isms”: “Naturalism, humanism, theism… These three
words have lost all clear meaning in our culture, and they ceaselessly pass into one
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another.” (N 135) We have an even better specification of the problem in a roughly
contemporaneous working note, in which Merleau‐Ponty writes:
“Necessity of a return to ontology—The ontological question and its ramifications: the subject‐object
question, the question of inter‐subjectivity, the question of Nature. Outline of ontology projected as an
ontology of brute Being—and of logos. Draw up the picture of wild Being, prolonging my article on
Husserl. But the disclosure of this world, of this Being, remains a dead letter as long as we do not
uproot ‘objective philosophy’ (Husserl). An Ursprungklärung is needed.” (WN 165, my italics)

The reference to Husserl is clearly positive. What is needed is an alternative
ontology—clearly inspired by Husserlian phenomenology, particularly the “genetic”
variety—to that of objectivism. The “question of Nature” is supposed to fit right into
this project. The problem, in short, is how to forge this new ontology, how to
overcome the “strabism” of Western ontology since Descartes (N 165), but also, to
some extent, of phenomenology itself (N 72), which in its “idealist” (i.e., Husserlian)
form is still somewhat haunted, we might say, by Descartes’ ghost.
VI has proven to be a stumbling block for some, as it can come across as a
curious amalgam of philosophy and poetry. At times highly esoteric (especially
when the “working notes” are factored in, some of which are brilliantly clear, others
all but inscrutable), it leaves readers with a certain sense of puzzlement, even
bewitchment, through its extensive use of metaphor and new terminology. A good
way to appreciate Merleau‐Ponty’s increasingly nuanced and technical explorations,
his new phenomenological ontology, is in fact to consult his investigations of nature.
Of course, these are not at all sufficient in themselves to expose Merleau‐Ponty’s
ontological project, since they are intended explicitly to be preparatory334 to

Explains Merleau‐Ponty: “…the ontology of Nature as the way toward ontology—the way we
prefer because the evolution of the concept of Nature is a more convincing propaedeutic, [since it]
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something else, namely a fuller engagement with some of the themes Merleau‐Ponty
is more well known for, including perception and embodiment. Merleau‐Ponty’s
treatment of these topics in the Nature lectures is indirect, for example through the
study of animal “Umwelten” or the study of the ontological implications of their
physiology.
There are other interesting differences between the two texts, when
compared side‐by‐side. Thus while VI emphasizes discontinuity between past and
present philosophy and speaks of radical renewal (VI 83, 165), etc., the lectures
reflect the flip‐side, offering a critical commentary that establishes links to the past
and seeks to “rectify” it. (N 186) Through a critical engagement with the
philosophical tradition and examination of the science of his day, Merleau‐Ponty in
the latter text strives for a balancing of opposites and, in effect, a new equilibrium,
between theoretical poles like “finalism” (teleology) and “mechanism.”
The multi‐disciplinary Nature seminars cover a vast amount of terrain,
exploring no less than the scientific, theological, and philosophical underpinnings of
Western notions of nature, animality, God, and the human mind. Through an early
rejection of the views of Laplace—a kind of “stand‐in” for modern‐scientific views
analogous to Augustine’s role at the start of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations—Merleau‐Ponty reveals himself in the Nature lectures to be a
champion of temporality, becoming, and holicity, as against an (exclusive or lop‐
sided) emphasis on spatiality, being, and analyticity.335 In this way he is working in

more clearly shows the necessity of the ontological mutation.” (N 204) (It is not clear from this part
of the text what the author is referring to as the “ontological mutation.”)
335 Take, for example, N, 89; in his stating of Laplace’s views, he is negatively also giving his own.
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obvious concert with “life philosophy” as well as figures such as Bergson and
Whitehead, only now in a more deeply phenomenological register that, once again,
comes more significantly to the fore in VI—notwithstanding those readings of the
text that, rather unjustifiably in my opinion, downplay its phenomenological
character. The contents of VI in fact bear continuity in substance, if not always in
style, to The Phenomenology of Perception336 and its questions of mind and body,
perception and reflection, language, and the nature of phenomenology and Husserl’s
thought. However, the latter text is more intent than ever, it seems, to describe the
ultimate nature of reality itself—or at least, to describe the task of “interrogation”
that circles around this ontological ultimacy. The questions of “Being” and “Nature”
come to the forefront in the later philosophy; the issues of perception, embodiment,
intersubjectivity, etc., are treated as illustrative or disclosive of the depths of Being
and human involvement in it. The influence of Heidegger is unmistakable, but for
the most part unspoken; this is probably because it is more so Heideggerian themes
(many of which are anchored in Husserl) that Merleau‐Ponty appropriates, and less
so Heideggerian conclusions. It is also important to realize that Merleau‐Ponty has
been interested in ontology, particularly the nature‐spirit question, from the first;
The Structure of Behavior is a kind of (evidently inadequate) phenomenological
ontology in its own right.337

Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Tr. Colin Smith. New York: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1962 (Hereafter “PP.”)
337 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Structure of Behavior. Tr. A.L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. For
a good discussion of that text with respect to Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy of nature, see: Toadvine,
Ted. MerleauPonty’s Philosophy of Nature. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009
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After that earlier work, however, Merleau‐Ponty took his point of departure
more explicitly from Husserl and the phenomenological reduction, as we have
already seen. PP is essentially motivated by the paradox of perception whereby the
world—the things—become really (and not merely “subjectively,” as through a
representation) available to me, despite the fact that they are transcendent to me.
This specifically phenomenological paradox made it necessary to rethink the real
nature of the “I‐think” or ego who perceives—far from being a disembodied cogito,
the “I” must be a body, the “body‐subject,” whose very being is worldly in the same
sense that the world’s is. Body and world form a circuit, a system of reciprocity,
which, as we will see, Merleau‐Ponty continues in the later writings to meditate on
intensively, though with reference to what he terms an essential “fold” or “hollow”
in Being.338
However, on its own, PP is, in a certain respect, locked in its own form of
Husserl‐inherited subjectivism, permitting the world to arise in consciousness,
albeit pre‐intentionally (or through a deeper “motor” or “operative” intentionality),
but not explaining at all how it is that this world, or transcendent Being, could and
does give rise to consciousness—and, more basically, to organic life. That
phenomenology instructs itself explicitly to avoid this kind of question does not
prevent Merleau‐Ponty from broaching it fulsomely anyway. Dupond describes

Here are two of the many instances in which Merleau‐Ponty makes use of this idea, both taken
from working notes: “It is not the eye that sees (the eye thing). But it is not the soul. There is a ‘body
of the mind’ (Valéry), something that is gathered in the apparatus of vision and hollows out the place
there from which one sees. …” (VI 222); “—And what replaces the antagonistic and solidary reflective
movement (the immanence of the ‘idealists’) is the fold or hollow of Being having by principle an
outside, the architectonics of the configuration…. There are fields in intersection…” (VI 227)
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thusly the difference in approach to nature that we find between Merleau‐Ponty’s
earlier and later philosophy:

“In the Phenomenology of Perception, the relation between nature and spirit [esprit], as the reciprocal
foundation (Fundierung) and the gateway to the enigma of the world, was dealt with by way of spirit
(incarnated in nature) rather than nature—a posture which reiterates the duality of subject and
object). In the [Nature] courses at the Collège de France, the relation between nature and spirit is one
of reciprocal envelopment, and the gateway to this enigma is nature rather than spirit.”339

If it is true that phenomenology abstains on principled grounds from questions
about life or being “before” consciousness—and going against this, to some extent, is
the significance of an inquiry into “Nature” from Merleau‐Ponty’s phenomenological
vantage‐point—this does not mean it cannot contemplate the paradoxical distance
(unknowability, opacity, “depth”) of Nature as the source of life and thought and yet
also the continuity of consciousness with Nature itself—or, put differently, the
“prolongation” of consciousness in “the things” that Merleau‐Ponty claims to
characterize vision, for example. (VI 271) Merleau‐Ponty spends a good deal of time
thinking about both the activity or “autoproduction” of sense in and by Nature itself,
on the one hand (this is most evident through the activities of organic life, whose
seemingly “miraculous” developmental processes defy causal explanation), and the
naturality of human existence, as revealed through the “intertwining” of body and
world already laid out for us; he further considers the implications of this unity for
the reconceptualization of the questions of subject/object and intersubjectivity (the
latter of which we will be able to say little, unfortunately, in the present chapter).

Dupond, Pascal. Dictionnaire MerleauPonty. Paris: Ellipses, 2008. (p. 153; my translation)
Hereafter “Dupond.”
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B. Defining “Nature”
As we have already seen, Merleau‐Ponty is thoroughly opposed to conceiving
Nature as “object,” including lifeless “mass of matter,” and so on. What it is, in itself,
is not the “in‐itself” of the tradition, strictly opposed to a “for‐itself,” but rather what
Merleau‐Ponty calls (after Schelling) “wild Being,” or the “barbaric principle,” which
is more basic than the subject‐object distinction (similarly to the “flesh,” a related
notion, as we will see below). (VI 200) The “wildness” of nature is not such that it is
something that must be “molded” or “informed” in a Kantian way in order to be
made sense out of, but rather that it contains all potentialities, it is all things, but
without having become, qua Nature itself, any of them. (N 212) At the outset of the
lectures, Merleau‐Ponty offers several important indications pertaining to his
developing concept of nature. Here I will quote them in full and then comment on
subsequently:

“There is nature wherever there is a life that has meaning, but where, however, there is not a
thought; hence the kinship with the vegetative.” (N 3)
“Nature is what has a meaning, without this meaning being posited by thought: it is the
autoproduction of meaning.” (N 3)
“[Nature] has an interior, it is determined from within; hence the opposition of ‘natural’ to
‘accidental.’ Yet nature is different from man: it is not instituted by him and is opposed to custom, to
discourse.” (N 3)
“Nature is the primordial—that is, the nonconstructed, the noninstituted; hence the idea of an
eternity of nature (the eternal return), of a solidity. …It is our soil [sol]—not what is in front of us,
facing us, but rather, that which carries us.” (N 3)
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The sentiments expressed in these four quotations are clearly meant to set the
direction of the investigations that are to follow. To recapitulate, they describe
Nature in the following positive and negative terms: 1) possessing or embodying a
meaning, 2) producing a meaning in or out of itself, 3) not having to do with or being
posited by thought, 4) possessing an interiority, 5) being distinguishable from the
artificial, conventional, or man‐made, 6) being eternal and primordial, and 7) lying
not “before” us but rather “beneath” us—and, as Merleau‐Ponty will also say, within
us. (N 212‐3) These are admittedly schematic properties, and it is not yet clear how
or if they interlock, but already they reveal quite a bit. Merleau‐Ponty’s conception
of Nature is that of an ontological ground (of sorts) that is non‐objective (cf. its
“interiority”) and radically primordial—and thus pre‐reflective: “…a type of
englobing being in which we discover ourselves already invested prior to all
reflection.” (N 84) That is, it is both “non‐instituted” (a reference to Husserl’s notion
of Stiftung, institution or establishment) and essentially so (it is non‐institutable).
But even more important, it is presupposed in every institution, in every human
project, indeed, in embodiment and perception themselves. At times, Merleau‐Ponty
singles out this property of Nature most, namely its haunting “presence by absence,”
or, temporally speaking, its being a “permanent past,” always behind us.
What Merleau‐Ponty is trying to get at here is perhaps best seen through his
critique of Bergson, who he clearly admires but also faults for having missed this all‐
important feature of the natural. Merleau‐Ponty attributes this blindness of
Bergson’s to a certain “positivism.” Merleau‐Ponty begins his critique by
acknowledging favorably that “Bergson… posits consciously a paradox inherent to
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perception: Being is anterior to perception, and this primordial Being is conceivable
only in relation to perception.” (N 55) But he goes on to criticize Bergson for
“making of this prehuman a being with which we coexist.” (N 58) There can be no
simultaneity of reflection (or “intuition”) with Nature—a major point that Merleau‐
Ponty will stress again and again, coming from the epistemological side of the
question of Nature. Merleau‐Ponty’s verdict: “In Bergson, the official position of
positivism also ruins the idea of Nature.” (N 70)
Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty claims, improves on Bergson in this regard, in a
passage that calls to mind what we have already said about the continuity of world
and consciousness:

“Husserl rehabilitated the idea of Nature by this idea of jointure to a common truth that subjects
would continue but of which they would not be the initiators. All that happens is not explained by
interiority, or by exteriority, but by a chance that is the concordance between these two givens and is
assured by Nature.” (N 78)

That chance plays a part in the “explanation” of the inner/outer structure of Being
once again underscores that there is no complete “logos,” no complete explanation,
of Being, or Nature, in itself—not, however, because it is just out of our “finite”
human grasp, such that God could understand it whereas “we” cannot, but because
there is a “savage” principle of being that underlies the essential polarities
encountered in reflexive thought, something connected with “the flesh,” which we
will discuss later on.
Merleau‐Ponty is also interested in the “productivity” of nature:
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“The concept of Nature does not evoke only the residue of what had not been constructed by me, but
also a productivity which is not ours, although we can use it—that is, an originary productivity that
continues [to operate] beneath the artificial creations of man. It both partakes of the most ancient,
and is something always new. Nature is, as Lucien Herr said in his article dedicated to Hegel in La
grande encyclopédie, an untamed thing: ‘Nature is there from the first day.’ Nature is not exhausted or
used up by the very fact that endures.” (N 125)

Thus, part of what lends opacity to nature is its never‐ceasing capacity for invention
and self‐renewal. This is something Bergson of course was highly impressed with as
well (not to mention Whitehead, who Merleau‐Ponty favorably comments on and for
whom the principle of “creativity” is the “ultimate category,” higher even than
divinity). As is clear from the passage cited above, the relation of natural
productivity to human creativity for Merleau‐Ponty resembles that assigned by
some of the German Romantics to art.340 Like artistic creation, indeed, Nature’s
“autoproduction” of meaning is open, fluid, and always unfinished—a point
Merleau‐Ponty makes through a reference to Heraclitus: “Heraclitus says that
nature is a child at play; it gives meaning, but in the manner of a child who is
playing, and this meaning is never total.” (N 84)
Finally, Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of Nature should be understood in relation to
that of “spirit”—mind, consciousness, language, thought. Toward the end of the
Nature courses he offers the following telling recap: “Our subject: Regarding Nature,
the concern was to study it as an ontological leaf—and in particular, regarding life,
Though I cannot explore this connection fully here, there are many other indications that Merleau‐
Ponty is turning to the German Romantics where they left off in terms of the philosophy of nature.
Above all, he writes very glowingly about Schelling’s conception of nature, as we will see below. And
like the German Romantics and German Idealists, he cites Kant’s third Critique repeatedly, and in
much the same spirit as they do: in order to draw it out beyond itself, in order to attain a more
satisfactory result of Kant’s inaugural investigations into the real nature of life, the organism,
creativity, and teleology. Also, it is important in this respect to look at the way that Kant’s third
Critique somewhat challenges the framework of his own transcendental idealism, in a way that
Schelling later does more definitively, and in the way that Merleau‐Ponty tries to do in relation to
Husserl. For some references along these lines see: N, 83, 84
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the concern was to study the unfolding of the leaf of Nature—regarding the human,
the concern is to take him at his point of emergence in Nature.” (N 208, my emphasis)
Dupond helpfully captures the sense in which the concept of “spirit” (l’esprit) ties in
with that of what Merleau‐Ponty is calling “the human,” and which Husserl has
identified with the “personal”:
“The notion of spirit habitually designates a figure of being in which man recognizes his originality or
his own proper mode of being. It thus forms a network with other notions which also have the
function of naming the ‘escape’ of man from nature: culture, history, Logos, reason.” (Dupond, 70)

Dupond further explains the sense in which Merleau‐Ponty’s attitude towards
Nature vis‐à‐vis Spirit should be appreciated historically: “[Merleau‐Ponty inverts]
the movement of the history of modern thought, which enters philosophy via spirit,
[and starts from] nature, in allowing himself the possibility of comprehending the
emergence, the surgissement of spirit…” (Dupond 70, my translation)
Merleau‐Ponty’s principal historical inspiration concerning his conception of
Nature appears to be Schelling. Indeed, Merleau‐Ponty seems to identify at least
partially with “romantic naturalism” as opposed to “scientific naturalism”—a
distinction he himself fitfully makes. (N 135) Thus he argues that we must preserve
the idea of “savage nature” from the Romantics, saving it for example from Kantian‐
humanist designs of a thinker like his own contemporary Neo‐Kantian Léon
Brunschwig. (N 35) What Merleau‐Ponty finds most impressive about Schelling’s
notion of Nature are the same things he tends to emphasize in his own explorations
of it, for example its description as “wild Being” that haunts consciousness as an
irrecoverable ground, as well as the idea of “…the subjective‐objective that Nature
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will always be.” (N 70) What Merleau‐Ponty finds in this idea of the “subjective‐
objective” is illustrated by him with reference to a kind of reciprocity of the two
orders, subjective and objective, in a quote that also helps to remind us of how far
Merleau‐Ponty is from abandoning a phenomenological first‐person perspective for,
say, third‐person “realism”:
“We are the parents of a Nature of which we are also the children. It is in human being that things
become conscious of themselves; but the relation is reciprocal: human being is also the becoming‐
conscious of things.”341 (N 43)

Scientific naturalism, as this term is widely taken, of course would deny both of
these conclusions. It does not see the sense in which “we are the parents of Nature”
because it denies any ontological or constitutional role to perception (fearing
idealism), and it does not think of human beings as the seat of Nature’s own
reflexivity because it has tacitly accepted the Cartesian principle of the pure
exteriority, and hence deadness, of natural being. There is no “autoproduction” in
Nature, there are only causal‐mechanistic processes governed by the “laws of
nature,” set in motion by the mysterious burst of energy called the “Big Bang.”
Of course, there is always the danger of “anthropomorphizing” nature,
making it into a kind of intelligence of consciousness, which Merleau‐Ponty is well
aware of: “If Nature is not an object of thought, that is, a simple correlative of a
thought, it is decidedly not a subject either, and for the same reason: its opacity, its
enveloping. It is an obscure principle.” (N 120) Merleau‐Ponty’s “Nature” is not,
therefore, like Hegel’s “Spirit,” that is, a “self” that finds itself reflected back to itself
Compare: “Not only must Nature become vision, but human being must also become Nature…” (N
47) And notice the phraseology here: “Becoming‐nature of man which is the becoming‐man of
nature.” (N 185)
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in (or as) nature. Rather, it is an “obscure principle” that unfolds partially in
consciousness, yet also partially outside of it—because it is more “ancient” than
consciousness itself and stands in irreducible tension with it.
Schelling’s philosophy of Nature thus teaches Merleau‐Ponty key lessons
about the limits of objective thought and of reflection, which objectify nature but
must fail to capture its depths. Thus, invoking Schelling, Merleau‐Ponty observes:

“A poetic consciousness recognizes that it does not possess its object totally, that it can understand it
only by a true creation, and that it creates clarity by an operation that is not deductive but creative.
Poetic consciousness, overcome by its object, must get hold of itself again, but without ever being
able to separate itself from its history.”342 (N 50)

The theme of non‐coincidence of reflection and object‐of‐reflection is of course a
major one in Merleau‐Ponty’s later ontology (and epistemology) generally, lying at
the root of his conception of “hyper‐reflection” and the method of “interrogation.”
What Merleau‐Ponty finds, in other words, is that Schelling’s is a “phenomenology of
pre‐reflexive Being” (N 41) that effects a “reflection on what is not reflection.” (N
45) Thus Merleau‐Ponty’s own particular fascination with Schelling does not lie
simply with the latter’s anti‐Cartesianism but also, one might say, with his anti‐
Kantianism (and anti‐idealism generally).343 Schelling, like Merleau‐Ponty, denies
that consciousness is coextensive with meaning. (Husserl, with genetic
phenomenology and the concept of the “life‐world” lying beneath the constructions
These ideas reappear in reference to Whitehead’s philosophy. “It is this stubbornness that
subtends all creation: ‘it belongs to the essence of the universe to pass into a future.’” (N 121) In stark
contrast, there is the devastating assessment of Sartre’s philosophy that it has “no place for a
conception of Nature or for a conception of history.” (N 70) This follows from Sartre’s dualism of the
in‐itself and for‐itself, of which Merleau‐Ponty never tires in criticizing.
343 See in this regard Merleau‐Ponty’s interesting remark: “[Schelling’s] conception is the only
possible form of realism.” (N 50)
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of thought, had surely been heading in this direction, Merleau‐Ponty would add, but
the seductions of an all‐encompassing transcendental consciousness remained.)
In my view, what is key to Merleau‐Ponty’s appreciation of Schelling is the
fact that the German thinker stood at the summit of—and he effects a certain
reversal of—a mature tradition of idealist thinking, beginning at least with Kant and
culminating in Hegel’s “System.” That Merleau‐Ponty understands his own role to
parallel Schelling’s in this regard is evident from a passage like this one:

“Schelling started from transcendental idealism around 1800 and wondered how to rehabilitate the
idea of Nature in the framework of reflexive philosophy. Yet this problem of transcendental idealism is
also Husserl’s.” (N 71; my emphasis)

In terms of Schelling’s infamous relation344 to Hegel and the latter’s “dialectical”
system, Merleau‐Ponty’s verdict is accordingly favorable to the former: “Schelling
thought this thesis of speculative philosophy at a higher level of rigor than did Hegel
because of his conception of the empirical; the identity of the finite and the infinite
is thought by him in a more decisive way.”345 (N 47)

C. Nature and the Sciences of Life
Because of its pre‐reflective and non‐objective character, Nature is hard to
investigate “frontally,” so to speak, which is what allows Merleau‐Ponty to begin to
Hegel drew copiously from the younger Schelling but famously criticized the latter in the preface
of the Phenomenology, albeit veiledly, calling Schelling’s Absolute “the night in which all cows are
black.” Schelling would go on to heavily criticize Hegelian philosophy—or at least its pretensions to
completeness—throughout his long career, well after Hegel’s own death.
345 Hegel is of course famous for having identified a “true infinity” which incorporates finite
difference into its make‐up, as opposed to the “bad infinity” that merely negates the finite. Schelling’s
thinking does not, however, allow infinity to have the “last word,” so to speak, in any sense. It is in
this sense that he thinks their “identity” more thoroughly. (We will examine the theme of “identity
and difference” more closely below.)
344
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try lateral approaches to it, including the study of the work of the natural sciences,
above all modern (in his time, up‐to‐date) biology. But how exactly does Merleau‐
Ponty see as the link between biology and his own philosophical investigation of
nature? He begins to explain it through the notion of “experience”:

“…Nature is an all‐encompassing something we cannot think starting from concepts, let alone
deductions, but we must rather think it starting from experience, and in particular, experience in its
most regulated form—that is, science.” (N 87)

What Merleau‐Ponty means by “science” is broadly encompasses all controlled,
observation‐based procedural disciplines, including psychology.
Merleau‐Ponty’s use of science is extremely subtle and sophisticated. It
certainly does not consist of a simple appropriation of the “scientific method,” but is
instead an interrogation of experience—the domain common to philosophy (at least
as phenomenology), science, and even religion, art, and literature (Merleau‐Ponty
famously turns to painters and writers for inspiration, and the Nature lectures are
no exception in this regard, as demonstrated by an extended discussion of Proust
therein). Though he undertakes an overview of the physical sciences, including
relativity theory and quantum mechanics, of which we will say a bit more later on,
he primarily examines the researches of scientists who focus on animality and
behavior, familiar old themes in Merleau‐Ponty’s work.
Merleau‐Ponty’s method is not inductive. Philosophy does not simply
generalize from results, if this is indeed what scientists do; it interprets science
according to philosophical categories whose legitimacy depends not merely on
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external verification‐procedures but, we might say, also on phenomenological
authenticity. Philosophy and science are to be conceived as partners in a dialogue.
Indeed, on science and scientific consciousness, there are ways in which
Merleau‐Ponty’s position has in fact not changed significantly from Husserl’s (from
the later period especially). Take, for example, the following remark:

“Science is not an unmotivated instance. We have to psychoanalyze science, purify it. Scientific
consciousness lives in the natural attitude, as Husserl said, and it ignores Nature because it is there: it
is a naïve and uncritical enjoyment of the natural certitude.” (N 85)

And again:

“The concern of the philosopher is to see; that of the scientist is to find a foothold. … The philosopher
must see behind the back of the physicist what the physicist himself does not see.” (N 86‐7)

In other words, the war of philosophy and science is a false one; even
Husserl’s strict division between eidetic and non‐eidetic disciplines, as we have
seen, is believed to be exaggerated by Merleau‐Ponty. Scientific evidence aids and
instructs the philosopher, even as philosophy puts scientific research into
perspective. Indeed philosophers, too, can be reckless in their own way, as Merleau‐
Ponty makes clear in his rebuke of Heidegger’s spurious etymologies, concluding
from this that “…it is dangerous to leave all freedom to the philosopher.”346 (N 86‐7)
The philosophy of Nature is thus not a kind of secret knowledge or “superscience” to
rival science (N 204), in the way, perhaps, Heideggerian philosophy (or “poetry,”

There is also here a dialectic of the negative and the positive with respect to the proper role of
science. For example, one can find Merleau‐Ponty on more than one occasion stressing the negative
role of science in helping to eliminate false or empty possibilities. See: N, 100, 106.
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Dichtung) might be a secret knowledge of (or access to) Being that eludes scientific
and metaphysical understanding.347 Thus it is simply a matter of having a “reading
of science itself as a certain (reduced) ontology in the broader context of the relation
with the most primordial being,” that is, with Nature itself. (N 206)
One of the more challenging sections (at least for philosophers!) of the
Nature lectures is its long assessment of the biology of his day. A great deal of
ground is covered in a short amount of time, all the more impressive as Merleau‐
Ponty is hardly stingy with details.348 What is the point of this study of animality,
according to Merleau‐Ponty? The key lines in this respect are these:

“The organism is not defined by its punctual existence; what exists beyond is a theme, a style, all
these expressions seeking to express not a participation in a transcendental existence, but in a
structure of the whole. The body belongs to a dynamic of behavior. Behavior is sunk into corporeity.
The organism does not exist as a thing endowed with absolute properties, as fragments of Cartesian
space. An organism is a fluctuation around norms, which are events enframed by a structure that
would not be realized in another order, but has relations with these events.” (N 183)

What is key here are the specifically ontological implications of organic life. What
the work of leading biologists show, he finds, is that organisms exhibit a specifically
holistic and non‐localizable style: “The reality of the organism supposes a non‐

Compare with these remarks from a working note: “The search for a ‘wild’ view of the world
nowise limits itself to a return to precomprehension or to prescience. …A return to prescience is not
the goal. –the prescientific is only an invitation to comprehend the meta‐scientific and this last is not
non‐science.” (VI 182) It is true that Merleau‐Ponty himself, at one point, identifies his own “Being”
with Heidegger’s. But the methodological difference has deeper implications: by involving natural
science, not to mention metaphysical thinkers like Leibniz, Schelling, Whitehead, and Bergson,
Merleau‐Ponty is undermining the Heideggerian suspicion of naturalism the latter inherited,
arguably, from certain features of Husserl’s (and Kant’s) transcendentalist framing of
phenomenology.
348 Though it would require a certain amount of biological expertise to determine the contemporary
validity of the science Merleau‐Ponty deals with, much of it concerns simple (though systematic)
observation of animal behavior, in which interpretation plays a significant role.
347

185
Parmenidean Being, a form that escapes from the dilemma of being and nonbeing.”
(N 183)
The principle of wholeness or totality (which are equivalent for Merleau‐
Ponty) is central to Merleau‐Ponty’s reflections on organic life and indeed ontology
generally. Thus he explains:

“Hence the organicist idea supported by [biologist G. E.] Coghill, according to which, inasmuch as we
analyze the organisms piecemeal, we find opposed only physiochemical phenomena, but when we
rise to the consideration of the whole of the organism, the totality is no longer describable in
physiological terms; it appears as emergent. How are we to understand this relation of totality of
parts as a result? What status must we give to totality? Such is the philosophical question that
Coghill’s experiments pose, a question which is at the center of this course on the idea of nature and
maybe the whole of philosophy.” (N 145; my italics)

Merleau‐Ponty spends a great deal of attention on one particular 1929 study
by Coghill, on the axolotl lizard.349 The axolotl “…is a very long lizard, about seven
inches, which as a tadpole lives in the water, then, once it has four legs, develops on
land.” (N 140) What is curious about the animal (which is really more of a
paradigmatic case than an anomaly) is the way that its anatomical developments
mysteriously (and non‐causally) parallel its adapted behaviors; there seems to be no
strictly causal‐physiological explanation of the coordination. The lizard’s
embryology, recounted by Merleau‐Ponty in painstaking detail, really suggests, for
Coghill and Merleau‐Ponty, that, “A ‘reference to the future’…already exists in the
embryo. [Thus] We cannot define the animal by its immediate functioning: here the
apparatus has meaning only for a future.” (N 144) For example, the “order of the
nervous cephalo‐causal development envelops [i.e., anticipates] swimming; there is
“This book [Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior] has still not been exceeded, but we haven’t yet
measured all its weight.” (N 140)
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the possible in the organism.” This notion of “the possible,” a “what it can do” that “is
realized at the same time” as the lizard develops physiologically, already places us,
Merleau‐Ponty points out, “beyond the physiological definition of the organism by
its real functioning.” (N 144) Merleau‐Ponty sees here the importance of a sense of
the totality of the organism, one that is immanent already in the organism’s
behavioral as well as anatomical development, even in the earliest phases. But he
does not want to suggest a simple teleology, for reasons that will become clearer as
we proceed.
It is useful in all of this to have before one’s mind one of Merleau‐Ponty’s
favorite images or metaphors for the kind of wholeness or totality that he has in
mind, namely that of the melody. The melody is a metaphor for the organism;
indeed, Merleau‐Ponty adapts it from famous biologist and ethologist Jakob von
Uexküll, who says of the Naturfaktor—his own explanatory notion for organic
development—that it is not an entelechy but a “melody singing itself.” (N 173) What
is key about the melody is this: “At the moment when the melody begins, the last
note is there, in its own manner.” (N 174) This is clear enough: a “first note” of a
melody is not the first note without the complete melody’s being at least implied—
even if not yet fully thought out, since the melody may be in the middle of being
created!350 (This of course is one of the reasons that Merleau‐Ponty opposes
teleology or “finalism”: that it presupposes a completeness that does not make
intelligible the imperfections of the processes of either natural productivity or

There is a connection here with the “flesh.” See: “Then past and present are Ineinander, each
enveloping‐enveloped—and that itself is the flesh.” (VI 268)
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artistic creativity.) Merleau‐Ponty explains animal behavior exactly in terms of the
melody, in the following passage:

“Behavior cannot be understood if we understand it moment by moment. Certainly we still find
sufficient conditions from moment to moment, but then we do not grasp the relation of meaning.
Each part of the situation acts only as part of a whole situation; no element of action has a separate
utility in fact.” (N 175)

It is of course characteristic of Merleau‐Ponty to fuse art and science in this
inimitable way!
For his students to gain a toehold in this notion of wholeness, Merleau‐Ponty
suggests that perception is helpful: “We find models of this idea of totality in the
world of perception.” For example,

“Psychology does easily what science finds difficult to do, namely to allow for an organizing principle
within totality. In effect, perception does not give us the things, but what we see. In the phenomenal
milieu, nothing impedes the whole from being other than the sum of the parts without being for all
that a transcendent entity.” (N 153)

It is clear that Merleau‐Ponty is referring to the thesis of Gestalt psychology, with
which he regained interest at the time of his later work. But what is key for us here
is that we can see what sort of conception of totality interests Merleau‐Ponty: one
that is non‐transcendent and yet also non‐immanent (if one means by this entirely
engulfed by the sum of the parts). The same idea applies at the level of organic life.
The organism does not embody a timeless Platonic Form, or even an Aristotelian
one, but this does not mean that its development or its behavior can be explained in
reductive, nominalistic, or mechanistic‐causal terms. Thus there is a “…truth of the
whole that does not signify a truth of the detail.” (N 31) But though the animal has a
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“why,” as it were, this “why” is an open, groping, and incomplete one. Merleau‐Ponty
calls on Hegel’s image of the cyclone to illustrate what he has in mind: “Hegel
already compared life to a cyclone. The cyclone is nothing other than water, but its
form is not explained by water.” We must not seek an organic totality “behind the
observable phenomena” (N 152), any more than we would seek to reduce the whole
to its “individual components.” Thus Merleau‐Ponty concludes, “The organism
would not be a transcendent totality, any more than it would be a totality by
summation.”351
The fact that organic totality is not anchored in a positive principle, such as
“life” (vitalism) or an entelechy (Aristotelianism), resonates throughout the Nature
lectures in a number of ways. Thus Merleau‐Ponty’s concept of “life” is essentially a
reaction against vitalist positivism—again, as typified by Bergson—as well as, as
always, scientific naturalism. Thus he pronounces that “…it is not a positive being,
but an interrogative being which defines life.” (N 156) Indeed, Merleau‐Ponty
repeatedly stresses this “negative principle” within the organism. (N 155) What
does he mean by this? The “negative principle,” he explains somewhat obliquely, “is
less identity‐with‐self than non‐difference‐with‐self. This absence becomes a factor
only by negation of its own negation.” But unlike what is found in Hegel, the “double
negation” never becomes resolved into a “concrete whole,” such as Life, God, Spirit,
or Der Begriff. In the case of a Hegelianism, Merleau‐Ponty observes critically,

There are several stunning “holistic” metaphors and images in VI, for example that of mirrors
facing one another, in which we find “…a couple more real than either of [the mirrors individually].”
(VI 139)
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“Life would be Spirit‐in‐itself, and Spirit would be life for‐itself. But life is not yet Spirit in‐itself. We
find in Hegel the same retrospective illusion as in Aristotle. To grasp life in the things is to grasp a
lack in the things as such.” (N 157)

What Merleau‐Ponty seems to mean is here 1) that the organism lacks an “in‐itself,”
and hence (obviously) cannot be the “in‐itself” of Spirit, and 2) that this “lack”
constitutes (or is a condition of) what it means to be “alive.” This negativity is
intertwined with a certain interiority; for there is “…a natural negativity, an
interiority of the living organism…” (N 210) But this is not to say that life is a “for‐
itself,” a consciousness. Just as Nature was said to be neither subject nor object, the
same holds for the organism as such. (We might recall that Husserl struggled with
this very issue in Ideas II, when discussing animality and the soul.) But this
interiority has to do with the symbolic depth of living beings, a meaning‐
generativity which is reflected in the structure of behavior (and the quasi‐interiority
of the Umwelt352), not in the presence of a (substantial) “consciousness.” Comparing
machines and animals (excepting the limit‐case as it were of the simplest of
organisms, which Merleau‐Ponty calls “animal‐machines”), the philosopher

In addition to organic holism, Merleau‐Ponty assigns a particular importance to the concept of the
Umwelt, as developed by legendary ethologist Jakob von Uexküll. (N 167) The untranslatable term
(which we, following Kersten, had earlier translated as “the surrounding world” in reference to
Husserl’s notion in Ideas II), is defined best through Merleau‐Ponty’s own descriptions of it and its
significance. He describes it as “[marking] the difference between the world such as it exists in itself,
and the world as the world of the living being.” That is, it is beyond the distinction of the “objective”
and the “subjective.” Essentially, it is the world of an animal—an animal lifeworld, in effect. “The
Umwelt is the world implied by the movement of the animal, and that regulates the animal’s
movements by its own structure.”352 (N 175) And again: “[It] exists for the behavior of the animal, but
not necessarily in its consciousness; it is the environment of behavior as ‘opposed to the geographical
environment.’” (Uexküll himself labels the “Umwelt” of higher animals the “Gegenwelt.” (N 172)) The
Umwelt is key to the explanation of animal behavior because “…between the situation and the
movement of the animal, there is a relation of meaning which is what the expression Umwelt
conveys.” (N 175) And finally: “The notion of the Umwelt no longer allows us to consider the
organism in its relation to the exterior world, as an effect of the exterior world, or as a cause. The
Umwelt is not presented in front of the animal like a goal; it is not present like an idea, but as a theme
that haunts consciousness.” (N 178)
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concludes: “There is no operating meaning within the machine, but only within the
living thing.” (N 163) The machine is pure exteriority in relation to life, a mere
simulacrum, while on the side of pure interiority would lie presumably a fully
developed and reflective egoic consciousness. Merleau‐Ponty’s brief but fascinating
commentary on machines and life culminates in a perceptive remark on artificial
intelligence. There is a certain “bad faith,” he argues, in the modern zest for creating
artificial organisms:

“We are amused to give birth to a phenomenon of life, and we deny that this phenomenon refers to
an authentic phenomenon, even though it is interesting only to the extent that it is an imitation of life.
It is in this way that Malebranche would not have beaten a stone as he beat his dog, saying that the
dog didn’t suffer.” (N 166)

III. The Nature Lectures and The Visible and the Invisible: Towards a New
Dialectical OntoPhenomenology

A. Introduction
What is the place of Nature in a general ontology? How does what Merleau‐
Ponty is doing in the Nature lectures inform his detailed investigations of the
“visible” and the “invisible,” the “sensible” and “sentient,” “touching” and “touched”
that we find in VI, the much better known work? The existence of the Nature
lectures poses a certain hermeneutical challenge for those seeking to piece together
Merleau‐Ponty’s mature ontology. This is because many of the terms that have
become familiar to us from an acquaintance with Merleau‐Ponty’s later work, such
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as “flesh,” “chiasm,” “reversibility,” and so on, appear only sparsely in his lecture
courses on nature, lectures which employ and adopt the working terminology of the
sciences and, in some cases, the history of philosophy. Even in the Nature lectures,
however, we can find the same sorts of insights that drive Merleau‐Ponty’s
ontological vision in the more well‐known work. The purpose of the present section
is to discuss the basic ideas of this ontology in a way that weaves the Nature lectures
and VI together, or at least understands them as possessing a common front.
There are several powerful ideas which dominate Merleau‐Ponty’s mature
thinking, and almost all of them can be considered as ways to understand the
“identity and difference” of the two orders of being—sensible and sentient, objective
and subjective—and of course the “dimensionality” opened up by their beautiful but
often baffling style of commerce. I will try to show in the following several sections
how Merleau‐Ponty’s key concepts are based on this underlying “identity‐and‐
difference” theme and a corresponding type of dialectic that emerges therefrom.
This will open up a discussion that will eventually take us through to the end of this
dissertation.

B. Reversibility
The foundation of Merleau‐Ponty’s dialectic is the phenomenon, or concept
(it is in fact both), of “reversibility.” In my own reading, there are two fundamental
points of reference for Merleau‐Ponty regarding this concept, the one historical and
the other systematic. The former is the mind‐body problem as inherited by
Descartes, while the latter is the phenomenon of self‐sensing, the observation of
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which Merleau‐Ponty borrows from Husserl (but expands in ways we will see
below). We will deal with the latter point of reference first.
Merleau‐Ponty’s classic phenomenological example of reversibility is
Husserl’s own observation of the reversibility of touch, or the phenomenon of the
“left hand touching the right hand…”353 Merleau‐Ponty notes, like Husserl, that to
“touch” something, when that something happens to be another part of one’s body,
is also to be “touched” by that something. “Subject” here becomes “object,” and vice‐
versa. The most dramatic case is that of hands touching one another; but Merleau‐
Ponty extends this phenomenon of “reversibility” beyond the sense of touch to
include vision, which explains the title of his projected work and the repeated
references to, for example, the “strange adhesion of the seer and the visible.” (VI
140) Husserl had initially distinguished touching from vision by noticing that while
touch is reversible, vision is not. That is, we cannot see ourselves seeing in the way
we can touch ourselves touching. But Merleau‐Ponty questions the validity of this
distinction on two counts. First, vision could not truly “see” the world if the world
did not “adhere” to its glance; and second, even in self‐touching, there is no
complete coincidence of sensing and sensed—“non‐coincidence” is in fact one of
Merleau‐Ponty’s fundamental ideas, and it applies as truly to this case as to any
other. As he explains in one characteristic passage:

“To begin with, we spoke summarily of the reversibility of the seeing and the visible, of the touching
and the touched. It is time to emphasize that it is a reversibility always imminent and never realized
in fact. My left hand is always on the verge of touching my right hand touching the things; but I never
Mereau‐Ponty’s references to this trope and to reversibility are frequent. Some of the most
interesting in the texts we are examining include the following: N 217; N 224; VI 272; VI 141‐2; VI
147, 148; VI 4 154, 155; VI 223.
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reach coincidence; the coincidence eclipses at the moment of realization, and one of two things
always occurs: either my right hand really passes over into the ranks of the touched, or it retains its
hold on the world, but then I do not really touch it—my right hand touching, I palpate with my left
hand only its outer covering.” (VI 148)

Thus while it is true that we cannot truly “see ourselves seeing,” in that the eye
cannot bend its vision back upon itself, neither, finally can touch.354 And to the
extent that either sense is reversible, it is reversible in this complex manner—that
is, with a combination of identity and difference. As for the relation of touch and
vision to one another, Merleau‐Ponty notes that while they are in some sense
incommensurable (we will see below that he makes similar remarks concerning all
of the senses taken together), they are nonetheless united in one aesthesiological
nexus, rendering back to us a unified world: “Since the same body sees and touches,
visible and tangible belong to the same world.” (VI 134)
Reversibility is, of course, a phenomenon we notice first of all with regard to
the body, which for its part is “…interposed [not as] a thing, an interstitial matter, a
connective tissue, but a sensible for itself…” (VI 135) The lived body is thus always
already “aware” of itself and the world, which, through its Umwelt, is “present”
before it immanently and not merely as an externality. But Merleau‐Ponty’s
discourse about the “body‐subject,” while legitimate in its own right, had tended to
obscure the “world” side of this (literal) equation. The world, nature, the sensible—
these are the complementary poles to the body, the mind, and sentience. Therefore
what we find above all in the later writings is Merleau‐Ponty’s parlaying the insight

Reversibility is thus, in the words of Dastur, “never finished and always in the making.” See:
Dastur, Françoise. “Merleau‐Ponty and Thinking from Within,” tr. Paul B. Milan. Printed in Merleau
Ponty in Contemporary Perspective. Eds. Patrick Burke and Jan Van Der Veken. Dodrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1993 (p. 26) Hereafter referred to as “Dastur.”
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of reversibility and the body into a general ontological principle, using it to meditate
on the reflexive depths of Being as a whole, the subjectivity‐objectivity Ineinander as
such:

“To touch is to touch oneself. To be understood as: the things are the prolongation of my body and
my body is the prolongation of the world, through it the world surrounds me…” (VI 255)

This move towards generalization is accompanied by a more ontologically general
(though somehow still thickly carnal) language than we find in his prior
phenomenological analyses. This language which may even come close to sounding
like a new “metaphysics.” Instead, it is intended to be taken as a way to frame the
results of phenomenology in a coherent or systematic way. As I will argue below (as
I have already begun to do in Chapter 3), Merleau‐Ponty’s objection to his own prior
researches is directed principally to their lack of balance, not to their radical
misguidedness.355
As I read it, there are basically three fundamental lessons or themes Merleau‐
Ponty takes from reversibility. The first is that of the unity or “chiasm” of subject
and object, touching and touched, sentient and sensible, etc.; the second is, in
apparent opposition to the first, “non‐coincidence”; and the third is the interplay of
identity and difference, chiasm and non‐coincidence, that produces the paradoxical
“sameness without identity” (VI 261) that we experience with respect to the world
as well as other people (for example, in the paradigmatic case of a shaking of hands).
The case of Heidegger is a good one for the sake of comparison; his own “Kehre” from
Dasein/Being to Being/Dasein is not entirely unlike Merleau‐Ponty’s own turn from the body‐subject
to the structures of being itself, though in Merleau‐Ponty’s case it is more of a matter of mundane
self‐correction than it is in Heidegger’s.
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After all, the phenomenon of reversibility could not become known to us if it were
merely a difference or merely an identity. Clearly the sensible and the sentient are
not simply two but rather in some way one (or else how could they be reversible and
simply “trade places”?), and yet they are two, since if they were simply one, they
could not produce an experience or the “distance” of mind and things. This
intercrossing of identity and difference also helps to explain why Merleau‐Ponty
speaks of the “indivision” (VI 208, 255) of Being in the same breath as its “self‐
splitting.” Further, it is embodied in Merleau‐Ponty’s reciprocal expressions
“difference without contradiction” and “identity without superposition.” (VI 135)
As I mentioned above, Merleau‐Ponty also develops his basic ontological
ideas in explicit reference to the history of philosophy, especially modern
philosophy and the mind‐body problem as it emerges in Descartes. This becomes
abundantly clear in the Nature lectures, where Descartes emerges as his main
philosophical “rival”—though hardly in the Manichean terms this term could be
taken in.356 Merleau‐Ponty states Descartes’ difficulty (which is also his own) in the
following terms:

“There is an extraordinary difficulty in thinking according to both the first and the second order
[physical and mental] at the same time. It is difficult to conceive the soul and the body as one and the
same thing, while at the same time thinking of them as distinct. Union and distinction are, however,
both required, yet they are unthinkable both at the same time.” (N 17‐8, my emphasis)

This quote refers to Merleau‐Ponty’s idea of non‐coincidence, as well as that of
intertwining—hence, the Cartesian problematic teaches us the same lessons taught
It is interesting to note in this regard that M. C. Dillon presents Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy as a
“critical assessment of Cartesianism” throughout his work, MerleauPonty’s Ontology. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1988) (The quoted phrase is from p. 6 of that work).
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by the phenomenon of self‐sensing. Cartesian dualism has to be replaced with
another, more flexible and dialectical model. Accordingly, Dastur asserts that
Merleau‐Ponty’s “entire philosophical undertaking led him to promote a kind of
thought which would no longer oppose interiority and exteriority, the subject with
the world, structures with living experience.”357 (Dastur 25)

C. Flesh
The notion of the “flesh” (chair) is meant to convey the commonality of both
“orders of being,” subjective and objective, while refusing to synthesize them into a
solid or substantial “this.” It is not a causa sui or a Spinozistic “substance,” much less
a neutral “substrate” of being. It has “…no name in traditional philosophy” since it is
neither subject nor object but something else entirely, a kind of “element” (VI 146)
or the site of an ontological exchange that itself comes close to defining what
Merleau‐Ponty means by “wild being.”358 This becomes clearer when Merleau‐Ponty
aligns the flesh with the idea of “life” he is developing in the Nature lectures:

Dastur also uses one of Merleau‐Ponty’s more interesting tropes, that of narcissism, through
which to understand—and subvert our own potential misunderstanding of—Merleau‐Ponty’s basic
insight into the way the “seer and the visible” relate. Thus while at first it seems as though the
narcissist is “egocentric” in the way he sees himself in the object (think of Narcissus staring into the
pond), nonetheless this is not the “second, more profound meaning of narcissism,” which is the
“feeling [that one is] looked at by things, by an inversion of the look that transforms subjective
activity into ontological passivity, so that vision no longer has an identifiable author, so that vision
becomes general visibility.” (Dastur 30) This notion that it is not only we that look at things but
things that look at us is one of the most original and challenging of Merleau‐Ponty’s thoughts, though
it can be seen to follow logically from the notion of “reversibility.”
358 The flesh can be imagined as a field of “assemblage” and “dehiscence” of sentience and sensibility,
similar perhaps to water or air (hence the notion of “element”), in the sense of permitting and
facilitating forms of creation and destruction, coming‐together and coming‐apart.
357
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“It is not that life is a power of being or a spirit, but rather, that we install ourselves in perceived
being/brute being, in the sensible, in the flesh where there is no longer the alternative of the initself
and the foritself, where perceived being is eminently in being.”359 (N 210, my emphasis)

Indeed, what Merleau‐Ponty is getting at with this concept of the flesh is often best
understood laterally, through other, related notions, including “nature” or “wild
Being,” as we can see from the following (dense) “working note”:

“Solution: recapture the child, the alter ego, the unreflected within myself by a lateral, pre‐analytic
participation, which is perception, ueberschreiten by definition, intentional transgression. When I
perceive the child, he is given precisely in a certain divergence (écart) (originating presentation of the
unpresentable) and the same for my alter ego, and the same for the pre‐analytic thing. Here is the
common tissue of which we are made. The wild Being.” (VI, 203)

This passage reveals that for Merleau‐Ponty we are always already, in perception,
separated off from ourselves—or from something, as it were, with which we are still
connected, with which we share a togetherness, and of course which is also the very
site of our conjunction, since it makes possible the experience of things—or
“phenomena”—in consciousness. Thus it seems what flesh, wild being, the “common
tissue” or “element,” etc., are trying to name, is precisely the phenomenon of
identity‐and‐difference of sensible and sentient orders, a primordial intertwining
that expresses itself, paradoxically, in a certain “separation.” The flesh turns out to
be an inevitable corollary to reversibility itself; it is the flesh that “is” reversible,
moving between the “flesh of the body” and the “flesh of the world.”360 That the flesh

In one place he even equates the flesh with Nature. He tells himself: “Do a psychoanalysis of
Nature: it is the flesh, the mother.” (VI 267) Merleau‐Ponty broaches the concept of the flesh towards
the end of his third Nature lecture, itself contemporaneous with the writing of the draft of VI. Indeed,
some of his most revealing thoughts on the flesh occur in these lectures.
360 Fred Evans makes much the same point when he observes: “The flesh holds seers and the visible
together (they are of the same flesh), while still respecting their difference and keeping them apart
(as respectively, the flesh of the body and the flesh of the world).” Evans, Fred. “Chiasm and Flesh.”
359
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is at the heart of reversibility also explains why Merleau‐Ponty calls the flesh the
“miracle that is the sense organ.” (N 209) As we have seen, the sense organ, for
example the skin in its tactility, demonstrates this reversibility in a paradigmatic
way.
The identity, as it were, of intertwining and separation (ségrégation) is
parallel with that of distance and proximity, which defines our strange intimacy
with things, even as they remain outside what in Husserlian parlance is called the
“sphere of immanence.” Indeed, Merleau‐Ponty takes the notion of an “immanent
transcendency” of things in consciousness to its logical conclusion:

“By definition perception puts us in the presence of a definitively opaque term. In other words, the
Nature that we perceive is as distant and as close as possible, and for the same reasons. There is
nothing between me and the Nature that I perceive. When I perceive a thing, I cannot conceive of a
perception interposed between me and the object.” (N 118)

He reiterates the same idea in the VI:

“…this distance is not the contrary of this proximity, it is deeply consonant with it, it is synonymous
with it.” (VI 135)

And in a similar vein:

Vision does not completely blend into visible; nonetheless we are close to it, palpation, gaze envelops
things, clothes them with its own flesh. (VI 131)

In: MerleauPonty: Key Concepts. Eds. Rosalyn Diprose and Jack Reynolds. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008
(p. 191) Hereafter “Evans.”
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It is important to realize that “distance” is in this sense a crucial concept361 insofar
as it is precisely such distantiation that is denied, overlooked, suppressed, and
“forgotten” by both flat‐naturalistic and idealistic ontologies. But Merleau‐Ponty’s
innovation is to understand, in a deeply Heraclitean way, this distance as
constitutive of and defining of its seeming opposite, proximity, in the matrix of
perception. We are what we see, which also means, once again, that what we see
sees us as well, in a way that transcends mere metaphor. Perception is of course
equivalent to the body, Leib, in the sense that to perceive is to be corporeal, and
vice‐versa. Thus Merleau‐Ponty observes, “…The thickness of the body, far from
rivaling that of the world, is on the contrary the sole means I have to go unto the
heart of things, by making myself a world and by making them flesh.” (VI 135) In this
way the body is not simply the “body‐subject” of the Phenomenology of Perception,
but that pole of the “body‐world” circuit now having been named the “flesh”; indeed,
it is the “flesh of the body.”362
In stressing the entwinement of sensibility and sentience over Cartesian‐
style dualism, Merleau‐Ponty becomes acutely aware of the need to stress their
difference as well, yet of course without lapsing back into dualism. To express the
complexity of this relationship, what Merleau‐Ponty searches for is a kind of
dialectic—but what kind of dialectic emerges? To begin with, it cannot be a dialectic
of “synthesis,” since it must include non‐coincidence, somehow, at its core. Yet non‐

The idea of “distance” has been emphasized recently in a work by Renaud Barbaras: Desire and
Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception. Tr. Paul B. Milan. Stanford University Press,
2006
362 Compare: “The world seen is not ‘in’ my body, and my body is not ‘in’ the world ultimately: flesh
applied to a flesh, the world neither surrounds it nor is surrounded by it.” (VI 138)
361
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coincidence is a function, ironically, of a certain identity of seer and seen. As
Merleau‐Ponty explains in a working note:

“The very pulp of the sensible, what is indefinable in it, is nothing else than the union in it of the
‘inside’ with the ‘outside,’ the contact in thickness of self with self.—The absolute of the ‘sensible’ is
this stabilized explosion i.e. involving return.”363

That such a “coincidence” is incomplete, never‐finished, always‐in‐the‐making, etc.,
helps to explain why facticity alone cannot explain existence, that is, why
transcendence or self‐distantiation—which are the twin bases of the possibility of
reflection and the “transcendental attitude” as a reflective stance—are equally
necessary determinants of the existential situation.

D. Identity and Difference, the One and the Many: Dimensions of MerleauPonty’s
Dialectic
The unity or “chiasm” of mind and world, spirit and nature, generates a sense
of a kind of “pre‐established harmony” (VI 133) as well as a sense of primordial, but
strictly unthematizable, mutual belonging, of the two nonetheless‐distinguishable
orders. Merleau‐Ponty treats this harmony usually as a brute fact of sorts, though he
does at times understand it as expressing a deeper logic of reciprocity: “…since
vision is a palpation with the look, it must also be inscribed in the order of being
that it discloses to us; he who looks must not himself be foreign to the world that he
looks at.” (VI 134) Merleau‐Ponty expresses this idea of harmony in many ways—for
VI 268. Elsewhere Merleau‐Ponty refers to this “explosion” as the “dehiscence” or “écart” that
marks the flight of being from itself—which is nevertheless, as Hegel says, a return to itself. See also:
“The true philosophy [is to] apprehend what makes the leaving of oneself be a retiring into oneself,
and vice versa./Grasp this chiasm, this reversal. That is the mind.” (VI 199) Relatedly, elsewhere
Merleau‐Ponty describes the flesh as an “anonymity innate to myself.” (VI 139)
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example, with regard to nature within and without: “By the nature in us, we can
know Nature, and reciprocally it is from ourselves that living beings and even space
speak to us…”364 (N 205) Central to this notion is the ultimate continuity of the
visible and the invisible: “The superficial pellicle of the visible is only for my vision
and for my body. But the depth beneath this surface contains my body and hence
contains my vision. My body as a visible thing is contained within the full spectacle.”
(VI 138) Again, this is a continuity “interrupted,” but not before it makes itself
known as a continuity. Thus I would wholly agree with Fred Evans that “…the
direction of truth Merleau‐Ponty speaks of, even if it can never be fulfilled in
principle, does seem to put a premium on perceptual and epistemological
convergence rather than divergence…” (Evans, 191)
Of course, the notion of the flesh has generated many controversies and
misunderstandings, one of them being that Merleau‐Ponty is a monist and that the
flesh is, as already alluded to negatively above, a kind of ontological substrate.
Merleau‐Ponty certainly is a nondualist; he does not use the word, now associated
with strains of “Eastern” (especially Buddhist) philosophy, but I think this much can
be admitted. For example, he makes clear in one place: “There is no intelligible
world, there is the sensible world.”365 (VI 214) Yet from this alone it does not follow
that Merleau‐Ponty is a monist. His point in this quote, for example, is that the
“invisible” is of this world, it is “that which inhabits this world, sustains it, and
renders it visible, its own and interior possibility, the Being of this [visible, sensible]
Compare: VI 99 “…the homogeneity of the measured and the measuring implies that the subject
makes common cause with space.”
365 In some places, “Nature” is equated (or aligned) with the “sensible.” See, for example: “The
sensible, Nature, transcend the past present distinction…” (VI 267)
364
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being.” (VI 151) Or stated in other terms: “Meaning is invisible, but the invisible is
not the contradictory of the visible: the visible itself has an invisible inner
framework (membrure), and the in‐visible is the secret counterpart of the visible, it
appears only within it…” (VI 215) What we see here is a kind of reflexivity that is
totally foreign to, say, Spinoza’s monistic system, though to be fair, Spinoza’s “dual
attribute” theory is not wholly incompatible with Merleau‐Ponty’s intentions. The
matter is highly complex, chiefly because Merleau‐Ponty is trying to re‐draw the
terms of this very distinction between “monism” and “dualism.”
It is important, however, to do some disambiguation at this stage. There are
actually two different kinds of questions with respect to the question of “monism.”
There is monism (or pluralism) of types of being—Spinoza may not fit this category,
but Berkeley, James, or Quine do—and a monism of just how many beings there are,
that is, just one (a cosmic whole, substance, etc.) or many (monads, Aristotelian
substances, etc.). Regarding this latter question of monism or pluralism, what is
really key for Merleau‐Ponty is the principle of a unity in the many. Evans put it this
way:

“What [Merleau‐Ponty] offers is…closer to what we might call a ‘unity composed of difference’ rather
than a collection of separate, merely externally related entities or a unity formed through domination
by one of the elements of that unity—he eschews, in other words, both pluralism and monism.”
(Evans 191)

Merleau‐Ponty illustrates the idea of unity‐in‐many through the expression “total
part,” that is, a part of a whole which, even as it is a part, captures the whole, as it
were, “partially.” As an example of what Merleau‐Ponty means by “total part,” let us
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consider what he says about the case of the senses (the quote is long but very
important in illustrating what Merleau‐Ponty is getting at—possibly a truly
revolutionary new contribution to the ancient puzzle of the one‐and‐the‐many):

“Each ‘sense’ is a ‘world,’ i.e. absolutely incommunicable for the other senses, and yet construing a
something which, through its structure, is from the first open upon the world of the other senses, and
with them forms one sole Being. … The ‘World’ is this whole where each ‘part,’ when one takes it for
itself, suddenly opens unlimited dimensions—becomes a total part. Now this particularity of the
color, of the yellow, and this universality are not a contradiction, are together sensoriality itself: it is
by the same virtue that the color, the yellow, at the same time gives itself as a certain being and as a
dimension, the expression of every possible being.—What is proper to the sensible (as to language) is
to be representative of the whole, not by a sign‐signification relation, or by the immanence of the
parts in one another and in the whole, but because each part is torn up from the whole, comes with
its roots, encroaches upon the whole, transgresses the frontiers of the others.” (VI 218)

These powerful statements essentially comprise the heart of Merleau‐Ponty’s
answer to the question of the relation of the many—for example, many subjects, or
multiple orders of being—to the one or the whole, and what he says of the senses, or
of colors, applies to many other things, from the coordinated anatomical/behavioral
development of organisms, already looked at, to the “becoming of a painting” out of
many strokes of the brush and even to sexuality.366 It is important to stress all of this
because of Merleau‐Ponty’s own remark, quoted above, that the principle of
“totality” might be the central one in all philosophy.
This quasi‐holistic approach is characteristic of how Merleau‐Ponty deals
with issues of opposition and dialectic. For it in fact goes specifically to his
understanding of what constitutes the “complementarity” of opposites. “There are
There is something analogous in Merleau‐Ponty’s description of what Matisse’s method of
painting and the “body of behavior” in the organism have in common: “Threads are tied up, which
come from everywhere, and which constitute independent forms, and the same time, he finds that
these threads realize something which has a unity.” (N 154) Elsewhere: “Thus the sexual is
coextensive with the human not as a unique cause, but as a dimension outside of which nothing
exists.” (N 282)
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two ‘sides’ of an experience, conjugated and incompossible, but complementary.
Their unity is irrecusable; it is simply as the invisible hinge on which two
experiences are articulated—a self torn apart. [my emphasis] …contradiction,
understood as interior to Nature, must be assumed. We must admit the idea of an
operating negation in Nature...”367 (N 65‐66) Merleau‐Ponty’s use of the term
“complementarity,” is not, I believe, accidental. I believe it is a deliberate reference
to Bohr’s theory of quantum mechanics by the same name, a subject to which he
devotes a good amount of attention in the Nature lectures themselves. (N 89‐100) In
a sense, he applies what is true of sub‐atomic particles, in particular the symmetrical
applicability of mutually incompatible wave‐theory and corpuscular theory to the
description of elementary particles, to being itself: “…the two maps are complete,
and yet they do not merge into one. The two parts are total parts and yet not
superposable.” (VI 134) (Note again the idea of a “total part.”)
In an interesting kind of convergence, Husserl scholar Sebastian Luft has
expressed the view that Husserl’s philosophy as a whole, with its twin poles of the
“Cartesian Way” to the reduction and the “Life‐World” method, can itself be
summarized in terms of two incommensurable and yet complementary “maps”:
“Thus, the interpretation [I present] attempts to overcome the common assertion that there is a
‘contradiction’ between Husserl’s Cartesian position and his account of the life‐world. I have tried to
show that a philosophical thematization of the life‐world is not possible without a transcendental
question as to its origin in (inter‐)subjectivity. In Husserl’s eyes, both agendas are correlative. At the
same time, I would like to insist that Husserl’s Cartesian account of the subject and his life‐world
ontology present two distinct and in this sense, separate programs. They are projects Husserl
pursues with different aims: Whereas the ‘Cartesian Husserl’ pursues a path of scientific grounding
and foundationalism, the ‘life‐world Husserl’ is interested in what can been called a hermeneutics of
the world of everyday life. Both projects are set squarely against each other, not in the sense that
The notion that Being contains its own negation ties in with the second of Merleau‐Ponty’s lessons
learnt from the reversibility of touch—that is, the impossibility of pure coincidence or a simple
“identity of opposites.” (VI 250‐1)
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they contradict or cancel each other out, but in that they pursue two different agendas. They are
located on two different ‘maps.’ One can pursue one while completely neglecting the other.368

In this way, a distinctly Merleau‐Pontian concept (presumably independently
arrived at by Luft) ironically comes usefully to define the career arc of Husserl
himself.

IV. Conclusion

Merleau‐Ponty begins the Nature courses, as we have seen, with an
investigation into the history of philosophy. He later shifts his interest to an
examination of contemporary science. But these prima facie unconnected discourses
are, as is customary in Merleau‐Ponty’s singularly syncretic approach, united in a
common purpose. The conjunction is revealed in telling working note, in which the
philosopher speaks of what is to be discussed in VI:

“I must therefore show in the introduction that the being of science is itself a part or aspect of the
objectified Infinity [of Descartes] and that the Offenheit of the Umwelt is opposed to both of these [i.e.,
Cartesian ontology and science]. Whence the chapters on Descartes, Leibniz, Western ontology,
which indicate the historico‐intentional and ontological implications of the being of science.”369 (VI
176)

Luft, Sebastian. “Husserl’s Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction: Between Life‐World and
Cartesianism.” In Research in Phenomenology 34, 2004 (p. 226)
369 Relatedly: “I clarify my philosophical project by recourse to Descartes and Leibniz.” (VI 177)
368
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Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of Nature is “polymorphous.” Phenomena such as life and
animality, wholeness and organic form, growth and creativity, “natural” origins and
processes—these are all phenomena that reveal different clues about the non‐fully‐
constitutable core of the world and of our own humanity. Naturality does not
exhaust the meaning of Being, but it does encircle all beings in its berth, and
ultimately, no one ever fully breaks away from it, just as Merleau‐Ponty already
observed about the “natural attitude” of Husserl. Thus it is fitting to end with the
following quotation, which neatly summarizes Merleau‐Ponty’s attitude towards
nature and its place in ontology:

“Nature… By examining it, we have retrieved everything, not that everything is in nature, but because
everything is or becomes natural for us. There are no substantial differences between physical Nature,
life, and mind. [my emphasis.] We passed between causal‐realist thinking and philosophical idealism,
because we found in brute, savage, vertical, present Being a dimension that is not of representation
and not that of the In‐itself.” (N 212)
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Chapter Five: MerleauPonty and Husserl on the Question of the
Paradox of Subjectivity and Nature

I. Introduction

Merleau‐Ponty’s embrace of “paradox” is radical, both in the sense that it
goes to the heart of his philosophical project and in the sense that it is very thorough
indeed. It could be argued that post‐Kantian Continental philosophy, especially in
the twentieth century, has come to take a more favorable view of paradox than did
its predecessors; one may think here of Kierkegaard’s famous embrace of the
“absolute paradox” of Christ, Marcel’s “Mystery of Being,” Heidegger’s “hermeneutic
circle” and paradoxical “always already,” even aspects of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of
identity (as evidenced in the title of one of his major works, Oneself as Another). The
difference is that Merleau‐Ponty made of paradox a central thematic in its own right.
That the human mind is led to express or elucidate its situation in paradoxical
terms—something Merleau‐Ponty steadfastly maintains—is a momentous fact for
someone who argues, as Merleau‐Ponty does, for the intimacy of subjectivity and
Being itself. For it means that Being, and not only consciousness, is contradictory on
the inside. Does this mean Merleau‐Ponty rejects the law of non‐contradiction?
Merleau‐Ponty’s application of this law (which he rarely deals with in just those
terms) goes as far as the intelligibility of Being to rational thought goes; but he is
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willing to concede (and in fact insists) that Being in its primordiality is ineffable and
even necessarily so—and that, accordingly, rational thinking (“reflection,” “the
transcendental attitude”) is less than ultimate.
If truth is unavailable to us through concepts, however, it is nevertheless
availably unavailable. It does not merely elude us, it eludes us because it surrounds
us and penetrates us to the core. Moreover, there is a way in which thought can
understand itself and employ its concepts—through “dialectical” and “hyper‐
dialectical” thinking—that serves to bring the “contradictions” of unreflected Being
into a fruitful relationship with reflectivity. The result of this exchange are the
paradoxes of philosophy, whose rigorous expression is no less challenging than any
manner of “problem‐solving” that we could adopt.
By “Being” Merleau‐Ponty does not mean to say anything different than
“experience” as known in “perceptual faith.” Being, which can be equated to a large
extent with what we have been calling “Nature” (“wild Being”), is experienced and
“lived‐through,” indeed it may be “life” itself (or again “time,” the sine qua non of
lived‐experience as such) whose primordial unity‐in‐difference conceals a truth,
even a “logos” or language, that reveals itself, in the paradoxes of thought, precisely
as concealed. The sayability and intelligibility of core experientiality and what it
discloses is preserved, therefore, partially and as if in trace‐like outline, in the form
of the paradoxes of being, experience, time, mind, freedom, and so on—and these in
turn give life to philosophical thought, which arise and must return to the depths
they open up. Paradox is thus, in Merleau‐Ponty, both “problem” and, as it were,
“solution.” It is the question and the answer, the “mystery of being” as well as the
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explanation of the mystery. In this way, paradox is not intentional—it does not
“point beyond itself” to a telos, a purpose, a form, or a plan. Its finality is equally a
function of its originality—there is only the Beginning, as it were, the birth that
eludes time by creating it.
Philosophy is therefore misunderstood by those, including Husserl, who think
of it as an essentially “problem‐solving” enterprise. Merleau‐Ponty’s conception is
closer in this case to that of the later (circa Philosophical Investigations)
Wittgenstein, in that he would agree that philosophy is better used for the purpose
of “dissolving” philosophical puzzles than solving them. But Merleau‐Ponty would
not think of paradoxes as linguistic confusions, rather as moments of “contradiction”
or “crisis” signifying the break down and limits of signification before the
unsignifiable verity at the heart of the being of the world. Merleau‐Ponty and
Wittgenstein are perhaps equally insistent on the centrality of language to thought
and even human experience. In the case of the former, of course, one must always
keep in mind his famous thesis of the “primacy of perception,” a primacy that
ultimately expresses a “faith” in Being that is its own meaning or meaning‐fount,
from which language and its “ideal” meanings arise and, over time, also dissolve.
This is another way of saying that for Merleau‐Ponty, there is still, after all, an
“absolute,” a “real” that cannot be demarcated so much as lived, and it is promised in
the simplest act of perception, which, through the “phenomenon,” promises
disclosure of the world—the first contradiction (subjectivity and objectivity) that
the perceptual faith harmonizes in its effortless way. Merleau‐Ponty is to this extent
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a “realist”—though the “real” can never be known purely as the real, but only that
which escapes language linguistically, so to speak.
The later Wittgenstein is of course notoriously mute about metaphysical
questions, but for Merleau‐Ponty, the knowable unknowability of Being is the
overriding theme of all reflection, while the struggles of philosophy itself are taken
as symptomatic not of pathological habits of linguistic behavior but, at their best and
most authentically approached, of the rigors of thinking through the dialectical
structure of phenomena.
In this final, culminating chapter of the present dissertation, my focus is
mostly on Merleau‐Ponty, but I also briefly examine and compare Husserl’s
approach to paradox to Merleau‐Ponty’s through the former’s famous discussion in
the Crisis370 of the “paradox of subjectivity.” Fundamentally, I will show that while
for Merleau‐Ponty paradox itself plays a fundamental role in explicating the
meaning of phenomenology, for Husserl, phenomenology is precisely a means to
solve paradoxes—a method to end all philosophical disputes, in fact.371 In this way
Husserl represents the mainstream, one might say, of philosophy in the “Western”
philosophical tradition—as well as, importantly for the themes of this dissertation,
the implicit paradigm of “scientific thinking,” which sees itself in similarly “problem‐
solving” terms. There is, of course, an interesting way in which even Husserl

Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Tr. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1970. Hereafter “Crisis.”
371 See: Husserl, Edmund. Encyclopaedia Britannica Article. In: Collected Works, Vol. 6. Tr. Thomas
Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997
370
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embraces something like the centrality of “paradox”—but only in the sense of its
being a “reversal of common sense”; this is a case of simple homonymy.
Merleau‐Ponty’s increasingly sophisticated reliance on dialectic becomes
entirely explicit in The Visible and the Invisible372, in which he endorses it
wholeheartedly, while trying to distinguish it from its Hegelian (and even Sartrean)
versions. Thus I briefly examine this philosophical appropriation and the ways in
which Merleau‐Ponty does and does not conceive of philosophy as a dialectic.
Finally, and relatedly, I look at Merleau‐Ponty’s use and analysis of the notion of
“reflection,” along with “hyper‐reflection,” his label for the philosophical attitude
once philosophy has been transformed from a problem‐solving to a self‐
problematizing (and thereby “self‐recovering”) enterprise.373

II. MerleauPonty’s Philosophy of Paradox

A. Overview of MerleauPonty’s References to Paradox
The seed of Merleau‐Ponty’s approach to paradox, and Being as a paradoxical
phenomenon that is (quasi‐)intelligible in thought through a movement of

Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Visible and the Invisible. Tr. Alphonso Lingis. Northwestern
University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 1969. Hereafter “VI.”
373 Note: Merleau‐Ponty achieves great lucidity when it comes to his mature epistemological views. In
fact, he speaks more clearly for his own positions than any paraphrase could do. For this reason, I
rely in this chapter more than I have to this point on lengthy direct quotations from the source
himself. This is particularly the case for certain sections from the VI, especially chapter 1, “Reflection
and Interrogation.”
372
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controlled contradiction (dialectic), are to be found already in this dense and
startling passage, which is worth quoting in full, from The Primacy of Perception374 :

“It is true that we arrive at contradictions when we describe the perceived world. And it is also true
that if there were such a thing as a non‐contradictory thought, it would exclude the world of
perception as a simple appearance. But the question is precisely to know whether there is such a
thing as logically coherent thought or thought in the pure state. This is the question Kant asked
himself… One of Kant’s discoveries, whose consequences we have not yet fully grasped, is that all our
experience of the world is throughout a tissue of concepts which lead to irreducible contradictions375
if we attempt to take them in an absolute sense or transfer them into pure being, and that they
nevertheless found the structure of all phenomena, or everything which is for us. … I wish only to
point out that the accusation of contradiction is not decisive, if the acknowledged contradiction
appears as the very condition of consciousness. [my emphasis] … There is a vain form of contradiction
which consists in affirming two theses which exclude one another at the same time and under the
same aspect. … There is the sterile non‐contradiction of formal logic [versus] the justified
contradictions of transcendental logic. The objection with which we are concerned would be
admissible only if we could put a system of eternal truths in the place of the perceived world, freed
from its contradictions.” (Primacy 18)

That we cannot put up such a system of “eternal truths” is less a criticism of
Husserlian method, perhaps, which arguably already problematizes the question of
“eternity” through its embrace of originary temporality, than of classical
metaphysical thought, particularly its anti‐paradoxical and anti‐dialectical
character. The above‐quoted passage states all of the fundamental themes of
paradoxical thinking that Merleau‐Ponty would continue to deepen and that, finally,
come to a startlingly fresh new expression in his later writings. Merleau‐Ponty
makes it clear that he is not interested in the sterile contradiction of “A and not A”
for its own sake. It is only under certain conditions, forced upon us by the exigencies
of lived experience, that there arise the “justified contradictions” of philosophy,

Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences.” Tr.
James M. Edie. In The Primacy of Perception. Ed. John Wild. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1964. Hereafter “Primacy.”
375 Compare: “Every attempt at elucidation brings us back to the dilemmas.” (VI 11) It is interesting
that one of the early words he uses for his method is in fact “elucidation.” (See, for example: VI 23)
374
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beginning already with the awakening of reflection from the oblivion of our pure
“perceptual faith,” Merleau‐Ponty’s term of art for the condition of natural
consciousness and, indeed, the natural attitude:

“We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind express a faith
common to the natural man and the philosopher—the moment he opens his eyes; they refer to a
deep‐seated set of mute ‘opinions’ implicated in our lives. But what is strange about this faith is that
if we seek to articulate it into theses or statements, if we ask ourselves what is this we, what seeing is,
and what thing or world is, we enter into a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions… What
Augustine said of time—that it is perfectly familiar to each, but that none of us can explain it to the
others—must be said of the world.” (VI 3, my emphasis on latter)

Merleau‐Ponty is widely known as a philosopher of “ambiguity,” as I have
mentioned, but less so as one of “paradox.” Yet the contradictions of philosophy are
organized, dialectical, and fit a pattern. Ambiguity, in Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy,
appears to me as a more inchoate‐sounding version of what he means by “paradox”;
or alternately, it has a different discursive function. That is, to say (for example) that
the human being is an “ambiguous” phenomenon is to deny, in essence, various
strictly delineated and one‐sided descriptions of him/her or his or her experience
(“intellectualism,” “empiricism,” “naturalism”). But it does not clearly pose an
alternative view. Since Merleau‐Ponty has no monolithic alternative, the alternative
is something like “paradox” or “justified contradiction”—that is, a logos of ambiguity.
Merleau‐Ponty’s repeated positive invocations of paradox, paradoxical thinking,
dilemmas, contradiction, and dialecticity are constant throughout his writings—but
initially only in the background, almost like an after‐thought. This changes as
Merleau‐Ponty seeks to emphasize that honest reflection can no longer pretend to
do philosophy in the manner that tradition has imagined it up to this point—that is,

214
with the tacit assumption that it can in reflection maintain a hold on the paradoxical
truth, so effortlessly inhabited by everyday pre‐reflective life.
It is impossible to mention all the ways in which Merleau‐Ponty embraces
paradox or all of the countless paradoxes he mentions, but it is worth noting that his
main preoccupation—perception—was explained by him as fundamentally
paradoxical already in the Phenomenology of Perception, in this case with respect to
immanence and transcendence, the paradox mentioned as central to
phenomenology.376 He repeats the same idea of the paradoxicality of perception in
Primacy and refers to the “internal paradox of my perception” in VI377, where he also
speaks of the “paradoxes of vision” and the “figured enigmas, the thing and the
world.”378 The essay “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” devoted to Husserl, also
stresses enigmas of perception as well as the hidden/revealed duality of things.379 In
another place we can find a reference to the “fertile contradiction of human
consciousness.”380 In the “Metaphysical in Man,” Merleau‐Ponty characterizes the
task of metaphysics as one of inquiring into paradoxes, which, he explains in a
footnote, he even outright calls contradictions:

Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Tr. Colin Smith. New York: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1962. Hereafter “PP.” (p. 425) Note also the wording he uses in the same passage,
further down: “At the level of being it should never be intelligible that the subject should be both
naturans and naturatus, infinite and finite. But we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we
relate to the paradox of time, those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, we shall understand
that beyond these there is nothing to understand.” (my emphasis)
377 VI, 11
378 Ibid., 4
379 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. “The Philosopher and His Shadow.” Tr. Richard M. McCleary. In Signs.
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964 (pp. 167‐8)
380 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Sense and NonSense. Tr. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus.
Northwestern University Press, 1964. p. 96 Hereafter “SNS”
376
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“I have the right to consider the contradictions of my life as a thinking and incarnate subject, finite
and capable of truth, as ultimate and true [my emphasis] because I have experienced them and
because they are interconnected in the unquestionable perception of a thing or in the experience of a
truth. I can no longer introduce a ‘transcendence in immanence’ behind me as Husserl did (even
transcendence qualified as hypothetical), for I am not God, and I cannot verify the co‐existence of
these two attributes in any indubitable experience.”381

And in one of Merleau‐Ponty’s lesser known essays on Montaigne382, in the
beginning of the essay, he chides Descartes for trying to “solve” paradox instead of
accepting it, a very telling sentiment. (Montaigne, 201)
Due to the limited focus of this dissertation I have had mostly to bracket the
question of intersubjectivity, but here, too, Merleau‐Ponty thinks in terms of
paradox. In Sorbonne lectures, it seems that Merleau‐Ponty accepts that there is a
“contradiction” in the fact that I cannot experience other people, yet naturally do
experience them, in the course of life.383 There is also a “contradiction” of self/other
at the heart of intersubjectivity as well. (Toadvine, 248). Interesting here is the
methodology of simply accepting a contradictory situation and proceeding from
there. In the “Preface” of PP he discusses the “paradox and dialectic” of the “Ego and
the Alter.” (PP xiii) Among other things, “the other” is paradoxical as an “I” that is
“not I” (not me), as well as an “other” that is “not other” (for I cannot be myself
without the other). All human solidarity, and all human violence, one might say,
stem essentially from the same source, the paradox of the other (or
intersubjectivity).

“The Metaphysical In Man.” In: SNS (p. 96)
Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. “Reading Montaigne.” Tr. Richard C. McCleary. In Signs. Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1964 (pp. 198‐210). Hereafter “Montaigne.”
383 Reference found in: Toadvine, Ted. “Merleau‐Ponty’s Reading of Husserl: A Chronological
Overview.” In MerleauPonty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree. Dodrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 (pp. 227‐286). Hereafter “Toadvine.”
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Merleau‐Ponty’s acceptance of paradox—even contradiction, in the sense we
have seen—can be gleaned indirectly as well, for example through his commentary
on other philosophers. We have already seen this with Kant and Montaigne. But in
his already‐examined critique of Bergson from the Nature lectures, for example, he
comments, “We cannot reproach Bergson for this contradiction, but he does not give
it the place that it merits.”384 In Bergson’s voice Merleau‐Ponty in one place remarks
favorably that: “Here, perception is contradiction realized.”385 Or again, on Coghill’s
experiment, also discussed in Chapter Four:

“Coghill goes further. He shows that the maturation of the organism and the emergence of behavior
are one and the same thing. For the axolotl, to exist from head to tail and to swim are the same thing.
This double phenomenon, which amounts to a paradox, develops at the same time in two contradictory
directions. …” (N 144, my emphasis)

Merleau‐Ponty even calls the axolotl lizard itself a paradox! (N 144‐5). Finally, in his
critical commentary on Guéroult’s conciliating approach to Descartes, also in the
Nature lectures, he comments that “The contradiction [of the two orders, subjective
and objective] is constitutive of the human. The domain of the human is always
equivocal...” (N 129)

Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France. Compiled and with notes
from Dominique Séglard. Tr. Robert Vallier. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 2003.
Hereafter the “Nature lectures” in the body of text or “N” in citations.
385 Ibid., p. 57
384
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B. Paradox and the “Perceptual Faith”
If the basic paradox of perception is the question of transcendence‐and‐
immanence, as we have seen described above, the fact is that in perceptual faith, this
is not a problem as such:

“The ‘natural’ man holds onto both ends of the chain, thinks at the same time that his perception
enters into the things and that it is formed this side of his body. Yet coexist as the two convictions do
without difficulty in the exercise of life, once reduced to theses and to propositions they destroy one
another and leave us in confusion.” (VI 8)

Merleau‐Ponty interestingly calls our natural certitude “unjustifiable”: an
“unjustifiable certitude of a sensible world common to us that is the seat of truth
within us.”386 It is “unjustifiable” of course because it is primordial—presupposed in
any justification (especially the justification of the “skeptic,” which we will see
pointed out below).
Merleau‐Ponty also calls perceptual faith “openness upon being.” (VI 88) But
openness entails not only access but occlusion: access to world exists side by side
with occultation (inaccess): “…these two possibilities, which the perceptual faith
keeps side by side within itself, do not nullify one another.” (VI 28) We have already
of course visited this notion of a side by side “contradiction” in which the sides
nevertheless do not nullify each other—Merleau‐Ponty has called this
“complementarity,” after the same notion in quantum mechanics (with whose
lessons he continues to be preoccupied). Thus “complementarity” and “paradox”

386

See also: VI 14 “insoluble antinomies” in perceptual faith.
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(“contradiction”) are closely intertwined, and together they begin to reveal new
folds in Merleau‐Ponty’s updated conception of “dialectic.”
As we saw in the Nature lectures, Merleau‐Ponty continues to regard the
phenomenon of wholeness or totality as a clue to not only the structure of being but
also the inability of thought to think Being otherwise than paradoxically. Totality is
of “another order” he states in one place, in this case in terms of binocular
perception. (VI 7) Just as one eye sees and so does the other, even as neither by itself
sees the “miracle of totality” and depth presented in perception (VI 8), so
philosophers are trapped in one‐sided ways to grasp Being: “…‘objective’ and
‘subjective’ [should be] recognized as two orders hastily constructed within a total
experience, whose context must be restored in all clarity.” (VI 20) Note that it is the
context whose clarity is to be restored, not the total experience itself. The experience
is already clarified, ironically, through the contradictions to which it gives rise in
philosophy, for these are “complementary” descriptions of the whole itself—we
have already seen how Merleau‐Ponty disposes of the “problem of the one and the
many” in this way.
As a totality, “the perceived world is beneath or beyond this antinomy [of
being‐object and being‐subject].” (VI 22) It is this fact which calls for a “…re‐
examination of the notions of ‘subject’ and ‘object.’” Says Merleau‐Ponty, “Every
question, even that of simple cognition, is part of the central question that is
ourselves, of that appeal for totality [my emphasis] to which no objective being
answers...” (VI 104) Against Husserl’s framing of phenomenology as a “rigorous
science,” Merleau‐Ponty offers, “Philosophy is not a science, because science
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believes it can soar over its object and holds the correlation of knowledge with
being as established, whereas philosophy is the set of questions wherein he who
questions is himself implicated in the question.” (VI 27) But even if philosophy is not
able to grasp its “object” in self‐coincident reflection (not least because the
reflection must take account of itself as a factor), it can and must—as we will see, in
regards to “hyper‐reflection”—take stock of its situation and find expression for the
inexpressible “totality” in which it finds itself always already. “Such is the total
situation that a philosophy must account for. It will do so only by admitting the
double polarity of reflection [reflection and perception/reflected and unreflected]
and by admitting that, as Hegel said, to retire into oneself is also to leave oneself.”
(VI 49)
The winding manner in which philosophy does and does not have a way to
address the contradictorily self‐unified “subjective‐objective” reality of the pre‐
reflective perceptual situation leads Merleau‐Ponty to offer a twist on the Sartrean
notion, derided by that author as a morbid imaginal construct identical to the “God”
notion of Christianity, of the “In‐Itself‐For‐Itself.” Of course it is Hegel who
announced his system as one in which “substance” becomes “subject” (tying the
latter to the historical advent of Christianity). Merleau‐Ponty finds a way to steer
between Sartre and Hegel on this point, while also trying to maintain a distance
from Kant’s negativist/idealist interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic:

“The truth of the Sartrean In‐Itself‐for‐itself is the intuition of pure Being and the negintuition of
Nothingness. It seems to us on the contrary that it is necessary to recognize in it the solidity of myth,
that is, of an operative imaginary, which is part of our institution, and which is indispensable for the
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definition of Being itself. With this difference, we are indeed speaking of the same thing…” (VI 85, my
emphasis; check)

C. Paradox and Philosophy
Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of paradox or contradiction can easily be
misunderstood and caricatured. One could always argue with a “pro‐paradox
position” that it “permits everything”387 or is too schematic and abstract, allowing all
binaries to be swallowed up within it, but that is precisely why Merleau‐Ponty’s
phenomenological method, which at least strives to be true to experience, is so
important. Dialectical logic is a logic of the things themselves.388
Merleau‐Ponty’s prioritization of paradox shapes the way he understands the
nature of the philosophical enterprise. He approvingly states that “philosophy [at its
best] becomes the enterprise of describing living paradoxes.”389 Philosophy simply
“interrogates” the perceptual faith. Or, even more precisely, “philosophy is the
perceptual faith questioning itself about itself.” (VI 103) In another place Merleau‐
Ponty comments: “Philosophy believed it could overcome the contradictions of the
perceptual faith by suspending it in order to disclose the motives that support it.”
(VI 50) Merleau‐Ponty thus also speaks of the “reflective vice of transforming the

For discussion of such a critique from a contemporary philosopher, see: Sainsbury, R. M.
Paradoxes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995 (pp. 136‐7)
388 In support of this idea, see for example on N 94‐5, where Merleau‐Ponty expressly rejects the
notion of refuting determinism with a “dogmatic indeterminism” which, as it were, “logically
disproves” determinism, showing something “contradictory” in it. See also first full paragraph on 92.
Also note the following remarks: “We want therefore to open logic without considering it simply as a
simply formal way of defining physical reality.” (VI 166)
389 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France 19521960. Tr. John
O’Neill. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 1970 (p. 108) Here he also cites Heraclitus
and calls for an “open Being”—one of many such auspicious references to the master philosopher of
paradox himself.
387
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openness of the world into an assent of self with self, the institution of the world
into an ideality of the world, the perceptual faith into acts or attitudes of a subject
that does not participate in the world.” (VI 51) The implicit critique of Husserl in
these words is evident; notice also the appeal once again to the “opacity” of the self
to self which must accompany the reflective flight from perceptual faith.
We will revisit the issue of Merleau‐Ponty’s reconception of the task of
philosophy in the future section on reflection.

III. Husserl and Paradox

Husserl recognizes plenty of “paradoxical enigmas” in his own presentation
of phenomenology.390 His approach to them is typical of philosophical tradition,
however, stemming all the way back to Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Book III), in seeking
to remove these enigmas in the name of truth and clarity.391 Husserl never questions
the notion that the paradoxes, which appear only “at first [as] insoluble” (Crisis, 175)
need to be “resolved” once and for all, lest his own project of transcendental
phenomenology fail. Husserl could not, for example, be more explicit about how he
feels about paradoxes when he criticizes the sciences in the “Epilogue” to Ideas II
(Ideas II, 427‐8), where he claims that their resulting “paradoxes” are precisely the

Crisis 174
Aristotle, Complete Works of Aristotle. Tr. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press, 1971. (pp.
1572‐1584)

390
391
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deleterious result of being “unphilosophical” in the required sense. When proper
procedures are taken, “In such a case there cannot be any unclear, problematic
concepts or any paradoxes.”392 (Ideas II, 428, my emphasis)
All of this becomes pertinent in the Crisis when Husserl confronts his own
philosophy and its apparent paradoxes, those which critics had on seemingly good
grounds pointed out. In this text, the paradox Husserl pays the greatest attention to
is termed memorably by him the “paradox of subjectivity.” How is it, the paradox
goes, that the entire world is constituted by only one part of the world, namely the
part that consists of human subjects—that is, “real” human beings, the “community”
of monads as they are elsewhere described? Of course, very much the same paradox
was on Husserl’s mind even in Ideas I:

“Thus, on the one hand consciousness is said to be absolute in which everything transcendent and,
therefore, ultimately the whole psychophysical world, becomes constituted; and, on the other hand,
consciousness is said to be a subordinate real event within that world. How can these statements be
reconciled?” (Ideas I 124)

The “solution” to the paradox (a “paradox which can be sensibly resolved”—Crisis
180) takes a familiar form in the Crisis. Husserl merely reaffirms the distinction he
has by now made long ago and many times since, namely between empirical‐real
human subjects, each of whom also transcendentally co‐constitutes the world (along
with other human subjects), and the transcendental subjectivity/intersubjectivity
for whom individual, particular egos are merely “phenomena,” ego‐poles of
noematic‐noematic a priori correlativity of constitution.
Husserl follows this by announcing that he sees spread out before him the “promised” land. (Ideas
II, 429)
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“Concretely, each ‘I’ is not merely an ego‐pole but an ‘I’ with all its accomplishments and
accomplished acquisitions, including the world as existing and being‐such. But in the epoché and in
the pure focus upon the functioning of the ego‐pole, and thence upon the concrete whole of life and of
its intentional intermediary and final structures, it follows eo ipso that nothing human is to be found,
neither soul nor psychic life nor real psychophysical human beings; all this belongs to the
‘phenomenon,’ to the world as constituted pole.” (Crisis 183)

Husserl’s solution, in other words, comes down to a distinction between “real” and
“phenomenal” senses in which we can understand the “I” of the human subject.
There is here a truly irresolvable paradox of subjectivity only if we are forced to
understand the transcendental “I” as identical, without qualification, with the real
“I.” This issue truly is central to Husserl’s enterprise. “If the paradox…were
insoluble,” Husserl explains, “it would mean that an actually universal and radical
epoché could not be carried out at all, that is, for the purposes of a science rigorously
bound to it.” (Crisis 180). For phenomenology would reduce to psychology. It is
interesting to remember that Merleau‐Ponty denied precisely the possibility of a
“radical” or universal epoché, which shows from a certain angle why he did not have
to worry about Husserl’s version of the “paradox of subjectivity.”
The distinction as philosophers between Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty can be
illustrated through contrasting statements they make on their ultimate task.
Husserl’s relentless goal is to understand, and to him this means, to a large extent,
framing things eidetically—that is, seeing them in their conceptual form:

“From the beginning the phenomenologist lives in the paradox of having to look upon the obvious as
questionable, as enigmatic, and of henceforth being unable to have any other scientific theme than
that of transforming the universal obviousness of the being of the world—for him the greatest of
enigmas—into something intelligible.” (Crisis 180)
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Of course Merleau‐Ponty, in accepting the reduction, parallels Husserl when he says
that philosophy “dispossesses humanity…by inviting it to think of itself as an
enigma.” (VI 3) But he follows this up with the distinctly un‐Husserlian sentiment:
“This is the way things are and nobody can do anything about it.” (VI 4)
In contrast to Husserl, that is, for Merleau‐Ponty the obviousness of the
world, or rather the “perceptual faith” with which we take the world and our
relation with it, in their essential oneness, for granted, is, strictly speaking, beyond
intelligibility. It is interesting in this regard that Husserl can tacitly concede this
point, at least in a certain limited respect, yet without accepting its consequences.
Thus he writes,

“Not even the single philosopher by himself, within the epoché, can hold fast to anything in this
elusively flowing life, repeat it always with the same content, and become so certain of its this‐ness
and its being‐such that he could describe it, document it, so to speak (even for his own person alone),
in definitive statements.” (Crisis 178)

It is more than apparent that Husserl thrives on the self‐image of being a
“paradoxical” philosopher in the sense of militating against common opinion and the
“naturalistic” and “realistic” biases of the common man and the scientist. But for his
part, Merleau‐Ponty shows little patience for resting content with this sort of strict
reversality. Consider for example his remarks on the ways people interpret the new
physics: “Thus the ‘strange’ notions of the new physics are strange… only in the
sense that a paradoxical opinion surprises common sense, that is, without
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instructing it in depth and without changing anything of its categories.”393 (VI 17, my
emphasis) This, in essence, is exactly what I have argued goes on in Ideas II with
respect to that text’s hybrid mixture of anti‐naturalism and tacit naturalism, which
conspire to occlude asking the meaningful questions of nature left to Merleau‐Ponty
(and others) to raise. With a critical tone, Merleau‐Ponty summarizes Husserl’s
attitude towards philosophy and paradox alike in the following manner:

“Thus, with the correlation between thought and the object of thought set up as a principle, there is
established a philosophy that knows neither difficulties nor problems nor paradoxes nor reversals:
once and for all, I have grasped within myself, with the pure correlation…the truth of my life, which is
also the truth of the world and of the other lives.” (VI 48)

IV. The Paradox of Reflection

A. The Reflective Attitude
The complex, ambiguous relationship between Merleau‐Ponty and Husserl,
which we have examined at length in Chapter 3 and elsewhere, becomes once again
strongly apparent in Merleau‐Ponty’s remarks on reflection. Consider the following
quote:

Merleau‐Ponty makes similarly derogatory remarks on the superficial version of “paradoxical”
thinking in the Nature lectures. See: N 108, 114 . The references here are to the “paradoxes”
generated by relativity theory.

393
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“Thought cannot ignore its apparent history, if it is not to install itself beneath the whole of our
experience, in a pre‐empirical order where it would no longer merit its name; it must put to itself the
problem of the genesis of its own meaning.” (VI 12)

On the one hand, this is the very task of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology in its
more mature phases, a “questioning‐back” of thought by thought. But Merleau‐Ponty
places a certain emphasis on “experience,” which, in its pure pre‐reflective form,
thought cannot—without incurring certain pregnant contradictions that must stay
with it as reminders of its distance‐in‐proximity from the origin—truly access:

“Through the conversion to reflection, which leaves nothing but ideates, cogitata, or noemata
subsisting before the pure subject, we finally leave the equivocations of the perceptual faith, which
paradoxically assured us that we have access to the things themselves and that we gain access to
them through the intermediary of the body, which therefore opened us up to the world only by
sealing us up in the succession of our private events.” (VI 30)

The “solution” to the antinomy, notes Merleau‐Ponty, is “ideality,” for which “the
world is numerically one with my cogitatum and with that of the others insofar as it
is ideal (ideal identity, beneath the several and the one).” But this is not a genuine
solution, inasmuch as it is actually deployed as a dodge of the actual problem:

“This movement of reflection will always at first sight be convincing: in a sense it is imperative, it is
truth itself, and one does not see how philosophy could dispense with it. The question is whether it
has brought philosophy to the harbor, whether the universe of thought to which it leads is really an
order that suffices to itself and puts an end to every question. Since the perceptual faith is a paradox
[my emphasis], how could I remain with it?” (VI 31‐2)

It is clear by now that the “perceptual faith” is another name for the “natural
attitude,” conceived now in its fullest, and not fully elucidatable, depths. And
reflection, as I have maintained all along, is what Merleau‐Ponty means by the
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“transcendental” attitude394, and clearly, it cannot for him pull effectively
consciousness out of its immersion in the world, its pre‐reflective home: “And if I do
not remain with [perceptual faith], what else can I do except re‐enter into myself
and seek there the abode of truth?” (VI 31) The problem with “philosophies of
reflection” is that they try to “comprehend” the self‐world bond by “undoing” it first,
then falsely trying to re‐fabricate it: “…the reflection recuperates everything except
itself as an effort of recuperation, it clarifies everything except its own role. The
mind’s eye too has its blind spot…” (VI 33) Furthermore, “reflective
thought…performs all its operations under the guarantee of the totality that it
claims to engender” (VI 33), whereas clearly the totality exceeds it.
It is clear that the “reflective attitude” applies to Descartes, Kant, Husserl, and
even Hegel in different ways. The moment of recovery or recuperation represented
by reflection, and ultimately the self‐interrogation of thought in the natural attitude
that Husserl identifies as the phenomenological reduction, is problematic, indeed
paradoxical395, insofar as it contains a moment of disruption or “non‐coincidence”396
which we have seen before: “What is given is not a massive and opaque world, or a

If there still is any doubt about this, Merleau‐Ponty’s own words should put it to rest: “With one
stroke the philosophy of reflection metamorphoses the effective world into a transcendental field; in
doing so, it only puts me back at the origin of a spectacle that I could never have had unless,
unbeknown to myself, I organized it.” (VI 44)
395 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France 19521960. Tr. John
O’Neill. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 1970 (p. 106): Reduction “involves a
paradox.”
396 Merleau‐Ponty makes the point that philosophy is more or less a translation. One might go so far
as to say that the problems of translation are coextensive, for Merleau‐Ponty, with those of his style
of philosophy, which effects a “translation” of the “mute” sense of nature/being into the language of
concepts (i.e., language in its propositional‐cognitive role). For a powerful and relevant examination
of the issue of translation from within the phenomenological‐hermeneutical tradition see:
Vandevelde, Pol. The Task of the Interpreter: Text, Meaning, and Negotiation. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2005
394
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universe of adequate thought; it is a reflection which turns back over the density of
the world in order to clarify it, but which, coming second, reflects back to it only its
own light.” (VI 35, my emphasis) Merleau‐Ponty’s verdict:

“This whole reflective analysis is not false, but still naïve, as long as it dissimulates from itself its own
mainspring, and as long as, in order to constitute the world, it is necessary to have a notion of the
world as pre‐constituted—as long as the procedure is in principle delayed behind itself.” (VI 34)

Merleau‐Ponty does consider challenges to this point of view. For example,
he addresses the key challenge that says that how reflection gets to its perch is
irrelevant, as the process is like a ladder that can be kicked away; but he notes on
the contrary that in that case, “there [would be] no longer the originating and the
derived” and hence no “philosophy of reflection,” strictly speaking, at all. (VI 35) In
other words, the “ladder” is built into the definition of reflectivity in relation to
something like “first‐order (unreflected) experience.”
Yet he does not endorse quietism, either. “It is a question not of putting that
perceptual faith in place of reflection, but on the contrary of taking into account the
total situation, which involves reference from the one to the other.” (VI 35, my
emphasis) (Recall that we have seen this reference to the “total” situation above.)
This is of course exactly what sets up the problematic of nature—namely, the
problem of a totality that cannot, in terms of spirit, fully envelop itself, but which
knows itself to be bonded, rooted, and even ensconced therein. That bond is of
course exactly what makes possible the “truth”—even as the “truth” in this deeper
ontological sense (deeper than linguistic‐conceptual truth) devolves into
contradictory concepts when we attempt to express it linguistically‐logically. The
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unity of this bond, a pre‐reflective unity that transcends, finally, the distinction
between “identity” and “non‐identity” that preoccupies the German Idealists, is
irrecoverable: “…the relation between a thought and its object…contains neither the
whole nor even the essential of our commerce with the world…which we shall here
call the openness upon the world (ouverture au monde)…”397 (VI 35)

B. “HyperReflection”
So what does Merleau‐Ponty oppose to reflection, pure and simple, without
“replacing” reflection (the transcendental attitude) with “perceptual faith” (the
natural attitude)? His answer is “Hyper‐reflection.” Hyper‐reflection is thus, I would
propose, a kind of “third attitude” to match the “third way” Merleau‐Ponty mentions
elsewhere: a “natural‐transcendental” attitude if you will, which comes to being an
awareness of what Heidegger calls “radical finitude.”398 In Merleau‐Ponty’s parlance,
what needs to be grasped is, as usual, the primacy of perception.

“To found the latter [perception] on the former [reflection], and the de facto perception on the
essence of perception such as it appears to reflection, is to forget the reflection itself as a distinct act
of recovery. In other words, we are catching sight of another operation besides the conversion to
reflection, more fundamental than it, of a sort of hyperreflection (surréflexion) that would also take
itself and the changes it introduces into the spectacle into account. It accordingly would not lose sight
of the brute thing and the brute perception and would not finally efface them, would not cut the

It seems that for Merleau‐Ponty, quantum mechanics shows that there is no “representation of
reality” through measurement, exactly in the same way (perhaps) that thought itself (as reflection)
cannot “retrieve” nature. (N 94‐5) But it is not simply a matter of its being “unable” to retrieve it, in
the way “God” (an intellectus archetypus) for example, could. It is very important that even God could
not retrieve it, because Nature itself is in virtue of itself irrecoverable, a “permanent past.”
398 In some senses, it could also be conceived as an answer to Foucault’s critique of the
“transcendental‐empirical doublet” from The Order of Things. See: Foucault, Michel. The Order of
Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York: Vintage Books, 1994 (p. 318)
397
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organic bonds between the perception and the thing perceived with a hypothesis of inexistence.”399
(VI 38)

The task for philosophy, by implication, is to think the world of transcendence in its
transcendence, difficultly and even impossibly, using “the significations of words to
express, beyond themselves, our mute contact with the things, when they are not yet
things said.” We might call this the “paradox of reflection”: “The reflection finds
itself therefore in the strange situation of simultaneously requiring and excluding an
inverse movement of constitution.” (VI 45)400
Merleau‐Ponty finds in his notion of “hyper‐reflection” a way to critique
Husserl’s idealistic interpretation of phenomenological method.401 What the notion
that every transcendental reduction is also an eidetic reduction means (a Husserlian
principle we have quoted elsewhere), for him, is that we cannot capture the
“concrete flux” of existence. To reflect in Husserl’s stark, transcendental sense is to

“…disengage from the things, perceptions, world, and perception of the world, by submitting them to
a systematic variation, the intelligible nuclei that resist… It therefore by principle leaves untouched
the twofold problem of the genesis of the existent world and of the genesis of the idealization
performed by reflection and finally evokes and requires as its foundation a hyperreflection where the
ultimate problems would be taken seriously.” (VI 45‐6)

Compare: 45 reflection: “[as] reflection, re‐turn, re‐conquest, or re‐covery, it cannot flatter itself
that it would simply coincide with a constitutive principle already at work in the spectacle of the
world…”
400 Compare to Merleau‐Ponty’s description of philosophy as concerning the “far‐off as far‐off.” (VI
102)
401 Seebohm mentions that there are hints of “paradox” and “contradiction” in Merleau‐Ponty’s
methodology, but claims (I think correctly) that it has more to do with the “what” than the “how.”
See: Seebohm, Thomas M. “The Phenomenological Movement: A Tradition without Method? Merleau‐
Ponty and Husserl.” In MerleauPonty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 (p. 66)
399
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Note that even here Merleau‐Ponty does not strictly speaking oppose either the
eidetic or phenomenological reductions; he simply wants to push further and
deeper, in an effort to be truly true to the “things themselves” and their paradoxical
(because accomplished through difference) unity with us. As Langer points out
helpfully, Merleau‐Ponty’s later procedure of thinking the origin, using reflection to
go beyond it, is radically paradoxical only in a way that matches our own (i.e.,
humanity’s own) paradoxical being‐in‐the‐world in the first place.402 (Langer 165‐6)
Indeed, once again, as we have come to expect, Merleau‐Ponty finds the reversal of
the Husserlian impulse in Husserl’s own phenomenological imperative: “In
recognizing that every reflection is eidetic and, as such, leaves untouched the
problem of our unreflected being and that of the world, Husserl simply agrees to
take up the problem which the reflective attitude ordinarily avoids—the
discordance between its initial situation and its ends.” (VI 46) Even in an earlier
essay, Merleau‐Ponty makes a similar point, saying, with what Merleau‐Ponty
interprets as the mature Husserl: “We must, rather, become aware of this paradox—
that we never free ourselves from the particular except by taking over a situation
that is all at once, and inseparably, both limitation and access to the universal.”403
“Hyper‐reflection” becomes another name of philosophy itself. It takes
account of dimensions of faciticity, spatiality and temporality, and ideality alike,
sparing no dimension of existence in its ray of regard. (VI 46) Here is the “third
dimension” where the antinomies of reflective analysis are, in a sense, lifted. But
Langer, Monika M. MerleauPonty’s Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary.
Tallahassee: The Florida University Press, 1989. (164‐5)
403 Merleau‐Ponty. “Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man.” Tr. John Wild. In The Primacy of
Perception. Ed. John Wild. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964. (p. 82)
402
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hyper‐reflection takes place through, and not outside of, reflection itself; in order to
see that which “delivers [the thinker] over to perception and to phantasms…he must
reflect. But as soon as he does so, beyond the world itself and beyond what is only ‘in
us,’ beyond being in itself and being for us, a third dimension seems to open up,
wherein their discordance is effaced.” (VI 29)
How does all of this square with Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of a silent Logos of
the world? That is, he declares in many places variations of this thought: “There is a
Logos of the natural aesthetic world, on which the Logos of language relies.” (N
212)404 What is key to see is that Merleau‐Ponty does not want to deny intelligibility
to the ground or “mainspring,” he simply wants to deny that it is completely
isomorphic, as it were, with human understanding. In this way it is akin to the
being‐in‐itself‐and‐for‐itself Merleau‐Ponty spoke of before. Already in “In Praise of
Philosophy,” Merleau‐Ponty observes that “man contains in silence all the paradoxes
of philosophy.”405 That is, humanity’s own being has a dialectical logic that can be
expressed in words, but only obliquely. Merleau‐Ponty’s understanding of the
tightly wound unity of contraries in Being actually, in his eyes, serves to preserve as
opposed to wound the intelligibility of Being. Thus he remarks (VI 268) that Ideas II
tries wrongly to disentangle knots, since disentanglement destroys intelligibility!
Cartesian dualism, for instance, has increased “intelligibility” of parts at the expense
of making entirely unintelligible the whole—that is, the whole being that is alive,
embodied, thinking, and sensing. Hyper‐reflection restores the “sense” of this whole,

See also VI, 145: “mind or thought” is “sublimation of the flesh.”
Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1988 (pp. 63‐4)

404
405
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even though, at the same time, this is a “sense” that eludes the logic of non‐
contradiction.
Merleau‐Ponty’s thought on reflection and the paradoxical perceptual faith
precedent to it has matured since PP, though subtly. Notice what he says in the
earlier text about the issue:

“It will perhaps be maintained that a philosophy cannot be centered around a contradiction, and that
all our descriptions, since they ultimately defy thought, are quite meaningless. The objection would
be valid if we were content to lay bare… a layer of prelogical or magical experiences. For in that case
we would have to choose between believing the descriptions and abandoning thought, or knowing
what we are talking about and abandoning our descriptions. … [Thus] we must return to the cogito,
in search of a more fundamental Logos than that of objective thought…” (PP 425)

In a slight but important contrast to these statements, the Merleau‐Ponty of the VI is
more comfortable living in the absence of another, deeper, non‐objective “Logos.”
This is not to say there is no such logos, or that “wild Being” lacks meaning in its
wildness (we have already seen that Nature for Merleau‐Ponty autoproduces its
own meaning), only that the distance between its meaning and the “meanings” of the
ideal, reflective order is in a certain sense unbridgeable, and that herein lies the
ultimate paradox of reflection: that while there is a meaning without thought, just as
there is transcendence without immanence—these truths can only be appreciated
through thought, immanently. Consciousness is bonded to its unconscious origin;
we are privileged to know the depths of our ignorance.
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V. MerleauPonty’s Paradoxical Thinking In Relation to Other Styles of
Thinking: Dialectic, Skepticism/Quietism, and Mysticism

A. MerleauPonty and Hegelian Dialectic
Merleau‐Ponty’s understanding of “paradox” and “philosophy” alike is deeply
informed by his reading and response to the “dialectical” philosophy of Hegel. Hugh
Silverman explains the precise sense in which Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy is a
“dialectic”:

“[Merleau‐Ponty] very much sees himself as part of a historical succession in which the discovery of
subjectivity and the discovery of history turn into a dialectic of existence and dialectic. But…his
dialectic is not of a Hegelian sort. His dialectic is such that he finds the philosopher encountering
what is already there; his dialectic is one of experience and philosophy becoming that experience,
philosophy interrogating what is and finding itself there in what is interrogated. His dialectic is more
of a tension between existence and dialectic, an ambiguity between the two.”406

The notion of a dialectic which includes dialectic as one of the terms of the dialectic
itself is characteristic of the sort of reflexively self‐critical endeavor Merleau‐Ponty
launches in especially his later period. Unlike Hegelian dialectic, Merleau‐Pontian
dialectic has no “goal” other than its own movement, which is not haphazard but
purposefully self‐inverting—but one cannot even say this much, it turns out,
without affixing an essence to what eludes essential description:

Silverman, Hugh. “Is Merleau‐Ponty Inside or Outside the History of Philosophy?” In Chiasms:
MerleauPonty’s Notion of Flesh. Eds. Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor. State University of New York
Press. Albany: 2000 (p. 138)
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“[The dialectic is] Selfmanifestation, disclosure, in the process of forming itself. … The dialectic is
indeed all this, and it is, in this sense, what we are looking for. If nonetheless we have not hitherto
said so, it is because, in [the] history of philosophy, it has never been all that unadulteratedly; it is
because the dialectic is unstable (in the sense that the chemists give to the word), it is even
essentially and by definition unstable, so that it has never been able to formulate itself into theses
without denaturing itself, and because if one wishes to maintain its spirit it is perhaps necessary to
not even name it.” (VI 92)

Merleau‐Ponty formally endorses the method of dialectic in chapter 2 of VI, entitled,
“Reflection and Interrogation.” (VI 89) (The chapter itself is a sustained response to
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness.) Merleau‐Ponty goes on to give a detailed account of
what he means by the “instability” (quoted above) of dialectic, its nature of
subverting, mediating, and transforming, not for the sake of resting in one finalized
thesis, but for the sake of expressing the inner nature of Being itself. Here more than
anywhere else, Merleau‐Ponty’s adoption of a certain radical Heracliteanism, one
that breaks away from both Platonic and Husserlian containers (which oppose an
existential Heraclitean flux to an ideal Parmenidean order, so to speak) becomes
clear. Indeed, he all but says so himself by approvingly pointing out that Heraclitus
already showed the way, “opposite directions coinciding in the circular movement.”
(VI 92)
As we examined before, Merleau‐Ponty’s thought embraces a paradigm of
opposition that he calls “complementarity”; it is a dialectic that refuses, we might
now say, to remain “static” by cresting into any form of synthesis of horizons. It is in
this spirit that I read Merleau‐Ponty’s remarkable intertwining of his critique of
Sartrean ontology and his own burgeoning dialectical method:

“Has not our discussion consisted in showing that the relationship between the two terms [Being and
Nothingness] (whether one takes them in a relative sense, within the world, or in an absolute sense,
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of the index of the thinker and what he thinks) covers a swarm of relations with double meaning,
incompatible and yet necessary to one another (complementarity, as the physicists say today), and that
this complex totality is the truth of the abstract dichotomy from which we started?” (VI 92, my
emphasis)

We already saw in the previous chapter examples of Merleau‐Ponty’s
suspicion of the Hegelian form of dialectic, albeit indirectly, with regard specifically
to his approval of Schelling’s effort to break away from Hegelianism. In this respect
Merleau‐Ponty revealingly ruminates:

“Position, negation, negation of the negation: this side, the other, the other than the other. What do I
bring to the problem of the same and the other? This: that the same be the other than the other, and
identity difference of difference‐‐‐‐this 1) does not realize a surpassing, a dialectic in the Hegelian
sense; 2) is realized on the spot, by encroachment, thickness, spatiality‐‐‐‐“407 (VI 264)

What is most of note for us here in his self‐comparison with Hegelian dialectic and
his rejection of an ultimate teleology, a “surpassing.”408 Merleau‐Ponty is careful to
identify what he calls a “trap in the dialectic” and the “bad dialectic” (VI 94) that
ensues, ironically echoing Hegel’s own terminological style (“bad infinity,” etc.). As
against these, Merleau‐Ponty, characteristically advances a new form of thinking
called “hyperdialectic”:

“What we call hyperdialectic is a thought…that is capable of reaching truth because it envisages
without restriction the plurality of the relationships and what has been called ambiguity. The bad
Compare, also in an obvious reference to Hegel: “Against the doctrine of contradiction, absolute
negation, the either/orTranscendence is identity within difference.” (VI 225)
408 In other respects, of course, many of Merleau‐Ponty’s dialectical observations mirror Hegel’s
method strongly, including the Hegelian principle of the convergence of opposites at their extremes
(most famously, the convergence of “Being” and “Non‐Being” in “Becoming”). Thus in the Nature
lectures, for example, we can see the way he shows how the effort to preserve determinism in
physics ends up going ironically towards the occult (N 92), or again how science moves towards
idealism in the name of realism (N 91). In another place he observes that possibility and necessity
are closely aligned, since necessity is just one of many possibilities. (N 88) Similarly, rigorous theism
threatens to become pantheism (since God is the same as Being itself), and so on and so forth.
407
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dialectic is that which thinks it recomposes being by a thetic thought, by an assemblage of
statements, by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; the good dialectic is that which is conscious of the
fact that every thesis is an idealization, that Being is not made up of idealizations or of things said, as
the old logic believed, but of bound wholes where signification never is except in tendency…” (VI 94)

Merleau‐Ponty’s critique of Hegel thus lies in the latter’s not being thorough enough
or authentic in thinking dialectically. Thus “the only good dialectic is hyperdialectic.”
(VI 94) Hyperdialectic, the “good” dialectic, is called this because it criticizes and
sees beyond itself. Merleau‐Ponty emphasizes “process” and processuality again and
again. Merleau‐Ponty’s “good” dialecticity is thus a movement of thought and the
manner in which thought must pursue the whole without pretending to have a grasp
of it unilaterally:

“The point to be noticed is this: that the dialectic without synthesis of which we speak is not
therefore scepticism, vulgar relativism, or the reign of the ineffable. What we reject or deny is not the
idea of a surpassing that reassembles, it is the idea that it results in a new positive, a new position. …
What we seek is a dialectical definition of being that can be neither the being for itself nor the being
in itself—rapid, fragile, labile definitions…” (VI 95)

B. MerleauPonty and Skepticism/Quietism
Merleau‐Ponty’s views on philosophy, reflection, and dialectic raise
important questions about the extent to which Merleau‐Ponty has effectively “given
up” on philosophy as normally understood, at least as a knowledge‐acquiring
enterprise for example, and whether his interpretation of phenomenology, which
begins in perceptual faith and ends in the recognition of its own futile attempts to
reproduce this faith in linguistic‐conceptual terms, is quietistic. This is not the case if
by “quietism” we mean the position that nothing can be accurately said of being or
the truth. It is true that Merleau‐Ponty believes that “…the ‘object’ of philosophy will
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never come to fill in the philosophical question, since this obturation would take
from it the depth and the distance that are essential to it.” (VI 101) But we can and
do speak about this situation—perhaps a clue as to the mystery of the
“intelligibility” of a Nature that makes itself unknown to the programs of
intelligibility imposed upon it eidetically by “grasping” thought.
Related to the “quietism” charge is that of “skepticism.” Merleau‐Ponty
himself has to worry about skepticism, of course, because he has opened himself to
the criticism of his position that argues that it (Merleau‐Ponty’s stance on
philosophy) effectively amounts to a version of skepticism. The kind of skepticism,
namely, that throws its hands up and declaring that philosophy resolves merely to
“unresolvable paradoxes.” One might call this “Carneadean skepticism,” after the
famous Academic who would lecture one day for a position, the next day against it,
demonstrating the futility of philosophizing (under one standard interpretation) in
the first place. This kind of skepticism eventually developed into the canonical
Pyrrhonian view of the unresolvability of “equipollent” views in philosophical
disputes, a view that resembles Merleau‐Ponty’s up until one realizes that Merleau‐
Ponty goes further than the skeptic by affirming a certain equipollence in the truth
itself. In other words, Merleau‐Ponty makes a metaphysical claim—supporting
himself on the wings of a pre‐reflective faith—about Nature, though admittedly
without the “dogmatic” support of, say, an “infallible” first premise. Merleau‐Ponty’s
“metaphysics” is still, in this regard, “post‐metaphysical.”
Strict Pyrrhonism aside, the fact is that while Merleau‐Ponty is vigorously
anti‐dogmatical, even to the point of embracing an infinite dialectics, he is certainly
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not skeptical insofar as “skepticism” is a negativistic approach to philosophical
problems that denies only what it can first identify as meaningful in the first place.
The skeptic in this sense is, in Sartre’s terms, in “bad faith,” playing (now in
Wittgenstein’s language) the language‐game of philosophy in order to undermine
philosophy. Thus Merleau‐Ponty explicitly opposes skepticism for negating or
calling into the question the existence of the world (and of truth) to perceptual faith
as the effortless pre‐reflective confidence in the world that even the skeptic
presupposes. (VI 95) Indeed, Merleau‐Ponty concerns himself with refuting (or
defusing) skepticism from the beginning of the VI.409 Later he questions at least
Cartesian skepticism for tacitly presupposing the “positivity of the psychic.” (VI 95)
One might call this a classically “phenomenological” critique of the “psychologistic”
assumptions of the skeptic, who must implicitly advance a metaphysics of solipsistic
idealism to ground his/her points.
Merleau‐Ponty’s attitude towards philosophy is not dismissive but rather,
one might say, both celebratory and ironic. He understands philosophy to be at first
a kind of effort to replace perceptual faith with a web of statements and concepts,
with an ideal order, whereas there is never really any question of replacing the
world—and philosophy itself can determine this, too. The world is something
experienced, while philosophy is to capture moments of this experientiality, this
primordial contact with truth, in part but not in whole. That which unites us to the
world—intentionality is one name for it—is that which separates us from it as well.

409

See VI 4, 6; 95
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And language, which we ask to dispel the mystery of being, is just as much part of
this mystery, an expression thereof:

“Far from harboring the secret of the being of the world, language is itself a world, itself a being—a
world and a being to the second power, since it does not speak in a vacuum, since it speaks of being
and of the world and therefore redoubles their enigma instead of dissipating it.” (VI 95)

In the end, however, it cannot be denied that there is a certain kinship
between radical Pyrrhonian skepticism and Merleau‐Ponty’s procedure—especially
in the spirit of openness preached famously by the original Pyrrhonists, from whom
the term “skepticism” (literally “searching”) derives. The link, as explained by
Merleau‐Ponty himself, is summed up thusly: “If [skepticism] multiplies contrasts
and contradictions, it is because truth demands it.” And thus Montaigne, a skeptic
who Merleau‐Ponty admires, as we have already seen, “begins by teaching that all
truth contradicts itself; perhaps he ends up recognizing that contradiction is truth.”
(Montaigne 198, my emphasis)

C. MerleauPonty and Mysticism
Is Merleau‐Ponty a mystic? Is there a religious dimension to this thought?
There is certainly a meditative, almost prayer‐like quality of Merleau‐Ponty’s later
discourse, not to mention respect for the ineffable unity of being, a staple idea of
mysticism across cultures, from Taoism to the Neoplatonically‐tinged mysticism of
the “Abrahamic” religions. Merleau‐Ponty’s rejection of contraries (neither
intellectualism nor empiricism, neither realism nor idealism, etc.) resembles the
method of “negative theology” and the “neti, neti” (“not this, not that”) methodology
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of the Upanishads, while his embrace of an identity‐of‐opposites crosses the final
barrier of classical logic (in Neoplatonism, logismos as opposed to Nous) that stands
in the way of a philosophical expression (which must also occlude or “obturate”)
what one might call the “One.”
Merleau‐Ponty’s lack of spiritualistic references, however—at least
compared to his interest in art, literature, politics, psychology, and the sciences—
betray a deeply secular mind. At the same time, even here there lies a paradox. For
Merleau‐Ponty states in one place: “For me, philosophy consists in giving another
name to what has long been crystallized under the name of God.”410 The ambiguity
of the statement speaks eloquently for itself: Merleau‐Ponty’s “philosophy” is pure
religion—in a manner religion itself does not think. In this spirit, I am tempted to
call Merleau‐Ponty a “methodological mystic,” or a thinker with tendencies towards,
but no real ties to, a philosophical mysticism, perhaps like Heidegger and
Wittgenstein in the last century, but unlike, say, Simone Weil, Emmanuel Levinas, or
Muhummad Iqbal.
Of course, there is no shortage of religious imagery, intended as such or not,
in Merleau‐Ponty’s writings. We have already seen his reference to “miracles,” for
example the “miracle of the sense organ,” “the miracle of totality,” etc. There are
other such references as well, almost to the point of invoking a “celebratory”
attitude towards existence akin to Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo‐Dionysius the

Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The MerleauPonty Reader. Lawlor, Leonard and Ted Toadvine, eds.
Northwestern University Press, 2007 (p. 240)
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Areopagite.411 It also cannot be ignored that his metaphysics of “flesh” has a clear
symbolic connection to the “flesh” of Christ, the man (visible) who, moreover,
was/is God (invisible). Or again, there are the invocation of perceptual faith, the
ultimate mystery of the world and being (PP xxiii), “pre‐established harmony,” grace
and the “gift” of vision, and finally, to more indirect and esoteric references, such as
the repeated use of “depth” to describe the absolute—a classically gnostic
(Valentinian) description of the divine, according to Elaine Pagels.412
But I think that Gary Madison goes too far when he claims we can only
appreciate Merleau‐Ponty in a Christian context.413 It is true that his attitude seems
ultimately to be one of gratitude, humility, and wonder before Being. But this is also
true of plenty of secular philosophers, not to mention mystics from other religions.
Also, there is a way in which Madison’s claim might also be too weak, in addition to
being too strong. For virtually any philosopher writing in the Christian West—even
an atheist like Sartre—can be said to be indelibly marked by the dialectics of
Christianity. By itself this illumines very little.
There are certainly those besides the present author who have identified a
distinct affinity between Merleau‐Pontian phenomenology and certain mystical
schools; a case in point is New York University Hebrew Studies professor Elliot R.
Wolfson, who uses Merleau‐Ponty’s thought to illumine the Kabbalah. Comments
Wolfson in the “Prologue” to his monumental work Language, Eros, Being:
For example, the “miracle” of the many‐and‐the‐one—in reference to painting and biology. (N
154) The most relevant Pseudo‐Dionysian text is probably The Celestial Hierarchy. (General Books
LLC, 2009)
412 Pagels, Elaine. The Gnostic Gospels. New York: Random House, 1979 (p. 32)
413 Madison, Gary. The Phenomenology of MerleauPonty: The Search for the Limits of Consciousness.
Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981 (p. 222‐5)
411
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“I shall labor…more on the pathways of Merleau‐Ponty’s thinking, as in his thought I find an affinity
with the understanding I have derived from the study of kabbalistic literature and consequently feel
it is legitimate to use his jargon to formulate hermeneutical and phenomenological suppositions in
reading these sources.”414

In another place he notes, “Sensible beings, or what we perceive to be such, are [for
Merleau‐Ponty] ‘radiations of verbal essences’—a notion that resonates with a
central imaginal modality of Jewish esotericism…” (xxiii) Wolfson astutely observes,
moreover, that for Merleau‐Ponty’s ontological phenomenology, as for Jewish
mysticism, there is a central dialectic of revealing and concealing, which in the latter
stems from the essential nature of the “effably ineffable” godhead, Ein Sof, and in the
former expresses itself in terms of the attempt of philosophy to grasp the paradox of
perceptual faith/the lifeworld:

“In the reconquest of the lifeworld, we thus discern a mutuality of ostensibly conflicting impulses: the
urge to uncover, on the one hand, and the discovery that every uncovering is a covering over, on the
other. As it happens, in English, the word ‘recover’ uncovers the paradox, for it means both ‘to
expose’ and ‘to conceal.’”415 (xxiii)

The question of Merleau‐Ponty and his “methodological mysticism” has much
to do with a question of attitude and affect. Merleau‐Ponty is as enthralled by a kind
of numinosity of nature, the hidden‐and‐revealed source of being and the miracles
of creativity and totality, just as surely as the Sufi mystic is fixated on the majesty
and mystery of the one ineffable God. There is in Merleau‐Ponty a wonder at the

Wolfson, Elliott R. Language, Eros, Being: Kabbalistic Hermeneutics and Poetic Imagination. New
York: Fordham University Press, 2005 (p. xxi) Wolfson’s massive volume was the winner of the
National Jewish Book Award by the Jewish Book Council.
415 See also: Wolfson elsewhere comments on Merleau‐Ponty’s “mystical tone” in various cited
passages. (xxvi)
414
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“miracle” of experience, as if it were a wonderfully (though imperfectly) coordinated
dance, involving great success and even “knowledge” of a kind that nevertheless
cannot be explained in terms of reflection alone. Merleau‐Ponty recognizes the way
in which human beings (and subjectivity) are essentially “of” the same stuff (the
“flesh”) as the world, or “Nature,” and that therein lies a clue to the fundamental
compatibility and even oneness of self and world. But there is also a radical break, a
‘dehiscence,’ or separation, which somehow, in a paradoxical manner, makes this
relationship possible. That is, there is not merely oneness, but a multiplicity
constituting oneness—thus there is wholeness, the ultimate theme of all philosophy.

VI. Conclusion

In his article, “Phenomenology and Hyper‐Reflection,” Ted Toadvine nicely
summarizes his own (and to a large extent mine as well) approach to Merleau‐
Ponty’s later writings:

“Despite his ongoing critical examinations, Merleau‐Ponty presents phenomenology in a positive
light throughout his later writings… This is not to deny that Merleau‐Ponty recognizes, and
increasingly accentuates, certain paradoxical tensions of the phenomenological method. But these
tensions inevitably point us back to the contradictory intertwining of immanence and transcendence
that is the perceived world.”416

Toadvine, Ted. “Phenomenology and Hyper‐Reflection.” In MerleauPonty: Key Concepts. Eds.
Rosalyn Diprose and Jack Reynolds. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008 (pp. 28‐9)
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For Merleau‐Ponty, philosophy is not a matter of “solving” a problem, but of
understanding the problem as its own truth. (This is different, of course, than
understanding truth as a problem, perhaps a more characteristic posture for radical
“postmodernism” than the “perceptually pious” Merleau‐Ponty.) When Merleau‐
Ponty states a problem, it is stated very much as something to be further deepened,
to be explored (the “absolute is depth”), etc. Towards addressing an issue in biology,
for example, he says approvingly, as if hungering to learn from the lesson of another
discipline: “Let’s say first that the expressions employed by the new school of
biology are not solutions: the notions of field and gradient are the index of a problem,
not responses.” (N 151, my emphasis) Contrary to Behnke, I don’t believe Merleau‐
Ponty abandoned “description” for “explanation”417; on the contrary, he shows why
a proper description, attentive to the paradoxical nuances of the truth made
available to us, makes (ultimate) explanations moot. Explanation is the goal, one
might say, of reflection; hyper‐reflection, by contrast, comes back to description by
way of self‐description or a radical, uncompromising embrace of the finitude of
reflection itself.
It also may seem that Merleau‐Ponty is more radical and subversive than
Husserl (for example, by “throwing out” the universalistic or trans‐historical
pretensions of philosophy once and for all), but this, as we have seen, can be turned
around. Husserl’s intentions are, in the end, revolutionary and “subversive” in a way
that Merleau‐Ponty’s are not. For Husserl seeks a “radical reshaping of our whole

Behnke, Elizabeth. “Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontological Reading of Constitution in Phénoménologie de la
perception.” In MerleauPonty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree. Dodrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 (p. 49)
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way of looking at the world” (Crisis 175), while Merleau‐Ponty instructs us simply to
“relearn to look at the world.”418 Perhaps Merleau‐Ponty is the more conversative of
the two thinkers after all.

418

More precisely: “True philosophy consists in relearning to look at the world.” (PP xxiii)
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Conclusion

We have now reached the end of our investigations. In this concluding
section I will offer some wider reflections on both some of the systematic
philosophical lessons to be learned from the Husserl‐Merleau‐Ponty encounter.

I. MerleauPonty visàvis Husserl
In this dissertation we have seen how Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty
understand and apply the phenomenological method and how they interpret its
results. In particular, we have seen how Merleau‐Ponty reconsiders and modifies
the basic Husserlian program—while somehow, I have argued, remaining true to
fundamental aspects of it. He remains “true” to Husserl at least in the sense of
embracing the Husserlian centralization of living consciousness and the
phenomenological reduction that brings this consciousness and its world‐relation to
active awareness (reflection).
Although we did not examine Husserl’s so‐called “later period” in much
detail, we did review Ideas II, which, through the notions of the “personalistic
attitude” and the Umwelt, already contains much of the core of the life‐world
philosophy that was to later emerge. Throughout his writings Husserl displays an
ambivalence, as Merleau‐Ponty points out, regarding the natural attitude in
particular: is it left behind, somehow, in the transcendental reduction, or is it merely
illumined therein? Do we come through the reduction to know ourselves as
“natural” consciousnesses more fully, or do we realize ourselves as self‐split
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between higher and lower levels, the latter of which is subsumed in the more
comprehensive (because intersubjective and oriented towards the universal)
former? I have argued that we would be remiss to understand Husserl as an entirely
consistent thinker with a predetermined agenda; on the other hand, one cannot
ignore his persistently rationalistic orientation and preference, if you will, for the
realm of “ideas.”
It is too easy, however, to assign Merleau‐Ponty the labels of “anti‐
essentialist,” “anti‐rationalist,” etc. Rather, Merleau‐Ponty sees the same thing, as it
were, that Husserl does; he knows the world to be a phenomenal field or milieu, not
an impermeable Object separable from its manners of “givenness,” and he knows
consciousness to be intertwined with the world through its body and its intuitive
grasp of the world’s (inexactly) eidetic structure. But Merleau‐Ponty also, critically,
sees the matrix of being‐and‐consciousness (or, simply, “Being,” the ontological
“totality”) to be, in a certain sense, ineffable. As a whole, Being cannot be properly
thought—a Kantian point from the latter’s “Transcendental Dialectic”—but neither
does “reason” have “autonomy” such that it may tame the forms of experience into
an idealistic template of determinacy. And the “whole” is not a regulative idea, such
that a divorce between theory and practice becomes the only way to accommodate
it. Rather, thought is part of the whole, it is part of “nature,” even if it is that part that
has the meaning of what is apart and “contrary” to nature—a contrariness endemic
to nature itself.
This kind of territory obviously lends itself to comparisons with Hegelian
dialectic, with which it is not unrelated even for Merleau‐Ponty. Hegel, famously,
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understands the spirit to know itself through its identification with a “higher form”
of nature, namely the cultural world and the domains of art, religion, and
philosophy. As I read him, Merleau‐Ponty, by contrast, understands what Hegel
means by “self‐knowing spirit” to be itself a form of alienation from its own nature,
though at the same time a necessary one that holds nature and spirit alike in a
tension that stems from an originary “unity of opposites,” which can no longer be
thought except paradoxically, and which leaves its legacy of lasting ambiguity in the
human experience.
Thus for Merleau‐Ponty, Nature is neither the object of thought nor a subject,
nor even their coincidence in a higher synthesis, but rather the paradoxical “depth”
(“the absolute”) and “otherness” (which is nonetheless paradoxically inclusive) of
the human spirit. By itself this is not a Husserlian view, but it is the culmination of a
systematic meditation Merleau‐Ponty refers to from very early on as the
“phenomenology of phenomenology”—a reaching of the limits of what is thinkable
in subjective or constitutional terms, limits which reveal the dependence of spirit on
a pre‐reflective nature which is also, at the same time, precisely not amenable to
theoreticization along the lines of a scientific “naturalism.” In this way, Merleau‐
Ponty’s philosophy preserves the sense of consciousness revealed in the
“transcendental” attitude and through the transcendental epoché and reduction, but
without going so far as to allowing thought to “take possession of the world.” The
transcendental attitude becomes subsumed in the paradox of nature—in a
wholeness or totality, that is, which can only be thought as an “unthinkable.”
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All of this exposes a signficant fault line between Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty.
For Husserl seems to broadly accept the scientific‐physicalistic definition of nature,
adding only that its sense as “physical nature” is derived from transcendental
subjectivity. But this will not do for Merleau‐Ponty. Nature cannot be limited to such
a sense, because it cannot be fully grasped in the first place. As the condition for the
possibility of consciousness, it is necessarily beyond it. At the same time, the
transcendental attitude—taken to the extreme of hyper‐reflection, which then
problematizes the scope of the transcendental attitude itself—is able to understand
this “beyond” as the hidden depths of its own self, the “soil of subjectivity.” Due to
this intertwining between the two—this is Merleau‐Ponty’s “speculative” move, if
you will—subject and nature (note: not “object”) are not simply mutually alienated
“substances,” but rather members of an identity relation that is nevertheless, at its
core, self‐splitting (dehiscence, the paradox of the “other,” etc.). Comparisons to
what Heidegger comes to call “sameness without difference” or “belonging‐
together” are probably apt here.
It is clear that Merleau‐Ponty is in a kind of struggle only or primarily with
the “transcendental idealist” Husserl of the middle period (and of the later period, to
the extent that this “Husserl” remains). We can only properly assess Merleau‐
Ponty’s philosophy once we accept the premise of there being certain “self‐
contradictions” within Husserl’s thought itself. Phenomenology becomes in
Merleau‐Ponty’s hands a meditation on the paradoxes of human existence and
incarnation left bare by Husserl’s analysis. Colloquially speaking, one might say in
this sense that Merleau‐Ponty “pitches his tent” in Husserl’s “backyard.”
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Thus this dissertation is about a critique, but it is a strangely “internal” one.
Merleau‐Ponty operates within a framework largely (though not wholly) defined by
phenomenology. He should be seen, I think, as someone who quietly but decisively
reforms phenomenology and brings it into a sphere of interactive relevance with the
sciences and with other realms of culture—history, politics, art, religion—by
softening the dichotomies that Husserl rigidly puts into place.

II. MerleauPonty and Some Other Philosophers
For Merleau‐Ponty, philosophy—as phenomenology—is an exercise in
dialectics. Not positive or negative dialectics, so to speak, but the dialectics of self‐
meditation. Like Montaigne, Merleau‐Ponty finds an infinity in himself. He is
fascinated by “experience” and its open‐endedness. He finds this same
wondrousness in Husserl’s writings, but he also identifies rationalist, Cartesian
presuppositions there that dictate a certain result. In contrast, Merleau‐Ponty’s
dialectic is not a movement “towards” anything. Experience neither begins nor ends
in thought, but outside of it. Thus philosophy is a matter simply of overcoming its
need, as it were, to overcome experience—it is a matter of finding its home not in
itself (this is the Hegelian solution, the “satisfaction” of consciousness) but in the
quest for itself, which necessarily does not end in itself (as a consciousness).
This is not Kant: for while Kant, too, places a limit on reason, he limits
experience itself to an artificially controlled domain, a discursive fiction. In Merleau‐
Ponty, humanity is plunged into a sea of unknowing, so to speak, on the raft of
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perceptual faith. There are no epistemic guarantees, not even of a “transcendental”
kind.
Merleau‐Ponty’s embrace of the Heideggerian “being‐in‐the‐world” in the
“Preface” of the Phenomenology of Perception is well‐known, but Merleau‐Ponty’s
conception of nature and spirit departs from Heidegger’s in a significant way. For
whereas Heidegger privileges “Being” over “beings,” suggesting a radical break
between them that is constantly covered over by “metaphysics,” Merleau‐Ponty
does not understand “Being” to be anything other than the interplay of nature and
spirit, or exteriority and interiority, in a carnal field he famously terms the “flesh,”
and which he also identifies with “nature” in an expanded, holistic sense. In this way,
Merleau‐Ponty is closer to Hegel, but again with a critical difference. For Merleau‐
Ponty rejects the idea that nature (and hence the self, since we are “of” nature) can
be fully known, since it is necessarily unknown to itself. In this regard Merleau‐
Ponty calls on Schelling’s notion of the Abgrund or “abyss within God” that is the
“savage principle” of nature. Merleau‐Ponty is less interested in the theological or
moral implications of this than the epistemological and ontological ones: nature is a
“wild being” that cannot be known by spirit even though spirit is of it.
In this way, Merleau‐Ponty becomes interested in the Freudian concept of an
“unconscious,” in that he saw a structural parallel between nature (or the body) as
the “unconscious” of spirit and the internal structure of the psyche, an interplay of
conscious and unconscious dimensions.
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III. The “Personalistic Attitude” and the Limits of Reflection
We have spent a good deal of time examining Merleau‐Ponty’s reformulation
of phenomenology in terms of the interplay of perception, reflection, and what I
have called a third and new type of attitude, “hyper‐reflection.” Hyper‐reflection is a
kind of “meta‐attitude,” an attitude in which the natural and reflective attitudes take
their respective positions.
Husserl’s recognition of the untenability of the sharpness of the natural/
transcendental divide is reflected in his notion of the “personalistic attitude.” Of
course, here, the “natural attitude” comes perilously close to merging with the
“transcendental”; some of Husserl’s descriptions of “spirit” smack of a similar or
identical “absolutism” and “ontological privilege.” Merleau‐Ponty is fundamentally
right to identify a central tension in Husserl’s philosophy between an understanding
of the “natural attitude” as one that is opposed and superseded in the
phenomenological reduction, on the one hand, and a “natural attitude” that is sub‐
divided, in itself, between lower and higher poles (as I have mentioned above). But
Husserl’s “poles”—the naturalistic and the personalistic—are not what Merleau‐
Ponty would have in mind. After all, the “naturalistic” attitude is not truly natural at
all. It is precisely unnatural, the purely theoretical lens of the scientist. Unlike the
transcendental or phenomenological or reflective stand‐point, it does not seek to
understand the world as existentially known, much less to understand the natural
attitude itself. It does not thematize natural experience or being, it simply restricts
the field of experience to a certain set of eidē that frame the results of experiments
performed in the world. Another way to put it is that there is no true, separable
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“scientific attitude.” This is what Merleau‐Ponty means when he suggests in the
Nature lectures that science (by which he refers to scientific praxis and not theory)
is continuous simply with “experience.” Clearly, it is the “personalistic attitude” that
is the truer, deeper form of the everyday natural life of living subjects—of human
subjects, though of course even animals possess Umwelten.
But we saw that with his description of it, Husserl makes of the personalistic
attitude a kind of basis for a subjective idealism. How can Merleau‐Ponty avoid this
result? He can do so precisely by limiting the scope of reflection, by assigning
reflectivity or the “thinking attitude” to an eidetic matrix, itself historically
conditioned, an attitude which at its outer limits of reflexivity opens up into an
interrogation into its origins. Nature, as the ultimate source of meaning and being
(as opposed to “transcendental subjectivity,” either individual or intersubjective), is
not coincident with the ego cogito. It appears in various guises as the hidden “other”
that is also the hidden “self,” the unknowable depth that is simultaneously
inescapably transcendent, and other such paradoxes that result from the attempt of
reflection to think the unthinkable. It is known through acts of creativity, through
the pulse of life and willed motion, and through the principle of “totality” which
eludes ratiocinative analysis and yet must be understood as being at the basis of the
significance of language, behavior, art, politics, and even sexuality.

IV. Phenomenology as Paradox
With bodily subjectivity, Merleau‐Ponty supplements the first paradox of
phenomenology, that of “immanent transcendency” (or, the principle of the world’s
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having to be within us just in order to be without us) with its flip‐side, namely the
principle that for there to be a “within” at all, this “within” must first be “without,”
spread out in the world, so to speak.
Of course both formulations are incomplete and even, technically,
misleadingly dualistic in their own right. But this is why Merleau‐Ponty’s later
reflections concentrate precisely on the mystery of the unsayability of this union—
which, as Heraclitus had maintained of all contraries, is “one” because of difference
rather than in spite of it—and its relation to thought, which must contradict itself,
finally, to recreate a sense of the unity, so to speak, “after the fact.”

V. Naturalism
Merleau‐Ponty, unlike Husserl or Kant, does not oppose a timeless realm (or
sphere of consciousness) to a temporal one. So there is also a move in him towards
naturalization and immanentism, though not in the “naturalistic” sense of those who
would circumscribe consciousness within an unconscious “reality.” Merleau‐Ponty’s
“naturalism” defies both realist and idealist interpretations of the term. Merleau‐
Ponty’s naturalism is phenomenological; he cannot be safely appropriated by
modern “cognitive scientists” and the like. This is a question of starting‐point;
modern naturalism starts later than it thinks it does. It obscures the origin by
theorizing it, indeed by privileging theory over experience. For what does
experience tell us about a “nature” or “world” that has no share in the “mind” or
“soul,” which is after all doing the experiencing?
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Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty, while having very different approaches, are both
respectful of the complexity facing any theory of nature in which human subjectivity
is taken seriously as non‐reducible to scientific‐naturalistic causality, while at the
same time involved in the thick of perceptual experience (as opposed to being
directed to an ethereal Platonic realm of Ideas). Husserl, however, believed that the
way to overcome scientific naturalism was to swallow it whole, as it were, in the
gulp of transcendental subjectivity. Merleau‐Ponty’s approach is rather to question
both naturalism and transcendental philosophy at once as victims of false
absolutization and avoidance of the fundamental paradoxes of human existence.
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